Explorando as Fronteiras da Superveniência: Uma defensa disjuntivista ao argumento da Causalidade

Ícaro Miguel Ibiapina Machado

Autori

Ícaro Miguel Ibiapina Machado UFSC

Parole chiave:

Disjuntivismo, Realismo Ingênuo, Argumento Causal, Superveniência Local, Michael Martin

Abstract

O objetivo deste estudo é fornecer uma defesa do Realismo Ingênuo/Disjuntivismo, apresentando uma nova resposta ao Argumento Causal de Michael Martin que resista à sua subconclusão de que as percepções instanciam a propriedade fundamental das alucinações. Para alcançar esse objetivo, conduzimos uma análise crítica da premissa do argumento, que sustenta que meros processos mentais são suficientes para a exemplificação das propriedades fundamentais das alucinações. Direcionamos nossos questionamentos às razões apresentadas por defensores do argumento, que se baseiam na conjunção de duas proposições. A primeira proposição, nosso foco no presente estudo, afirma que as experiências, em geral, são exclusivamente causadas por processos cerebrais. Essa razão é principalmente respaldada por regularidades observadas entre o cérebro e eventos mentais. No entanto, questionamos esse último passo com base na concepção de que ele implica uma conclusão inadequada a partir de dados empíricos. Em primeiro lugar, isso ocorre por desconsiderar possíveis hipóteses causais adicionais que, segundo o modelo de causação de propriedades determináveis, admitem padrões extras sobrepostos. Em segundo lugar, a razão ignora algumas observações fundamentais sobre subdeterminação empírica

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