Reflections on the Concept of Truth: articulation of Thomas Aquinas' adequatio and Hegel's absolute Knowing

Abstract

This article examines the Thomistic definition of truth as adaequatio rei et intellectus and the status of truth in God, comparing it with the Hegelian conception of truth as a process that culminates in absolute Knowing. It also tests the hypothesis of a conceptual articulation between adaequatio and absolute Knowing, and indicates the limits and implications of this comparison. It is understood that by bringing two classical theoretical matrices into dialogue, the study illuminates the relationship between being and thinking and re-qualifies the contemporary problem of the intelligibility of the real, avoiding both static realism and strict constructivism; the importance of the comparison lies in shedding light on the tension between thought and reality, finite and infinite. To do this, the reference theoretical used as primary sources was De Veritate (q.1, a.1; a.7) and Phenomenology of Spirit (final chapter, §§798–808), with support from the Encyclopedia to address the absolute Spirit, articulated with commentators. Based on these, the work is divided into three parts: in the first part, we seek to understand truth in God as adequacy by identity; in the second part, we seek to understand the Hegelian absolute as self-knowledge of the Spirit; in the third part, a careful comparison is made, guided by a theological-metaphysical point of convergence (truth in God/absolute Spirit), evaluating compatibilities and asymmetries. In summary, the work argues for a qualified proximity between adaequatio and absolute Knowing without erasing structural divergences, proposing the unity of being and thinking anchored in the absolute as an interpretive key.