On the [im]possibility of tolerance towards the intolerant

Abstract

How to use tolerance as a way of rationally overcoming subjective differences, avoiding exacerbated conflicts, but not allowing a relationship of subservience? In this article, we think on the paradigm of the necessity to tolerate the intolerant, both in individual and intersubjective terms, and in relational terms of individual-state. Thus, in the first section, we define the concept of tolerance, distinguishing it from ethics and respect, commonly regarded as interchangeable synonyms. We also address ways and limits of classifying patterns of actions that can be either relieved or rejected in the name of social tolerance. In the second section, we approach the paradox of tolerance proposed by Popper, arguing that it is no salutary to institutions to neglect intolerant — sometimes undemocratic — attitudes which, as we will show, with Rawls, might weaken the social contract. Finally, we elaborate few critiques regarding the limitations of Popper’s thesis and consider the way in whichcertain individual/social, clearly intolerant attitudes are accepted in certain social groups and the threat to the contemporary democratic institution.