

Gamelin, the Army Modernizer

1 INTRODUCTION

In tough competition for markets for their armaments industries at the beginning of the twentieth century, Germany and France attempted to get the contract to modernize the Brazilian army. The outbreak of World War I momentarily interrupted the complex contest that involved politicians, diplomats, businessmen and journalists as well as military men. In the meantime, Brazilian officials who had trained with the German army and grouped around what became known as the *Indigenous Mission*—the so-called *young Turks*—introduced technically advanced subjects into officers' training and developed a successful campaign for compulsory military service. Despite the widespread impact of their efforts, these officials did not succeed in altering the profile of the Army. The Army remained under the command of older generation officials who, though partisan to certain changes, showed themselves incapable of profoundly modifying the Army. With Germany's defeat, France obtained the contract to reform the Brazilian Armed Forces.

The French Military Mission (FMM) began its work in 1919 and stayed nearly twenty years in Brazil. Accompanied each step of the way by the French Command, the Mission transfigured the Brazilian army. The Army gained new weapons, even the aeroplane, the cutting edge of modern warfare, and its training was revamped and made more technical. Under

Gamelin's guidance, new specialized schools were established. The Army finally had trained reservists at its disposition. Ignominious disciplinary practices dating from the time of slavery fell into disuse due to their incompatibility with the notions of citizenship and nationalism then being propagated by supporters of compulsory military service. The troops began to receive training and daily routine in the barracks was revised according to written regulations. New norms authorized professionalism and promotion based on the principle of merit as shown during training. The structure of the Army was profoundly reorganized: small isolated detachments and unconnected units gave way to *large units*, in conformity with World War I tactics. Officials adopted a *war doctrine* and learned how to constitute and run a General Staff; they became capable of planning and carrying out *large-scale manoeuvres*, exercises combining troops in a simulation of war. The country's immense development problems entered the agenda of those who were readying themselves to take on major state [corporatist] responsibilities.

In 1926, the young Turks, perceived by the French as *germanophiles* surrendered to FMM professionalism and recognized as old fashioned the *Old Army* with its *militia style of organization*; the *new Army* would win *by virtue of the example of its irreducible dreamers*.¹

The modernization of the Army by French military officers deserves attention because of its widespread impact on national life. In fact, the Brazilian State's main instrument of violence extended its dependence upon foreign suppliers and, above all, entered into shock with reality: in a backward country, the correct use of equipment and techniques developed in industrialized countries would have been impossible. The Army's transformation gave rise to deep cleavages between officers: the youngest began to defy openly the hierarchy and to involve the-

mselves in rebellions that later became known as *tenentistas*.² Having understood the strict relationship between military efficiency, socio-economic conditions, technological development, public services and the formation of the patriotic sentiment needed to legitimize universal and obligatory military service, the youngest officers prepared themselves for far-reaching interventions in the life of the nation. Without a doubt, France was fundamental in preparing an Army that would interfere decisively in Brazilian life throughout the twentieth century.

In this work, I study the performance of the most prominent leader of the FMM, General Maurice Gustave Gamelin, who worked in Brazil from 1919 to 1924. The important role exercised by this soldier during the most radical reform undertaken by the Brazilian army in the whole of its existence is almost forgotten in the specialized literature. Numerous ministers and Presidents of the Republic were students of the Military Mission organized by Gamelin. The study of his personality, ideas, behaviour and of the legend that he was able to construct among Brazilian soldiers helps us understand the activities of the great powers in Latin America between the two world wars as well as crucial aspects of the evolution of the Brazilian army.

2 A CAREFUL CHOICE

One of the delicate aspects of carrying out the French plan for extending its military influence in Latin America was the selection of the chief of mission to be sent to Brazil. The details of the plan are available in the secret reports archived by the *Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre* (SHAT) in the Château de Vincennes.

Besides having prestige and organizational skill, this official needed to be young enough to see his work take hold, because the reorganization of the Army would necessarily be long

and would face resistance. France did not wish for a superficial and light presence: the stronger the ties established by its soldiers, the better were the chances for a thriving business for its arms industry and the firmer the possibility for future strategic alliances. For its part, the Brazilian military command deluded itself by thinking that, with a young general, it would be easier to preserve its own authority.³

The FMM chief needed also to have diplomatic qualities: *a good appearance and education, a good character and lots of patience*. It would be up to him to defend the image of his country, to circulate with poise among important persons, to turn around seasoned opponents, arouse sympathy and find ways out of predictable crises. The work that awaited him would unfold in an ever-increasing climate of competition because, since the beginning of the Versailles Conference, the instability of the international balance of power was obvious. The loss of British influence did not automatically provide the opportunity for US supremacy in Latin America, which remained a relatively open space in the struggle among the European great powers. The interwar period was bustling with the constant endeavours of these powers in defence of their industrial parks and strategic alliances.

According to the French military attaché, Fanneau de la Horie, the prestige referred to in the French plan can be explained by the FMM leader's need to impose his authority over Brazilian field marshals and generals and to penetrate their *bastions*, the Army General Staff and the Ministry of War, given that the Military Academy was under the influence of the young Turks. This was a ticklish situation because of internal disputes, aggravated vanities, the clash of personal interests and the different conceptions as to the changes that had to be made and, above all, the greed with which the large-scale arms manufacturers conducted their dealings in Latin America.

In the Brazilian army, the majority of the oldest officers were against changes that would result in their loss of position or prestige, gained more through political and family ties than technical competence. The top ranks of the hierarchy were of an advanced age by modern military standards. Some, even though favourable to modernization, tried to avoid abrupt changes that would accelerate the end of their careers. There were even those who worked hard for change but wanted to limit foreign activity because of their concern for the autonomy of the Brazilian state. In the course of the negotiations, the attitudes of the higher echelons were thus understood by the French military attaché:

The objective is clear. What the old ones want, including the previous War Minister, Caetano de Faria, would be the placing of officials at the head of the mission whose grade would not invest them with sufficient authority to speak energetically in case of necessity. They want to direct them and disperse them in order to impede a unity of efforts. A general known as one of the best and most intelligent in the Army told me: "we need a mission, a French mission. But this mission has to be limited. Foreigners cannot understand many of our things, especially our recruitment. It is necessary that the mission does not mess with our General Staff."⁴

Chief of Staff between 1910 and 1914 and later nominated War Minister, Caetano de Faria was, in truth, one of the most motivated supporters of modernization, having also favoured the activities of the young Turks. He stood out among the officials of his generation as a cultured military man and, to the extent possible, as up-to-date. Showing great leadership capability, he involved himself in the campaign to establish compulsory military service, defended with vigor the reorganization of the General Staff, and attempted to formulate, without

much success, a doctrine that would assure unity of thought within the Company. Aware of the novelties brought to light by the world war, this general pointed out the Army's need to acquire new weapons and to prepare itself for aviation (BANHA, 1984:28-32).

