O funcionalismo alético consegue contornar o conflito entre monismo e deflacionismo nas teorias da verdade?

Authors

  • Yuri Rodrigues Universidade Federal do Ceará - UFC

Keywords:

Theory of Truth. Monism. Substantivism. Deflationism. Allelic Functionalism.

Abstract

The problem that is addressed in this article is the scope problem of Theory of Truth. According to the received view, the scope problem consists in the fact that a theory of truth applies to a limited set of truth bearers. We think that the scope problem consists in the fact that a theory of truth assumes without foundation that only the applications of the concept of truth under its realm of explanation are genuine cases of truth. Our goal is to re-address the scope problem and indicate allelic functionalism to circumvent the problem.

Author Biography

Yuri Rodrigues, Universidade Federal do Ceará - UFC

Graduando-se em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC). Interesses atuais de pesquisa: (A) Teoria Funcional da Verdade (Funcionalismo Alético) no que toca ao problema da caracterização da verdade como uma propriedade funcional em resposta ao conflito entre as abordagens substantivista (monista) e deflacionista de Teoria da Verdade. (B) Teorias axiomáticas da verdade enquanto modelos para a compreensão formal do fenômeno da verdade na linguagem natural.

References

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Occursus - Revista de Filosofia - V2N2 - Jul./Dez. 2017

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Published

2024-04-09

How to Cite

Rodrigues, Y. (2024). O funcionalismo alético consegue contornar o conflito entre monismo e deflacionismo nas teorias da verdade?. Occursus - Revista De Filosofia, 2(2 - Jul./Dez.), 28–34. Retrieved from https://revistas.uece.br/index.php/Occursus/article/view/12839

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 2 - Jul./Dez. (2017): Occursus - Revista de Filosofia

Section

Artigos

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Copyright (c) 2024 Yuri Rodrigues

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