

The dilemma of the 1990s: what to do about 'nationalism' in post-communist countries?

1 INTRODUCTION

This critical essay was addressed to those Western intellectuals who draw the conclusion that contemporary development in post-communist countries is dominated primarily by the growth of irrational and destructive nationalism. A number of terminological and methodological misunderstandings are pointed out. Nation-forming has occurred in the form of national movements, a type which started from a non-dominant ethnic group and not from an Early-Modern state-nation. Such development towards a modern nation was prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe, although it is also found in Western and Northern parts of Europe. This type of nation-forming resulted in some permanent characteristics and stereotypes which developed typically in the members of 'small nations'. It is necessary to discriminate in the use of the term, nationalism: we must recognize that national identity is different from nationalism. Ideas about real or partially imagined national interests accompany the existence of every (and hence also East European) nation.

The process of education toward a European identity cannot ignore the existence of nations as a sociological fact with regard to the pos-communist countries. The decision about the inclusion of these countries in the European identity does not

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only depend on the members of these nations, but also on whether the West will cease to perceive the small post-communist countries as mere accidental foci of 'nationalism' and the recipients of economic aid.

Whether one finds it exciting or distressing, it is an undeniable fact that 12 new nation states were formed over the last few years in the region formerly comfortably labeled the Soviet Bloc by Western Europeans. These states did not come into being by command from Moscow, but were (mostly) motivated by a spontaneous desire for national self-determination, by which most Western commentators unfortunately including social scientists were taken aback. Western commentators were used to the idea that constitutional change in 'the East' happened by Moscow's orders, and that there was only one 'correct' way of resisting communism; adoration of the global market economy and a declaration of civil rights. They were almost uniformly horrified by the current development, Europe was endangered by a new kind of destructive nationalism! This paper does not want to increase the number of the moralizing accounts telling us what is correct, nor does it venture any fashionable forecasts. The primary task of a historian is to analyze and explain, not to judge.

2 POINTS OF DEPARTURE LEADING TO THE DEADLOCK OF MISUNDERSTANDING

Current studies on 'nationalism' in Central and Western Europe struggle with several methodological and terminological problems which are a handicap in capturing the essence of the current processes.

First is the semantic problem. Every specialist knows that the term 'nation' has a different meaning in the English linguistic consciousness than the word's equivalent in German and most Slavic languages. Yet, we encounter opinion and attitude

analyses of the members of these nations using the term 'nation' (which is connotative of 'state') in English texts unreflectingly. However, the agents of contemporary national movements in post-communist Europe strongly associate the term with ethnicity, language, and community of culture. The English linguistic context understands the relation between 'nation' and 'ethnic group' as two different categories, while the German, Czech, Croatian and other linguistic environments refer to two developing categories: a nation is a successor of an ethnic group, ethnicity is contained in national existence.

The danger of a bad misunderstanding is obvious. Even worse is the misunderstanding ensuing from similarly reckless use of the derivative 'nationalism'. In English, this is again connotative of the strive for statehood or of the idea of the state interests, while its meaning is very unstable in the linguistic context of Central and Eastern Europe. The negative connotations of the term are prevalent there. This is reinforced by the official terminology of the Leninist theory considering 'bourgeois nationalism' corrupt.

The term nationalism is a relatively recent academic concept, it entered American research in the period between the World Wars, and appeared in Europe after World War II. Many social scientists have tried to use it as a neutral, technical term, but it has always depended on the linguistic consciousness of the particular nations whether it is accepted as neutral or negative. After all, even in American terminology 'patriotism' refers to positive manifestations of the relation to a nation.

Nationalism appears in so many contexts that we can characterize the situation as one of total confusion. Does it refer to the 'state of mind' as Hans Kohn understood it in his classic "The Idea of Nationalism" published at the end of World War II? Does it mean a human activity, political struggle, or armed struggle? Is it to be understood as the reality of identification with the nation? Certainly all of this and much more. We can see the

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paradox even in the work of such a concise thinker as Ernest Gellner. He defines nationalism as a 'political principle asserting that the political and the national units must be identical', but he further speaks about nationalism in relation to already existing states, that is, where the postulate of nationalism was achieved and its effects *ex definitione* should therefore have ceased (E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1983). The same pertains to the thesis shared also by Eric Hobsbawm that 'nationalism created nations'. If this were the case, nationalism ought either to disappear or 'start creating' something else after the formation of fully-fledged nations.