If a modernizer like Caetano de Faria was seen by the French as an opponent, the resistance to reforms among those who served in the farthest units was much more serious. The young Brazilian officers, trained in the Military Academy of Realengo under the direction of the *Indigenous Mission*, encountered many obstacles in conveying their new skills and military mentality to the troops. According to Cordeiro de Farias, who knew the young Turks and had obtained the best grades as a student of the French before integrating into the command of Coluna Prestes, *the old generation, which had not had a systematic military preparation*, resisted the new ideas:

The clash of the generations was inevitable in certain regions. The lieutenants who went to Rio Grande do Sul or Mato Grosso were badly received by the commanders of some of the units who told them: "don't come to me with these training ideas, life in the barracks must not be disturbed. We are a family. We don't want problems" (FARIAS, 1981:66-67).

The professional prestige held indispensable for the future head of the FMM was important for the confrontation foreseen with Brazilian military authorities and in order to silence the admirers of German military fashion. Providing an opportunity for new equipment and new ideas, the World War demonstrated the limitations of the *Indigenous Mission*. Cordeiro de Farias afterwards remembered the predominant feeling among the ex-students of the young Turks:

(...) the world war showed our military weakness and the non-existence of organized armed forces. This worried the whole of my generation, because, at the beginning of the 1920s in relation to the rest of the world, we were as disarmed, in terms of military capacity, as the Indians were in comparison to the Portuguese on the day of Discovery. (FARIAS,1981:81)

The spectacular novelties revealed in Europe explain the commotion prevailing among the young officers as well as their perception of not being able to modernize the Army by themselves. The attempts to disseminate technical literature, turn the General Staff into a coordinating and planning body, introduce specialized subject matters into officers' training, to stimulate troop instruction and to combat the paternalistic relationships in daily barracks life showed signs of slow results and did not reach the entire body of the Company. An important Army intellectual and admirer of the young Turks, Francisco de Paula Cidade considered that, *up until a certain point*, the role of these reformers had been to create *an atmosphere where certain old methods could no longer live and prosper*. The journal "A Defeza Nacional", their main platform, functioned in the sense of *dethroning old idols, preparing the ground for a new seed*. Paula Cidade concluded: paradoxically, the *germanophilia* of the young Turks opened the way for the French mission.⁵

In fact, in its 1918 editorials, the young modernizers' journal recognized the impotence of Brazilian officers to guarantee the changes that they wanted to impress upon the Army and it constantly demanded the contracting of foreign instructors who would be able to impose themselves on the oldest officers. The help the young Turks gave to the French did not mean that they abandoned their idealization of the German Army. Rather it was an assertion of the willingness to modernize in the conditions established at the end of the world war.

The young Turks' reforming spirit was taken up by the Minister of War, Alberto Cardoso de Aguiar, who pointed out the necessity to stamp a practical and technical nature definitively upon military instruction in his 1919 Report because of the extraordinary development of the military industry. The requirement of the Army to have teachers trained in the long and cruel four-year war became the formal justification for contracting without delay French instructors.⁶

In December 1918, Cardoso de Aguiar asked the Brazilian military attaché, Coronel Malan d'Angrogne, to indicate a French general to lead the projected mission. Malan sounded out Marshal Joffre, and out of this conversation the name of Maurice Gustave Gamelin arose. This officer met the Brazilian expectation and the prerequisites established by the French General Staff for a head of the FMM. It would have been difficult to find in France anyone with a more appropriate résumé: Gamelin came from a military family and his father liked to assert that, ever since the reign of Louis XV, there had always been a general among its members serving the expansion of French power. According to his biographer, Pierre le Goyet, from the General Staff course onward, Gamelin manifested a desire to work outside the home country, revealing his complete assimilation to the imperialist nature of the State he was serving. By leading a mission to the biggest Latin American country, the young general preserved a long family tradition (GOYET, 1975:19). Besides this, he would gain important points in his ascension in the hierarchy.

Gamelin received a good education, showed good manners, dressed impeccably and his communication skills were very much commented upon. At Saint-Cyr, a prestigious French officers' academy, he obtained first place in his class of 499 students. Right after that he was sent to Tunisia and Algeria where he always left a good impression upon his commanders. As

captain he showed great diligence in the War College that prepared General Staff officers and, at the end of the course, the following comments were made:

Superior intelligence, very alive and open, a fine spirit, lucid, methodical, cultivated, quick and sure judgment. Very apt for study of the highest questions of military art. Regarding tactics, a solid and developed feeling. Ardent character, correct, firm, decided. Full of personality. Very active and resistant. Very good manners and education. (...) (GOYET,1975:17).

At 48 years of age, Gamelin had accumulated the experience of a General Staff official, and following that, of a *chef de cabinet* and confidant of Marshal Joffre, one of the most famous French World War I commanders. Gamelin rose rapidly in the hierarchy due to his behaviour as commander of an infantry division in that devastating war. Early on, he gained a reputation as a cultured person with a penchant for philosophical discussions; he was recognized as an excellent instructor. The many comments on his professional performance, one of which was signed by Joffre, give us an idea of the French High Command's expectations regarding his career:

For me, he was the most valuable collaborator I could have wanted, never weakening. While participating in the work of the Superior Studies Centre, he demonstrated a refined military culture and a quick perception of the most difficult situations. In the Army's own interest, he needs to be promoted rapidly. (GOYET,1975:19).

In the second semester of 1918, Gamelin directly settled the details of the FMM contract with the Brazilian War Minister, Cardoso de Aguiar, who was whole-heartedly involved in the overhaul of the Army. In the first semester of 1919, Gamelin

arrived in Brazil on a journey of initial assessment and planning. In 1920, the FMM began its work.

3 DEFENDING FRENCH INTERESTS

Among the many diplomatic reports that related the impact of Gamelin's first encounters, that of the French Counsel of Porto Alegre perhaps best expressed the significance for France of the contract to instruct the Brazilian territorial force:

Whatever else it may be, it is a success for our diplomacy and will benefit French economic expansion and moral influence. And this, through intrigues as hollow as they are interested, inseparable from these negotiations.⁷

Returning from his trip to the south of Brazil and São Paulo, Gamelin enthusiastically told his superiors: *everywhere, I received the best welcome and my voyage prompted homages to France*.⁸ All during his stay in Brazil, the head of the FMM took advantage of every opportunity to defend his country's commercial interests, without neglecting his own interests and that of his team. His constant attention to his own personal image was always linked to bolstering the image of French superiority.

In the negotiations pre-dating the signing of the Mission's contract, Gamelin resisted attempts to limit FMM assignments; demanded material advantages and facilities for the officers who accompanied him; and firmly opposed the Brazilian authorities' wanting to safeguard their right to recruit foreign technical assistance for factories, arsenals and geographical services. Displaying a clear intention to preserve his country's monopoly over the direction of the Brazilian army and the production of war materiel, the French general explained that he would at most accept foreign civilian not military techni-

ans; he argued that these activities, and in particular that of the mapping service where *there was everything yet to do*, had to be coordinated with military training, the section that would have to accommodate to ensure it. The importance of mapping did not stop growing given rapid troop deployments and the growth of aviation. It was finally agreed that Brazil could hire professionals of other nationalities, as long as they were civilian.⁹

The highest Army and Navy officials were often present at the lectures he gave. One of them was the Minister of War. The themes he tackled obviously had reference to the Great War and to various aspects of military modernity. On these occasions, Gamelin presented his nation as in the vanguard of technical progress, science, culture and civilization and also furnished grounds for construing the relevance of his own personal role in the war. His résumé, which the FMM circulated officially, emphasized his *remarkable* action in decisive moments of the global conflict. (GAMELIN, 1926:11).

