Normatividade, Convenção e Anti-reducionismo na Epistemologia Naturalizada de Quine
Mots-clés :
(1) Empirismo, (2) Pragmatismo, (3) Holismo, (4) Conteúdo Empírico, (5) Esquema Conceitual ou Teoria, (6) Assimetria EpistemológicaRésumé
Procuro mostrar nesse artigo que a Epistemologia Naturalizada de Quine preserva uma dimensão convencional ou normativa. Sustento que o projeto epistemológico de Quine é basicamente explanatório, buscando oferecer um relato de como, a partir de escassas evidências empíricas, desenvolvemos as complexas, abstratas e sofisticadas teorias científicas contemporâneas. Ao invés de pretender desenvolver uma redução do conhecimento científico às evidências empíricas, ou, uma fundação da ciência imediatamente a partir dos estímulos sensoriais. Defendo que o cerne da epistemologia de Quine se baseia fundamentalmente na dualidade conteúdo empírico, de um lado, e esquema conceitual ou teoria ou linguagem, de outro lado, e no reconhecimento de uma assimetria epistemológica fundamental entre o escasso input sensorial e o torrencial output conceitual, teórico e linguístico. Reivindico que essa dualidade e assimetria constituem os elementos teóricos fundamentais que implicam na necessidade da normatividade epistemológica na epistemologia naturalizada.
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(c) Tous droits réservés Hippolyto Ricardo da Silva Ribeiro 2023
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