The picture of confusion will be complete if we ask in reference of whom the term is used. This terminology makes a member of the SS a 'nationalist', as equally as a participant in the Norwegian or Polish resistance, a Medieval chronicle, Dostoievski, or Masaryk. The term is used also in the plural and some groups are labeled as 'nationalists'. Neither developmental nor structural differences between these groups of 'nationalists' are taken into consideration. Even whole nations were in the 1990s called 'nationalist': i.e. Serbians, Estonians, Macedonians, Russians. Only the Germans, who have at the very same time united with such national enthusiasm, are spared this stigma.

The list of examples could continue. For now, I would like to add that the evidence of one person taking a 'nationalist' attitude to one nation and being sympathetic to another is quite common. One person or one group of people can take 'nationalist' attitudes at one time and depart from them later, and vice versa.

We can lessen the confusion at least to an extent, if we use 'nationalism' in its rather old-fashioned meaning, that is, in relation to an attitude of superiority of one's own nation and its interests over other nations and their interests. We can also add that, in many languages (and also in the United States!),

the term 'patriotism' and its equivalents are the positive counterparts of 'nationalism'. The problem is that we may be able to draw a line between these attitudes (with some difficulty) in the analysis of an individual's attitudes, but it is impossible to apply it to group attitudes. It seems that academically the most productive solution is to avoid the term nationalism and replace it with other, less confusing terms, like national consciousness, national identity and identification, national movement, love for one's country, hatred toward the nation N, separatism, xenophobia, etc. As we will see later, the most important of these is the term 'identity'.

Another shortcoming of many studies on the nation-forming processes and national objectives in Central and Eastern Europe is that they take the 'French model' as their starting point for assessment of the development of the whole of Europe. Any phenomena which do not fit the model are considered 'deviations'. It is significant that Kohn's dichotomy of double nationalism is being revived (whether authors quote him or not), in that Western nationalism was bred on the ideas of democracy and liberalism, and Eastern nationalism based on the principles of ethnicity, that is, 'blood'. The former is, of course, progressive, because it is in accordance with the civil principle; the latter is reactionary and should be renounced, for it is associated with authority and dictatorship. The problem, however, is not so simple, since nations were formed as part of a historical process, and history did not unravel the way contemporary humanists had imagined it would.

This brings us to another defective approach, the lack of a historical approach to the contemporary processes in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, it is symptomatic of studies of nation-forming in the cases of France, Great Britain, or the Netherlands to reach as far back as the late Middle Ages, while studies on the European East present the issue as if current 'nationalism' came out of the blue in this region, or was a re-

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petition of a 19th century phenomenon. The sheer ignorance of the history of nations which dared to form a nation state in the conditions of backward 'Eastern' society (whose languages and culture the Western authors usually do not know) is, of course, much at fault.

The most frequent interpretation of the 'new nationalism' in post-communist Europe was during 1990s to blame Communism for everything. Nationalism was banned and suppressed under the dictatorships, therefore, it could not manifest itself. It emerged out of some tucked-away source like the genie out of the bottle with the fall of the dictatorships. This simple-minded, but effective theory presupposes that it is possible to freeze a state of mind of decades, and it will then arise afresh after defrosting. Unfortunately, the reality, which can be tested empirically, does not correspond to this theory.

Empirical evidence in support of the other part of the interpretation of nationalism as the work of communism is a bit better. Many former Communist leaders used after 1990 nationalist slogans to achieve their political objectives. This interpretation, however, also has a weak spot: it does not explain why, in some countries, the masses agreed with these former leaders and supported them, while in others, such argumentation is not successful. Should we not look for the causes of the success of nationalist slogans rather in the overall conditions of a particular country, in the context of its historical traditions, and international position?

The last element of the methodological confusion, which I would like to point out, could be called 'pars pro toto'. The fact that a strong wave of aggressive nationalism and mass xenophobia sprang out in one or two post-communist countries - Serbia and Croatia - is only too often generalized in Western European studies (or rather, in current-affairs coverage) to the extent that many authors spoke about nationalism in the whole of Eastern Europe. The same short cut occurs if several nati-

onalist articles appear in the press of one of these countries, or if nationalist slogans win the support of a certain percentage of voters. The manifestation of nationalism of a part of society is then presented as 'nationalism' of the whole nation, as evidence of the absence of the civil principle in the whole society etc. I do not venture a guess as to how Western Europe would accept this interpretation, if someone concluded from Le Pen's election successes that all French are xenophobic, or from IRA activities that all Irish are terrorists.

