Explorando as Fronteiras da Superveniência: Uma defensa disjuntivista ao argumento da Causalidade

Ícaro Miguel Ibiapina Machado

Authors

Ícaro Miguel Ibiapina Machado UFSC

Keywords:

Disjuntivismo, Realismo Ingênuo, Argumento Causal, Superveniência Local, Michael Martin

Abstract

The aim of this study is to provide a defense of Naive Realism/Disjunctivism, offering a new response to Michael Martin's Causal Argument that withstands its subconclusion that perceptions instantiate the fundamental property of hallucinations. To achieve this goal, we conduct a critical analysis of the argument's premise, which asserts that mere mental processes are sufficient for the instantiation of the fundamental properties of hallucinations. Our inquiries are directed at the reasons presented by proponents of the argument, which are based on the conjunction of two propositions. The first proposition states that experiences, in general, are exclusively caused by brain processes. The second proposition internal to the conjunction leading to the idea of the cerebral supervenience of hallucinations, and the object of the present study, is the conception that hallucinations are internal events, coupled with the notion that internal events are never non-causally determined. To contest this assertion, we present what we term the negative view of hallucinations, highlighting the idea that, from hallucinations, it is not possible to have "unsuccessful" demonstrative thoughts, with content different from counterparts in perceptual cases. However, it has been demonstrated that the causality of these thoughts, in cases of neurological correspondence, cannot be compatible with the restricted internality of hallucinations, at least considering the other propositions leading to the idea of supervenience.

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