"Disability" as a Philosophical Problem

Abstract

The renowned “History of Philosophy” is characterized as a set of reflections of a philosophical nature. It is carried out in different periods and territories. In each of these periods and territories, there is a profusion of concepts and categories whose fundamental premise is to address a specific theme or problem. This functions as the starting point of every act of philosophizing, an admiring astonishment thaumadizem (θαυμαδιζέμ) in the face of everything that is how it is. Is “disability”, the person with a disability, and their existence intended as a philosophical theme or problem? Would it be capable of awakening an admiring astonishment? thaumadizem. Would it be capable of initiating an act of philosophizing? Within the history of philosophy, very few pages are dedicated to dealing with “disabilities” and often intend to explain that disability constitutes a disarticulation of the standards of nature and culture. This article proposes to think about disability as a philosophical object, turning to the control machinery that constitutes the bodies of people with disabilities in a restrictive way. Determining what a person's body can or cannot do and where that body may or may not be. Thus, these machines build a preconceived, ableist understanding of what “disability” is.