3 THE SPECIFICITY OF 'SMALL NATIONS'

If we want to explain the 'new nationalisms' in Central and Eastern Europe, we have to take the fact that this region, just as any other part of Europe, has been subject to nation-forming processes as our point of departure. Historically, there are two basic types of this process: the first started from integrated state-nations, absolute or constitutional monarchies. At the end of the 18th century, these began to transform – either gradually or by means of a revolution – into communities of equal citizens sharing national consciousness. The state-nations had their own culture in the tradition of a literary language; the social structure of their members included all classes and social strata corresponding to the existing level of economic and social development. The modern French, English, Dutch, Portuguese, and Swedish nations followed this path, as with some modifications did the Spanish and Danish nations.

The second type of the nation-forming process gave rise to all other European nations. It occurred in the conditions of a non-dominant ethnic group, that is, 'an ethnîe' (A. Smith), which had a higher or lower degree of ethnic identity, but which lacked the following criteria of a full national existence: (1) statehood; (2) a complete social structure (that is, own 'national' elites); and (3) the tradition of a literary language. The de-

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velopment into a national community took the more complicated form of a national movement; that is, a purposeful effort to achieve all the missing attributes of full national existence. Such national movements occurred in the territories of multi-ethnic empires. The best known of these are the Russian, Habsburg, and Ottoman Empires, but Great Britain, Denmark, and Spain also belong to this category.

The programs of these national movements included linguistic, social, and political demands. Both specific national (the use of language in the state administration, political participation, complete social structure) and general modernizing (civil rights, democratic franchise, freeing of the peasantry, etc) objectives were included. The political objectives of these movements usually did not include the demand for full national independence. Only Balkan, Polish, and later also Hungarian national movements aimed at that. It is important for our argument that all nations in the post-communist part of Europe (with the exception of the Russians) were formed by this process, which means that they resulted from more or less successful national movements. It needs to be emphasized that the process was one of these two basic types of nation-forming and not a deviation, mistake, or artificial construct, as German Nationalliberalen and Russian Slavophiles asserted in the 19th century.

This typological differentiation was not included in order to preach about dead history, but because the forming of modern nations in the condition of national movement has had far-reaching effects on the mentality of these nations and their specificity? We can sum it up as follows.

(1) Most national movements originally did not focus on forming a state and therefore, the tradition of modern statehood has only marginal importance in the underlying political thinking. This explains their weak interest in the discussions of

Jacobinism or liberalism, and the fervent protection of their newly-gained statehood as a national value. This attitude certainly contains (and did contain in the past) the danger of establishing an authoritarian regime out of 'national interests'.

(2) The existence of nationally-relevant antagonisms – that is social antagonisms – in which members of the non-dominant ethnic group conflicted with members of the state-nation or ruling elites of a multi-national empire, was very important for the success of national mobilization. This bred a stereotype of nationalization of social conflicts and conflicts of interests in general. That which is addressed as a social antagonism and sometimes 'translated' into political terminology in state-nations becomes translated into national terminology in the conditions of a national movement and later also in the nation-state. The old stereotype mixed with reality in this process.

(3) The national movements in all the three 'Eastern' empires (Ottoman, Russian, and Habsburg), targeted directly or indirectly, the old system of absolutism and oppression, and its dynastic legitimacy. Disrespect for legitimacy and continuity often followed this attitude. Also, these movements started 'from below' and were directed up against the ruling elites. The image (and later the stereotype) of the enemy, thus, was not associated with the neighbor, as was the case with state-nations (for examples, Germans in the view of the French), but with somebody 'at the top': Turks for the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks; Russians and Germans in the case of the Poles; and Hungarians in the view of the Slovaks. This relation was then easily open to the idea of the national movement as a struggle in the interest of progress and against the forces of the old world; Tsarism, Ottomanism, the Habsburgs. It is possible that this idea still survives with some modifications; i.e. the Soviet system took over the role of Tsarism, Ottomanism was replaced by the Turks (or rather, with Muslims), and the Habsburgs with the Germans.

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(4) It follows from these typological characteristics that national movements had to aim at winning the support of the masses, because the success of nation-forming depended on their mobilization. The quick integration of the masses in the myth of the people as the preserver of ethnicity, and therefore, the core of the nation, followed from this premise. We can also deduce spontaneous democratism and egalitarianism, as well as the weakened resistance against populism.

