Propositions and Thisness: a presentist solution to the problem of propositions on the past
Keywords:
Presentismo. Constitutionality of Propositions on the Past. Thisness Ontology.Abstract
Presentism is the theory that everything that exists is present or, grossly speaking, only what exists is present. However, like any metaphysical theory, Presentism is not free from criticisms and objections of the most varied. The objection that has left the rest of the philosophers-and which will be the focus of this article- concerns the constitutionality of propositions about the past. What will be discussed here is a means of resolving this problem once presented in the article Thisnesses, Propositions, and Truth by the American philosopher, David Ingram. Ingram explores the thisness ontology and draws its resources from it as a means of solving the problem of the constitutionality of propositions about the past. From the source mentioned and the reading of some other authors it will be possible to reach the conclusions developed throughout this work.
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