In his analysis of the 1914 military operations, Gamelin stated that *the dangerous honour of forming civilization's Vanguard Corps* had fallen to France, being the nation principally responsible for resisting German imperialism and offering to *all nations of equal intellectual training the necessary time to join the combat* (GAMELIN, 1926:53). *Committing itself to total victory* against the Germans in the war, France had gambled on a *very lofty plan* and acted like the *great artists* who, choosing simple causes, do not permit mediocrity (GAMELIN, 1926:63). This eulogy of good propositions, moral grandeur and genius went to the extreme when France was skilfully confounded with Napoleon's military prowess.

The incomparable genius which was Napoleon, whatever the judgement regarding the immediate or remote consequences of his

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reign, progressed from masterpiece to masterpiece and extinguished itself in splendour (GAMELIN,1926:108)

While the German defeat in World War I was a virtual condemnation of the pride of an overly ambitious people that had led them to commit *crimes against humanity*, the French victory was the best example of a campaign based on long and patient efforts to reach a goal in the precise circumstance in which one is ready to despair. Gamelin introduced himself as the uncontested representative of the splendid trajectory, which he attributed to his country. In front of an audience fascinated by his eloquence he projected himself as a suffering warrior, a proven leader in the most spectacular confrontation in history:

We lived a lifetime in those agonizing hours in which the weakest hearts had already faltered and the strongest began to lose self-confidence. Now, there was an attack that did not go well...The other time, an enemy counter-attack that seemed imminent...precautions of all kinds needing to be taken furiously. The nagging hope that night brought, the barrage of gunfire, the asphyxiating gases, the breakdown of telecommunication...Later, the morning after, we verified that the enemy, having suffered more than we did, had retreated. All along the front line arose a cry of satisfaction. And every one, forgetting his fatigue and afflictions, marched happily, in pursuit.

The members of the FMM participated actively in promoting Gamelin's image, choosing the operations of the Division he commanded during the war as themes for conferences and classroom. Fearing that his obsessive campaign of self-promotion would have negative repercussions in Paris, Gamelin told his superiors: *Rest assured that these conferences do not merely have education in view but act also as French propaganda, of which we never lose sight.*¹⁰

4 SOLDIER OR MERCHANT?

France stubbornly tried everything to impede the resurrection of the German war industry. The global conflagration highlighted the strict ties between military might and a nation's technological and industrial capacities. The conquest of markets for the weapons industry had become a strategic defence problem: companies directly or indirectly connected to military activities had to engage in large-scale production or they would remain without prospects. If, during conflict, scientific research and economic production were not distinguishable, in the post-war era, military men continued to deal with economic and technological problems in the conviction that they were within their professional competence. Even Gamelin was open to the idea that French officials should intern in weapons factories in order to familiarize themselves with the latest innovations and in order to be able to speak about the advantages of new products to perspective buyers. Gamelin sent long reports explaining the modifications that French manufacturers should make to adapt an armament to Brazilian fighting conditions.¹¹

*Prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles to manufacture and sell arms, Germany tried to fool the keen French surveillance. Paris asked Gamelin for information about all Brazilian imports of German goods that could fall under the classification of war materiel. The head of FMM hurriedly replied: As soon as I know that, in spite of my efforts, the Brazilian government is buying material in Germany that could be considered, in any way, war materiel, I will telegraph you.*¹²

The French took great pains to enlarge the range of what might be considered war materiel. In 1921, Germany tried to sell telegraphic equipment to Brazil. Helped by Marshal Cândido Rondon, Gamelin blocked the deal. In the same period, Marshal Foch, who was president of the Versailles Allied Military Committee, was warned by Gamelin and was able to stop the

*sale of German military kitchens to Brazil. Alert to business opportunities, Gamelin also involved himself in the supply of fabrics for uniforms; he suggested to his superiors that France could replace England, the traditional supplier of this merchandise to Brazil.*¹³

With the authority of someone who has closely studied the geography of Rio Grande do Sul as a *likely theatre of operations* and has noted the rare and badly maintained gaucho roads, Gamelin advised the Brazilian War Minister that the French vehicle Chenille Kegress was the best adapted for military transport. When he reported this fact to his superiors, he made the point that this deal represented *a great advantage as much for Brazil as for French industry*. The FMM guided the establishment of a Supply Corps in the Brazilian army and by January 1922, Gamelin told the French command that his subordinate, Quartermaster Buchalet, was on his way to France with two Brazilian officials for the purpose of selecting and buying uniforms, camping equipment and 500 vehicles of the type that the French had developed for its colonial expeditions.¹⁴

Gamelin introduced into Brazil a military engineer, Commander Lacape, specialized in the fabrication of gunpowder and explosives. However, as a result of his arrogance, this official quickly upset General Tasso Fragoso, then Director of Army Materiel. Tasso maintained the best relations with Gamelin and he immediately asked for a much less haughty replacement for Lacape. The French general was afraid that gunpowder manufacture would fall into North American hands in Brazil because the Army chief of staff, General Bento Ribeiro, had sent officials to the States to get to know its capacity in this realm. Because the French Army did not have available any gunpowder specialists, Gamelin tried to convince Tasso Fragoso to head directly for a French factory. Tasso refused this idea and Gamelin ably proposed that Lacape's project for the manufacture of gunpowder and explosives be tabled for future negotiations.¹⁵

The sales that most interested the French were those of aeroplanes and armaments. In these sectors, competition was the fiercest and Gamelin showed a special talent as a strategist in commercial dealings: from the beginning in his proposals for the reform of military training and Army organization, the head of the FMM prescribed in detail large-scale acquisitions.

The selection of artillery materiel was under the responsibility of a commission headed by Tasso Fragoso, who was very much in sympathy with the French (*très francophile*). According to Gamelin, Tasso was, however, under the permanent pressure of Colonel Leite de Castro, described by the French as a German admirer. This officer, who headed a mission of the Brazilian army in Paris for the objective of purchasing war materiel, was awarded the Legion of Honour medal. Instituted by Louis XVIII, this decoration, a reward for all types of service given to the country, came to be widely used to feed the narcissism of foreign military allies.