(5) The national movements occurred in the ambience in which national existence was not taken for granted. The movements' leaders were rejected, humiliated, sometimes even persecuted, and their objective was called fiction, a mistake, a crime. This gave rise to the ensuing feeling of endangerment of the nation – which was later transformed into a lasting stereotype – as well as an urge to prove the legitimacy of one's own national existence. A member of a state-nation, who takes the existence of his or her own nation for granted has difficulty in understanding these feelings and stereotypes. The need to justify the grounds for one's own national existence has manifested itself in various and often controversial ways. On the one hand, it can stimulate innovation, the effort 'to catch up', but on the other hand, it can encourage looking for excuses for one's own shortcomings, and creating delusions of one's qualities.

(6) The feeling of endangerment also bred another attitude which has survived in stereotypes: the position of defense. The national movements started from the premise that they had merely defended the rights of their nations to existence, that they had not threatened the existence of other nations and had not intended to do so. The image of a peaceful and non-violent national character usually developed from the defensive complex: bravery and war qualities are appreciated in the historical consciousness only in relation to the defense against an external threat. While this stereotype could have positive educational effects (a plough is always a better national symbol than a sword), another stereotype is clearly dangerous: it is the moral

exculpation from deeds committed in the defense of real or fictional national interests.

(7) The national movements were always movements of the province against the centre and, therefore, had great difficulties in overcoming the barriers determined by this peripheral position. The leaders often idealized 'smallness' and marginalization as specific virtues, to which evaluating criteria used by 'big' nations could not be applied. Hence there was strong provincialism, which has survived to the present day. This also explains why the national movements paid relatively less attention to international relations and contacts – at least in comparison with the state-nations.

National movements were not exclusively Central and Eastern European phenomena, nation-forming in Western Europe has also occurred in this way – as was the case in Germany and Italy where national movements strove to achieve just one attribute which they needed for full national existence: statehood. We can trace many German and Italian stereotypes similar to these we have just described.

4 LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE HISTORICAL PARALLEL

If we attempted an unbiased assessment of the events in the so-called post-communist countries during the decade of 1990s, we find that we can characterize only a fraction of them by the term 'nationalism' in the narrow traditional sense of the word. The term 'national movement' will cover a much larger spectrum. Indeed, the development in many of these countries was, in a condensed form, what in historical terminology is called a national movement. The parallels are convincing, also in the present, the main objective of these nations was to achieve the attributes of a fully-fledged national existence, which they lacked – that is, full independence, a complete social structure

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corresponding to those countries with developed market economies, and an independent national culture. Although the basic elements of the national demands were the same, they differed in detail so that the political programme was also strong, especially in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The question is whether the comparison with a historical parallel can help to explain the roots or at least more complex circumstances of contemporary national movements. The 19th-century national movements were responses to the crisis of the old system, to the disintegration of the old value systems. This determined the need for a new community, new relations, a new group identity. This is essentially similar to the post-communist disintegration of established relations, uncertainties, and fears for the future that followed the collapse of the centrally planned economy, social security, and ideological control. In this situation, a national community constitutes a promise of tangible support, and a new and comprehensible value system. Unlike the 19th century, the idea of national solidarity was already in existence and could be adopted and modified.

In most national movements, agitations started in a situation when neither the protagonists nor the addressees had any political experience of life in a civil society, and therefore, national demands were more easily understandable and acceptable for them than abstract political programs. A similar situation occurred in the late 1980s: after the 50 or 70 years of authoritarian regime. National and social demands were more successful in mobilizing the masses than complicated statements about human rights and consensual democracy.

The national movements had to define the physical borders of their nations (the nations were seen in terms of a group personality) sooner or later. Two criteria were available for this process – ethnic or historical definitions. Neither criteria covered all the known consequences of minority movements in the period between the two World Wars in those cases in which a historical definition was possible. Nearly all contemporary na-

tional movements faced the same problem, and their leaders usually decided in favor of the historical border, although it would again create ethnic minorities in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia and Moldova. Nations are still personified, which increases the discordance between ethnic and political borders. It is still true that the situation of minorities consisting of the members of the former ruling (state) nation in the territory of the former under-privileged nation is particularly critical. The role that German and Hungarian minorities played between the World Wars was during the 1990s played by Russian and Serbian minorities.

The defensive argument still dominates national stereotypes; a national movement defends rightful claims, which makes possible moral exculpation. This is usually complemented by the stereotype of peacefulness, the demand for the national unity, and the need to express the right to sovereignty.

