“O melhor dos mundos possíveis”:

os limites da teoria leibniziana

Abstract

This article examines the controversial Leibnizian thesis that we live in the best of all possible worlds, exploring its implications for the problem of evil and for the philosophy of religion. We begin with the recognition that the presence of evil constitutes one of the central challenges to the Christian theistic tradition, demanding responses capable of reconciling divine perfection with the reality of human suffering. Based on qualitative and bibliographical research, we analyze how Leibniz understands that this is the best of all possible worlds, as presented in the Essays on Theodicy (1710) and in related texts.. We show that, far from proposing a naïve optimism or one detached from human experience, Leibniz defends a highly structured and complex metaphysical system in which the creation of the best world follows from divine rationality, wisdom, and goodness, articulated through principles such as compossibility, sufficient reason, and the maximization of total perfection. By discussing the main criticisms directed at this thesis and Leibniz’s responses to them, the article seeks to contribute both to the historiographical debate surrounding theodicy and to the contemporary understanding of the problem of evil, offering an accessible interpretation of this essential dimension of Leibniz’s thought.

Keywords: God, possible worlds, evil , perfection , metaphysical optimism.