By 1919, Tasso Fragoso discarded the cannon produced by Bethlehem Steel, the then second major US steel company. Prohibited from manufacturing and selling arms, Germany offered Krupp spare parts through the Swedish company Bofors, which belonged to Alfred Nobel and had acquired the reputation for quality production of steel and explosives. Such German industrial pragmatism had paid off in many countries, including Argentina, which bought Krupp machine guns. This awakened FMM anxieties. Meanwhile, the Argentinean purchases indirectly worried the Brazilian military, which helped to position French producers in Brazil.¹⁶

Tasso Fragoso opted for Schneider and Saint Chamond cannons; he demonstrated the results of his studies to Gamelin before showing the final report to the War Ministry. Writing to his superiors, the head of the FMM commented: *One should not give much importance to this report because political influen-*

ces predominate here. Making it quite clear that his main concern was the sale of French products rather than the qualitative selection of weapons for the Brazilian army, Gamelin was very reluctant to give an opinion on the range of manufacturers presented by Tasso: *When there is only one French competitor at issue, it is obvious that I will orient the competitor in the best possible manner.*¹⁷

In truth, the French tried to sell goods that they did not have the conditions to produce. Many times Gamelin addressed his War Minister complaining about the French industry's incapacity to fill the orders for which he had dedicated much of his efforts with the Brazilian government. He even related the attacks he was suffering in the Brazilian press: *The opposition newspapers represent the French Military Mission as a commercial mission committed to selling the cast-off stocks of the French Army.*¹⁸ Some journalists, who favoured the Germans, were very aggressive in their treatment of the FMM. One editorial in "O Combate", referred to Gamelin in this way:

Mr. Gamelin, from what can be seen, has a lot of virtuosity and commercial talent. He is a bold 'travelling salesman,' who only deals in foisting upon us old steel, rehabilitated aeroplanes and every type of entirely worthless war materiel. His fearlessness lies in trying to ruin our country. (n.90, ano I, Rio de Janeiro, 30.05.21)

The Minister of War, Pandiá Calógeras, was also attacked for his sympathetic posture towards the French:

(...) While Mr. Calógeras buys condemned types of cannons and worn-out machine guns, Argentina buys the best equipment from Germany and acquires the most modern weaponry from the House of Krupp. ("A Pátria", N. 248. Anno 2, Rio de Janeiro, 22.05.21)

The sale of cannons to Brazil had perhaps been more disturbed by the bitter dispute between the French manufacturers, Schneider and Saint Chamond, than by the activity of German sympathizers. The two companies mutually disqualified themselves in the Brazilian press and Gamelin's appeals for an understanding between them were useless. In conversation with Gamelin, Tasso Fragoso went as far as saying that Schneider's methods were even more *bloodthirsty* than Krupp's. The dispute reached a point where the competitors were passing confidential French Army reports regarding their respective products to Brazilian officers. Because such reports should not have gone to the French industries, the French Army's Intelligence Service opened an investigative enquiry into the case.¹⁹

The Brazilian army ended up choosing the Schneider cannon but the delay in delivery of the order provided an opportunity for manoeuvring to the supporters of the Krupp model, including even the Minister of War, General Setembrino de Carvalho, involved in the negotiations. In May 1924, Setembrino sought out Gamelin because he was interested in his opinion on the new cannon produced by Saint Chamond, which he had heard was more modern than the Schneider model; it turned out that he was also worried about the possibility that it was being acquired by Argentina. Gamelin mistrusted the conversation and, three weeks later, he told his superior officers that, as he had foreseen, *because in Brazil it was necessary to be suspicious of everything*, Setembrino's pretence was a smokescreen for the transaction in course to buy the 75 Krupp cannon, reworked by the Austrian enterprise Bofors. In fact, these arrangements represented an attempt by the German manufacturer to receive payment for acquisitions made before the War. Forbidden to contract and receive payments for war materiel, Krupp tried to camouflage its undertaking.²⁰

Gamelin also reported that the person responsible for the procrastination over the purchase of the Schneider cannon and for the intrigues against the FMM was the representative of the enterprises Bofors and Krupp in Brazil: the Brazilian officer attached to the General Staff in the War Ministry. The situation also interested cabinet officers and relatives of Minister Setembrino de Carvalho. Gamelin extended his accusations to General Leite de Castro, head of the Purchasing Commission of the Brazilian army in Paris. Sensing the possibility of losing the important contract, Gamelin asked his superior officers for permission to threaten the Brazilian government with the return of the FMM if the Germans won the orders.²¹

5 ANYTHING GOES IN THE SALE OF AEROPLANES

The complexity and bitterness of the contest over the sale of military aircraft to Brazil surpassed the schemes to sell cannons. From 1911, European flight academies had enrolled Brazilian officers; at the beginning of 1913, the Brazilian Flight Academy was founded in Rio de Janeiro, co-directed by an Italian and an Argentine, civilians contracted by French industry. It was equipped with Farman and Blériot planes and financed by the Brazilian government in order to train Army and Navy pilots. According to the contract, the Brazilian government could requisition both the planes and the personnel in case of necessity.

The establishment of military aviation in Brazil was interrupted by the outbreak of the War, which made it impossible to buy equipment. Before the end of the conflict, the aeronautical industry, which in a few years had grown exponentially, resumed the row over the Brazilian market. At the time, the United States was in the position to export aeroplanes and some Brazilian officers were sent to train in that country. In 1916, the

Ministry of the Navy established the Naval Flight School and the first hydroplanes were bought from the Curtiss American Company (LAVANÈRE-WANDERLEY,1975), which opened its local offices in Rio de Janeiro. However, by 1918, the English company, Handley Page and the Italian Caproni had set up factories in Brazil for the assembly of aeroplanes and the manufacture of spare parts.

While the Navy oversaw its orders from the United States, the Army turned to France. In the negotiations for the FMM contract, it had been established that the French would organize and direct the Army Flight Academy. Practically all of this school's equipment was acquired from French companies. In 1919, when the first orders arrived, the equipment was detained some weeks in the Customs Office. Surprised by this, the French verified that this was due to Curtiss American Company agents' manoeuvres to delay the inauguration of the Academy. In the same time period, Caproni technicians had made exhaustive surveys of locales for airfields in the mountainous Rio de Janeiro topography and had chosen a site in the Ilha do Governador (Governor's Island). Aware of the Italian reports, Handley Page personnel tried to anticipate their purchase of the site.²²

In the rivalry, the French were in a comfortable position by virtue of the FMM's influence. Besides this, the former ties established with Santos Dumont, a national celebrity, facilitated their initiatives. Before the War, Santos Dumont had placed his aircraft at the disposition of the French Army on condition that they would not be used against American countries. The flight tests of the *father of aviation* had been achieved with French equipment. Having foreseen the value of aviation as an instrument of war before the war began, Santos Dumont completed, with the French military, trials using aeroplanes in tactical manoeuvres. After the War, at the height of glory, this would

become a fundamental element in the conduct of the French agents involved in the conquest of the Brazilian market.²³

Several months after the instructors' arrival, the Afonsos' Flight School was inaugurated. The French tried to show the best results by avoiding accidents that could have been catastrophic to their image. The first pilots were trained in 1919. In that same year, Captain Etienne Magnin, head of the French Aviation Mission, proposed the participation of aeroplanes in Army manoeuvres for pure publicity: the machines were specifically designed for training purposes and were piloted by the same Academy instructors. The Brazilian military accepted this novelty with enthusiasm.²⁴

The French encouraged further spectacles, under the most varied pretexts (the inauguration of a factory, the issuance of proclamations, the arrival of authorities, etc.), leaving the Rio de Janeiro population in raptures. Captain Magnin, who had the rank of Colonel in Brazil, explained to the French War Minister:

The publicity that I make here about the work of our mission every time an occasion presents itself may seem strange to you. However, it is necessary in a country like Brazil where the press exerts a considerable influence not only over the popular mentality but also over the ruling classes. I also have to fight against the intense propaganda put out by the British, represented by the Handley Page firm; by the Americans, represented by Curtiss and the Italians, represented by Caproni.²⁵

Gamelin avidly followed the *lances* (dealings) of the competition. The Handley-Page agent had asked the Brazilian High Command permission to hold air shows in the military airfield and offered free aeroplanes to the Academy. The Italians followed suit.²⁶ In 1920, Gamelin showed concern

over the difficult conditions French industry had to face in the stiff competition:

Because our aviation companies have not wanted to take part, we are reaping the harvest of our apathy. The North Americans have established themselves in São Paulo with a flight school. This school even receives students from the Police. The Italians offered a Caproni aeroplane that has been placed in the military Flight Academy and this permits 2 Italian pilots to be introduced into the Academy on the pretext of holding exhibitions. Moreover, the Italians created the post of military aviation attaché assigned to the Ambassador. Finally, the newspapers announce the organization of a short-term airmail service Rio-São Paulo under the direction of an American company. For reasons I do not understand, however, Commander Precardin withdrew the projects for Brazil that he had espoused to me and to M. Castillon St. Victor for which he had asked permission to continue.

I do not see any other way of temporarily fighting back, in order to save face at least, than to ask our military aviators to redouble their efforts. Therefore I have asked the dispatch of 2 Bréguets of the "grand raid".

Magnin, however, knows all these issues better than I do. I hope that he can shake the apathy from our designers. Can not French industries entrust the equipment to the Mission?²⁷

In 1921, French industry increased even more prospects of sales to Brazil with the organization of a group of flight squadrons in Rio Grande do Sul, which had been proposed by Gamelin.

From 1922, French expectations of sales began to run risks not only due to competition but also to the *tenentista* movement. Numerous aviation officers were involved in the movement and the Academy's installations were occupied by the

forces loyal to the government. After the July 1922 rebellion, the Academy was inactive for many months. In 1924, the majority of students were arrested; the Academy remained closed for two years. A good part of the planes were destroyed by the young officers' exhibitionism; they were anxious for notoriety and were lovers of acrobatics. Of the Army's 140 planes, almost all of which were French (80 Nieuport, 40 Bréguet and 20 Spad), few were functional. Especially responsive to the country's modernization, the aviators were very obvious in the events that preceded the 1930 Revolution despite their derisory numbers. The government began to vacillate in its support for the development of Military Aviation.²⁸

Nevertheless, the French redoubled their efforts in order to ensure aeroplane purchases especially because the clash over the development of commercial airlines had started and Germany came back on the scene in grand style. Hoping to maintain the monopoly of supply to the Army, Gamelin was concerned with the Italian offensive which offered cheaper planes with the same characteristics as French models. The leader of the FMM counted on the support of the Minister Cardoso de Aguiar and General Tasso Fragoso, but he had to face the insistent activities of the head of the General Staff, Bento Ribeiro, whose son was accused of acting in favour of Italian industry. Gamelin also accused of bad faith General Leite de Castro who continued in Paris as head of the Brazilian army's Purchasing Commission.

6 GAMELIN'S AUTHORITY

In his report, a balance sheet of his five years of work, to the French government, Gamelin underlined the hostility he had suffered from the highest levels of the Brazilian army:

That which made the work difficult when I got to Rio was the hostility to military reorganization of the majority of the Military. Soon I saw that the whole High Command did not look well upon someone who was called to disturb their idleness and the benefits provided by engrained abuses. In any case, I had the support of the Minister of War (Pandiá Calógeras) and the President of the Republic (Epitácio Pessoa). Our adversaries grouped themselves around the head of the General Staff, General Bento Ribeiro, surrounded by a group of officers who were clearly *germanophiles*. (...)

Upon signing the contract, the first problems appeared with the General Staff, which wanted to reduce our rights. (...) A fierce press campaign financed by the Germans almost put everything up for grabs. It was necessary to maintain a cool head in order to avoid reacting in the way our adversaries hoped for; it was a test of patience and calm.

Buoyed by our ambassador, when I felt the time had come to report to the Minister and President of the Republic that the behaviour of the head of the General Staff (Bento Ribeiro) was incompatible with Mission, they had already noticed it themselves. They only asked me to have confidence in them and let them choose a favourable moment. In fact, they caused the chief of the General Staff to resign, letting the public know that the conflict was with the Minister and not with me.²⁹

The mentioned incompatibility did not derive from the clustering of officers around Bento Ribeiro, who Gamelin made an issue of presenting as *clearly germanophiles*, but to the fact, above all, that the Frenchman could not concede cutbacks in his authority and to Ribeiro's attempts to avoid a tight dependency on French manufacturers. In so far as his admiration of the Germany army counted, Bento Ribeiro was not a *germanophile* and, particularly through his endeavours, the National Congress had ordered in 1917 the hiring of the FMM.

Gamelin's animosity was fuelled by Bento Ribeiro's determination to reserve the leadership of certain initiatives for Brazilian officers. During the period in which he headed the General Staff (1915-1921), the Army made the first great step on the road to its transformation by effectively initiating Compulsory Military Service. Ribeiro dedicated himself systematically to plans for reforming the Army and called attention to the necessity of making it autonomous in relation to foreign suppliers. This is the way Bento Ribeiro explained himself before the FMM's arrival:

It is necessary to approach resolutely the problem of our military organization and resolve it correctly and conscientiously, by studying in a mature way a rational and practical programme and rigorously enacting it, without sluggishness or weakness.

Certainly, there are enormous obstacles to overcome and one of these is that of absolute independence from foreign material resources. (BANHA, 1984:53).³⁰

Exposing strategic concerns, Bento Ribeiro vigorously defended the development of the naval industry, the steel industry and coal mining and he always called attention to the need for dominion of new technologies. He strove for the success of the Gunpowder Plant of Piquete and the Factory of Cartridges and Artefacts of War. For this reason, he sent a commission of Brazilian officers to the United States. As Chief of Staff, he clearly upheld the necessity for Army operational autonomy. Learning the lessons of the World War, he observed: *an army without munitions and materiel is not able to accomplish its mission. It is important to say that a country without a military industry is at the mercy of the unknown, the unexpected and, consequently its military defence is in danger* (BANHA, 1984:47).

