The mystical ethics of Plotinus’s: a brief examination about the presence of socratic intellectualism

Abstract

In Protagoras (352a - 353e) the validity of the position of assuming that when someone act badly their intend is consciously (gnosiologically) to do so is questioned. That leads to the reflection about akrasia, that is, incontinence or privation of self-control in the face of the impulses of desires, pleasures or of external influences in general. The hypothesis of ignorance (amathía) as an explanation instead of an instructive deliberation gives rise to a conception that is attributed to Socrates, i.e, that of his “intellectualism”. It is intended to discuss the limits of this intellectualist conception when applied to the discussion of akrasia. Thus, this work aims to do a brief examination of whether Plotinus assumed a posture similar to that of Socratic intellectualism in his philosophy. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to read the pertinent excerpts of the Enneads.