Because of such ideas, Gamelin saw in this official a source

of disturbance to his undertakings. In no case would the French soldier accept that his authority was less than that of the Chief of Staff of the Brazilian army. In September 1920, when the Belgian king, Albert, visited Brazil, the organizers of the official reception decided that Gamelin should be seated with his country's diplomatic corps. Gamelin refused the invitation saying that, according to the terms of the FMM contract, he had a right to participate in the solemnities alongside the Army Chief of Staff.³¹

The clash over authority turned nasty when Bento Ribeiro decided to change the titles of the French officers who were advising the academies from *Commander* to *Technical Director*. Gamelin interpreted this decision as resulting from the manoeuvres of a '*small group of germanophile officers* who encouraged intrigues against the FMM. Never acknowledging that the Brazilians would react badly at his onslaughts in favour of French industries and his illusion of knowing everything, Gamelin passed on to the French Army Command the notion that such behaviour was manifestly anti-French. Without hesitating, he reminded Bento Ribeiro that the term *Commander* was foreseen in the contract and could only be changed with government consent.³²

The *germanophilia* of Bento Ribeiro was false. Gamelin purposefully underestimated this Brazilian officer's efforts in favour of the FMM's appointment. The incompatibility of the French general with Bento Ribeiro increased with the latter's clear effort to guarantee the technical autonomy of the Brazilian army. Gamelin could not support the idea that the working team he headed could be dispensed with by the officials of a country that he perceived as inferior, whose population were composed for the most part of *mixed race people without a political education*. In this regard, he was in tune with Brazilian civilian and military intellectuals, who were involved in the building of

a national sentiment and called attention to what they considered serious defects within Brazilian public life. Gamelin expressed himself thus:

In Brazil, as I have already written many times, public opinion, such as we know it in Europe does not exist and is not taken into consideration. If we wish to have contact with real Brazilians, those who are the real force and produce for the nation, it is in the *fazendas* or in the small interior cities that we will find them, not in Rio, where, besides cosmopolitan elite, are amassed political and business opportunists.³³

The idea that there was no public opinion in the country, or nationalist sentiment, was widespread among Brazilians who were used to evaluating society on the basis of comparisons with industrial Europe. The Great War consolidated the Nation-State as the unique form of political organization compatible with modern civilization; rulers and soldiers were to be legitimized to the extent that they were understood not as representatives of gods, castes or dynasties, but of national communities. In the confrontation of 1914-1918, mobilization for the war and the very Armed Forces was mixed together with efforts to construct nationalism. Gamelin encountered in the country and above all in the Brazilian army an ambiance permeated by nationalism and he positioned himself in the elevated position of leader of the *armed nation*. At the beginning of his work, Gamelin responded to the inquiries of the French Army General Staff regarding the Brazilian military situation and he reported: *The organization of a nation with war in mind is still in its infancy in Brazil and the FMM is occupied precisely with establishing its logical foundations.*³⁴ By *logical foundations*, the French general meant the guiding principles of the nation-state's armed branch, principles that gave direction to what, at the time, was known as the *war doctrine*.

Aware of the global process of nationalist mobilization as a basis for military preparation even before Gamelin's arrival in Brazil, the young Turks' journal, "A Defeza Nacional" (n. 38, 10.11.1916), thought that adopting the slogan of the *Armed Nation* was *the only way to arouse patriotism and the unity of the patriotic ideal among Brazilians*. The way Gamelin saw Brazilians, however, was not foreign to these modernizing military men. The problem was that the General saw in these officers, who had put themselves forward as patriotic apostles, the very same negative characteristics that he perceived in the population: the tendency toward idleness, dishonest practices (or *habitual abuses*), the absence of noble motivations, the enjoyment of maleficence and, worst of all, the lack of vision and standards.

The French general, as happens to those aspiring to great military leadership, presented himself as the paradigm of competency and morality, while tirelessly pointing the finger at the most outstanding of the Brazilian reforming officers for professional weaknesses and character faults. Gamelin's appraisal of Hermes da Fonseca who, when he was War Minister from 1904 onward, unleashed great changes in the Army, was hard. Commenting on a famous letter attributed wrongly to Arthur Bernardes that contained rude remarks about Hermes, Gamelin considered its content to be *perfectly correct* and only that there were *things [in it] that one does not put on paper*.³⁵ The episode of the letter itself served as a fuse for a series of military rebellions in the 1920s.

As for Pandiá Calógeras, the War Ministry civilian who coordinated the Army's modernizing efforts between 1919 and 1922, the French Mission chief showed respect for his intelligence but not his character. This Minister as well as his chef de cabinet, Colonel Malan d'Angrogne had acted in bad faith. Angry at the fact that Calógeras had hired retired Austrian officers, as civilian experts on a scientific mission, to guide the

Army's mapping service, which constituted a defeat for the FMM, Gamelin reported to his superior officers:

The Minister of War, Calógeras, and his head of Cabinet, Colonel Malan, the former Brazilian military attaché in Paris, acted in absolute bad faith in my regard. The more I know Mr. Calógeras, the more I think that his character is not equal to his intelligence and that one cannot believe in his declarations of sympathy toward the French.³⁶

As he began to familiarize himself with the national military situation, Gamelin construed the officers as *false*, mistrusting even the unconditional admirers of France who forever gave him solidarity and support as, for example, General Tasso Fragoso, one of the most highly thought of Brazilian commanders of the time:

General Tasso Fragoso supported me in the development of our training role as far as he could given his versatile spirit, his taste for details and his mania to do everything himself. Without a doubt, his growing vanity makes it difficult for him to tolerate my supervision. But I do not think, unless he is falsier than I suspect—and what Brazilian is not?— that he will be our adversary, like some intriguers used to tell me.³⁷

Despite this very negative impression of Tasso Fragoso, the French general acknowledged in the dedication, written in Portuguese, of his book *Assumptos Militares* (*Military Affairs*, a collection of his lectures in Rio de Janeiro, today archived in the Library of the General Staff Academy), that Tasso was *without question the best mind in the Brazilian army and one of the most well-rounded military brains in South America*.

Measuring others by himself, Gamelin looked at Brazilian officers either as cunning competitors or potential antagonists,

always ready for low blows and deceitful games. In a secret report to the French Minister of War, he boasted about his position: *A long familiarity with the Brazilians has shown me that, without knocking them, it is always convenient to show them that they cannot deceive us. If we do not, they think that we are afraid and take advantage of this immediately.*³⁸

Independent of his personality traits and the habits stamped on him by a military career, working in an environment that he considered very undermined, Gamelin could not help demanding blind obedience. For the task he assumed, to modernize the Brazilian army making it submissive to the French Army, it was necessary to secure unquestioned authority.

But was the FMM head expressing his genuine convictions on the Brazilian army in his Paris reports or was he trying, above all, to exalt his personal behaviour? The question is pertinent when one recalls that, during his career, Gamelin obstinately sought promotion until he reached the highest post in the French Army. The dispatches sent from Brazil, where he highlights his ability to supplant the achievements opposed to French interests, caused a good impression on his superior officers. Be that as it may, Gamelin impressed his commanders as much as he conquered the affection and respect of the Brazilian military men. It did not matter that they had suspicions about the bad image the Frenchman expressed in their regard.

In March 1920, when he was attempting to score points by inaugurating the first schools organized by the FMM, Gamelin was anxious about the Brazilian officers' interest in learning the lessons given by the foreign instructors rapidly.

The anti-French crisis that I pointed out in June of last year, after having been attenuated, has reappeared as though it were an epidemic. Our response was made much more difficult, in a mediocre environment. With the exception of a few rare, convinced and loyal

friends, the sentiment of many people is to accept us, because it could not be otherwise but to limit our general influence. In any case, many, and among them the most intelligent, want to use us rapidly with the intention of getting rid of us as soon as possible. It is this card that we need to play, because it is that which will allow us to accomplish a tangible result. It is a permanent game of gossip and pettinesses.³⁹

Gamelin's efforts to reorganize the Brazilian army only would have meaning if the prolongation of the dependency upon the French military-industrial complex could have been guaranteed. Obviously, it did not occur to him to side with the defence of Brazilian autonomy. The victorious rivalry that he maintained with Bento Ribeiro served as a warning of his intentions and astuteness. The conflict went out of bounds when Bento Ribeiro's son, an Army lieutenant accused by the French of taking bribes, acted in defence of the Italian aeronautical industry. Imperious, Gamelin let the Minister of War, Cardoso de Aguiar, know that he would not oblige his officers to use planes that had not been manufactured in France. Worried that the Mission's presence was threatened, the Minister ceded and authorized the purchase of French aeroplanes even at prices higher than those of the Italian's.⁴⁰

The frequent misunderstandings resulted in Bento Ribeiro's resignation as Chief of Staff and the appointment of General Celestino Alves Bastos, considered a great ally by the French. Gamelin immediately asked his superiors to bestow the medal of the *Légion d'honneur* on Alves Bastos.

General Luís Barbedo, commander of the Rio garrison that was Brazil's most important group of men and military equipment, tried to organize a demonstration of solidarity for Bento Ribeiro. Having no success, he was also asked to resign. But Gamelin was not satisfied: judging that the subordination of

officials to be a *sign of the times*, a *progress of military spirit*, he lamented that the government would not take advantage of the situation in order to fill vacant posts with young officials: *tradition continues to triumph, which is exceptionally disturbing for the future*. The generals in ascent were not hostile to the FMM, but Gamelin considered them *intellectually and even physically old, not having the preparation to assimilate new points of view*. With reason Gamelin foresaw the explosive co-existence of officers with different professional training and mentalities in the same Forces. The clashes fuelled the lieutenants' movement in the last decade of the Old Republic, when the young officers ostentatiously revealed their scorn for a hierarchy trained in the traditional way.

About a year after Bento Ribeiro's resignation, Gamelin related with satisfaction to the French command that he had given a lecture on *Napoleon's strategy* in Rio de Janeiro attended by almost all of the generals, which showed Gamelin's ability in the middle of tensions that involved even politicians.⁴¹

7 A GENERAL OF TWO COUNTRIES

Gamelin's speech on the occasion of the Infantry School inauguration in June 1921 in the presence of the President of the Republic illustrates his capacity to disguise his role as foreign agent. With well-turned phrases, the French General did not spare self-praise: he made himself out to be a professional of undeniable competence, a man of high purpose, a wounded war hero who was always humble and conscious of his own fragility. Focused on what sounded sincere, the talk was full of the cunning typical of businessmen and wily politicians. Because no motive other than a concern for the country's destiny would justify better the great expenditures and enormous efforts exacted for the Army's modernization, Gamelin declared him-

self without hesitation to be entirely devoted to the greatness of the Brazilian nation!

After a long preparation, we brought Brazil the lessons of modern warfare, our own experience on the battlefield. But we count on respecting, in every circumstance, your traditions and your special conditions of climate and terrain (...)

Most particularly in the area of services, and especially in matters of supply, nothing solid and permanent can be accomplished without the strict and secure collaboration of national energies and capabilities.

From whichever angle we examine it, an army can only be essentially national.

We work with the same ardour and the same conviction as though we were in our own land. As descendants of those who proclaimed the rights of man and the liberty of peoples, we know how to accept all criticisms made in good faith. Moreover, we take into consideration that there are no initiatives of general interest that do not frequently clash with particular interests. No human endeavour is without weaknesses. But the honour of officers who have gone through battle and who, almost all, have been gloriously wounded is above certain insults and insinuations.

It is, therefore, with all courage, that we continue along the path intended. We assure you once again, Mr. President, of our full devotion to your cause: the greatness of the Brazilian nation!

Years later, the general of two nations that Brazil hired to modernize its Army became the supreme commander of French troops. In this position, he demonstrated that his qualities of cunning politician prevailed over that of military strategist. Nevertheless, for the Brazilian officers involved in Army modernization, Gamelin would remain as an example of professionalism and as a friend of Brazil, revered as the foreign military

man who most distinguished himself in the development of Brazilian officers.

On the occasion, in Paris, in which Gamelin was decorated with the medal of Great Official of *Légion d'honneur*, the journal "A Defesa Nacional" (n.154, 10.10.1926), which was the mouthpiece of those whom a French official labelled as French enemies, overflowed with happiness remembering *the immense services given by the famous general to the country and especially to our Army*. The journal noted, that even though the assistance lent by Gamelin might be *unknown to some* or not even *well understood by everyone*, it enthusiastically acclaimed the French general as the undeniable *founder* of the *war doctrine* adopted by the Brazilian army. This doctrine had its principals set in the regulations and teachings that Gamelin disseminated in *splendid practical and theoretical lessons in military exercises and in conference halls*. According to "A Defesa Nacional", Gamelin also left an *admirable example of a modern military leader* due to his *impressive military culture and his vast general culture*. His teachings would be updated but never put into doubt by the military leadership that lived together with Gamelin and would matter decisively to the course of Brazil. *Gamelin said: therefore it is necessary to think*, observed the periodical of the modernizing officers.

In his speech of 6 September 1927 at the farewell party of General Coffec, who had replaced Gamelin, and the arrival of the new head of the FMM, General Spire, the War Minister, Nestor Sezefredo Passos, mentioned Gamelin in the following terms:

Three years ago, our dear friend, General Gamelin, whom we remember with great nostalgia, including those who had the pleasure of being one of his disciples, among whom I have the pride to include myself, and those who, for some reason got close to

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him, the General Gamelin used to say to us that, among the best memories of his career, he preserved the impression that he really belonged to the Brazilian army, in the way all of us used to call him "my General." ⁴²

For decades, the status of being a former student of Gamelin would be flaunted as an important point in a Brazilian officer's career.

An analysis of Gamelin's doctrinal teachings, of his Brazilian army modernization project, of the regulations he edited and the specialized schools he organized is beyond the scope of this article. But these notes on the General's intentions, manners and successes, in an environment that he insistently characterized as false and mediocre, could possibly also help reflect upon the tragic error of the French political power at 1940: the handover of the supreme command of land forces to this General. Facing the well planned and sudden advance of the Nazi tanks, Gamelin did not draw up a plan of resistance worthy of respect. The qualities of a good arms dealer, an eloquent orator, an able diplomat in the wings do not always combine with the performance needed by a commander-in-chief when the country is in danger. Gamelin ended up Hitler's prisoner. When he left prison, he passed the rest of his days trying to transfer to others the responsibility for the great humiliation Hitler's troops imposed upon his country. He still had the ability to go from one side to another and to keep himself in a position that he was in no way fit to occupy; he lacked the greatness to admit his incapacity as a strategist and military commander.

Charles De Gaulle went discreetly to his poorly attended funeral, in 1952. In spite of the French enjoyment in honouring its

warriors, Gamelin today does not figure in any public space in Paris. Even in the ancient quarters of the Château de Vincennes, where he was located on the occasion of the great confrontation with the Nazis, nothing recalls his sojourn.

However, whoever visits the Army Officers Academy in Rio de Janeiro today can find in the entranceway, to the left, near the commander's quarters, a discrete room which shelters Gamelin's photograph and some souvenirs of the time in which he prepared the Company, in the name of the fatherland, to intervene profoundly in Brazilian life.

Translated by Rosemary Galli

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NOTES

¹ “A Defeza Nacional”, N. 149-150, maio-junho, 1926.

² Regarding the interest of European powers to send military missions to Brazil, see my “A Disputa pela Missão que Mudou o Exército”. I deal with the changes in the Company and its consequences in “Acerca da modernização do Exército”, Comunicação e Política, v. 22, n. 3, Rio de Janeiro, CEBELA, 2004.

³ In this work, I especially use the correspondence of the French military attaché to Brazil, Commander Fanneau de la Horie, Rapport au Ministre de la Guerre (Report to the War Ministry), Rio de Janeiro, 13.12.18, SHAT.

⁴ Fanneau de La Horie, Rapport au Ministre de la Guerre, Rio de Janeiro, 13.12.18, SHAT.

⁵ “A Defeza Nacional”, No. 190, Rio de Janeiro, outubro de 1929, p 15.

⁶ Ministério da Guerra, Relatório do ministro Alberto Cardoso de Aguiar, Rio de Janeiro, 03.05.1919.

⁷ Consul de France à Porto Alegre, Lettre au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Porto Alegre, 27.04.1919, SHAT 7N 3391.

⁸ Gamelin, Rapport Secret N. 9. Rio11.06.19 - SHAT, 7N 3391.

⁹ Gamelin, Rapport Secret au Ministre de la Guerre, n. 9. Rio de Janeiro 11.06.19, SHAT, 7N 3391.

¹⁰ Gamelin, Rapport Secret, 29.11.21 N. 280, SHAT, 7N 3391.

¹¹ Gamelin, Rapports Secrets N. 378, 19.08.20; N. 6 de 05.01.22 e N. 21, 17.01.22, SHAT 7N 3391.

¹² Gamelin, Rapport Secret N. 285, 30.11.21, SHAT, 7N 3391

¹³ Gamelin, Rapport Secret N. 241, 07.10.21, SHAT, 7N 3391; Comite Militaire Allié de Versailles, 24.10.21; Gamelin, Telegrama cifrado de 09.10.21, SHAT, 7N 3391.

¹⁴ Gamelin, Rapport N. 128, 09.05.21, SHAT 7N 3391; Rapport N. 3, 04.01.22, SHAT 7N 3391.

¹⁵ Gamelin, Rapport Secret N. 378, 19.08.1920, SHAT 7N 3391.

¹⁶ Gamelin, rapport Secret, N. 187, 29.07.1921, SHAT, 7N 3391

¹⁷ Gamelin, Rapport Secret N. 9, 11.06.1919; Rapport Secret N. 177, 15.07.1921; Rapport Secret n, 119 de 12.05.1921, SHAT 7N 3391.

¹⁸ Gamelin, Rapport Secret N. 119, 12.05.21 SHAT, 7N 3391.

¹⁹ Rapport Derougemont rapport Secret E-M Armée Française, s/data, recebido em 02.03.1922; Section de Centralisation des Renseignements, No. 9384 SCR. 2/11, SHAT 7N 3391

²⁰ Gamelin, Rapport Secret N. 201, 23.05.24; Rapport Confidentiel N. 221, 10.06.24 SHAT 7N3391.

²¹ Gamelin, Rapport Confidentiel N. 225, 14.06.24, SHAT 7N3391.

²² Magnin au Ministre de la Guerre, Rapport secret n. 72, Rio de Janeiro, 11.12.1919. SHAT

²³ Fanneau de la Horie, au Ministre de la Guerre, Rapport Secret, 13.12.1919. SHAT

²⁴ Magnin au Ministre de la Guerre, Rapport secret n. 65, Rio de Janeiro, 07.11.1919 SHAT

²⁵ Magnin au Ministre de la Guerre, Rapport secret n. 29, Rio de Janeiro, 10.09.1919 SHAT

²⁶ Gamelin, Rapports Secrets, de 01.04.1920 e N. 12, de 15.06.19, SHAT 7N 3391.

²⁷ Gamelin, Rapport Secret N. 134, 02.02.1920, SHAT 7N 3391.

²⁸ Moinville, Rapport Secret de 01.05.23, SHAT 7N 3321.

²⁹ Gamelin a M. Herriot, 'Note sur l'action de la Mission Militaire Française au Brésil, janvier 1914 – janvier 1925', SHAT 7N 3391.

³⁰ The General certainly intended to say that the Brazilian Army needed to gain independence in relation to foreign industry.

³¹ Gamelin au Ministre de la Guerre, Rapport Secret n. 390, Rio de Janeiro, 20.09.1920, SHAT, 7N 3391.

³² Gamelin au Ministre de la Guerra, Rapport Secret n. 134, Rio de Janeiro, 02.02.1920, SHAT, 7N 3391.

³³ Gamelin au Ministre de la Guerre, Rapport Secret n. 187, Rio de Janeiro, 29.07.1921, SHAT 7N 3391.

³⁴ Gamelin au Ministre de la Guerra, Rapport Secret n. 12, Rio de Janeiro, 15.06.19, SHAT, 7N 3391.

³⁵ Gamelin au Ministre de la Guerre, Rapport Secret n. 280, Rio de Janeiro, 29.11.1921, SHAT 7N 3391.

³⁶ Gamelin au Ministre de la Guerre, Rapport Secret n. 370, Rio de Janeiro, 08.10.1920, SHAT 7N 3391.

³⁷ Gamelin au Ministre de la Guerre, Rapport Secret n. 87, Rio de Janeiro, 14.04.1924, SHAT 7N 3391.

³⁸ Gamelin du Ministre de la Guerra, Rapport Secret n. 8, Rio de Janeiro, 05.01.1923, SHAT 7N 3391.

³⁹ Gamelin au Ministre de la Guerre, Rapport Secret n. 180, Rio de Janeiro, 24.03.1920, SHAT, 7N 3391.

⁴⁰ Gamelin au Ministre de la Guerre, Rapports Secrets, Rio de Janeiro, 31.03.1920 e 16.04.1920, SHAT, 7N 3391.

⁴¹ Gamelin du Ministre de la Guerre, Rapport Secret n. 199, Rio de Janeiro, 12.05.1921, SHAT, 7N 3391; Rapport n. 119, Rio de Janeiro, 12.05.1921, SHAT, 7N 3391.

⁴² Spire, Rapport Secret au Ministre de la Guerre, n. 329. Rio de Janeiro 23.09.27, SHAT, 7N 3392.