The important role of the nationally relevant conflict of interests has shifted in comparison with the past: then the conflicts of interests occurred in the conditions of an ascending society, and of economic growth. The present conflicts, however, have been accompanied by economic depressions and crises and, above all, with a total change of the economic system and the ascension of new elites to the power vacuum that was left after the withdrawal of the Communist 'nomenclatura' elites.

If a certain level of social communication conditioned the success of national agitation in the past, the role of the mass media has now become the decisive force in the speed and intensity of national mobilization. This was a reason for a speedy mass response to national agitation. Nevertheless, not even the mass media can 'construct' a nation state if the favorable conditions are not fulfilled.

The possibility of social advancement was another necessary condition of successful nation-forming. We can observe a

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significant difference in this respect. In the past, national movement leaders had to strive for each position and, if they managed to penetrate into the elites, they had to modify their lifestyle and moral code. Leaders of the new national movements penetrated 'a vacuum' in which no traditional values exist. This contained the potential for abuse, but also a fresh start.

After the 19th-century national movements rejected identification with a dynastically defined multi-ethnic empire, they had no supranational authority as a source of a higher identity. Today, the supranational identity is represented by the project of European integration. Even though almost none of the new national movement leaders questioned verbally the prospect of 'Europe', it is not clear whether they were at that time willing to accept fully the Europe of regions.

5 EUROPEAN, NATIONAL AND REGIONAL IDENTITIES

The aim of the emphasis on the regional identity is to weaken national identity and nationalism to make way for the European identity. Although the idea was developed in the post-war period, it needs to be noted that the relationship between the region and the nation has a longer history. In the 18th century, the patriotism of the Enlightenment was based on identification with 'the country', which was defined in terms of a region. A national identity, or a national movement marginalized and eventually suppressed this regional identity. The historical experience can be a useful lesson for the present. Let us focus on the points of difference. How did, and how does, national identity differ from regional identity?

Both identities are related to the population of a particular territory, but they differ significantly in defining the territory. A national territory does not have to be entirely compact (it can include minorities living in the territory of other nations or sta-

tes) and it is determined by a strict dividing line between US and THEM, the two ethnically defined groups. A region is not so precisely defined, nor is it important whether the inhabitants of the region are ethnically homogeneous. A nation has members, a region has inhabitants. This means different consequences of migration. The inhabitants of a region lose their regional identity by moving out of the region, while members of a nation preserve it (at least for one generation). Similarly, immigrants can easily accept a regional identity, but they have the status of foreigners in relation to the ethnically-defined members of a nation for a long time.

National identity is based on the existence of a distinctive culture, different from others, while a regional culture usually constitutes a part of a broader national culture or several national cultures, although it can have certain national specifics in this framework. From the perspective of cultural specificity, both identities are not mutually exclusive but complementary.

National identity is associated with the idea of a personified nation (group personality) with its own history, with which and individual identifies. Regional identity has no such personification. This creates a difference which was more important in the Enlightenment than today. Regional patriotism was based on the idea of the patriot's responsibility for the people, for the inhabitants of the region, including the possibility of advancement. National activism aims at a fictional idea of a personality who has certain needs and articulates his or her demands. Regional interests are only the interests of the community of the inhabitants, and lack the charisma of a group personality.

The difference in the relation to state power is symptomatic. A region always evokes the image of a province, a territory within a larger whole. A multi-ethnic empire represented the larger whole in the period of nation-forming. If the regional identity was compatible with the national identity at the time, it was not the case with the relation between the natio-

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nal identity and the supra-national state. There, the effort toward the minimization of the peripheral position of the nation and the subsequent establishment of national territory as a sovereign centre within the state prevailed. In the change conditions of the 20th century, this process results in the drive for nation statehood.

The most important advantage of a regional identity is that although conflicts of interests will still occur they will not become nationally-relevant, and therefore, will not be used in the interest of nationalism. The advantage might become merely relative if the concept of a region is substituted for the concept of a nation in our time, because antagonisms between regions could be 'translated' into the language of antagonisms between nations.

Here we arrive at an important relation to political power. While the politicians of a nation-state are more or less independent agents of power in their 'own' territory, regionalization presupposes dependence of the politicians in the region on the overarching state – or on Europe. Under what conditions will the ruling elites of the post-communist nation-states be willing to concede their position to regional politicians? Direct dependence on Europe seems to be, at least judging from verbal declarations, more acceptable than dependence mediated through a multi-ethnic state. From this perspective, the disintegration of federations and the creation of nation-states after 1989 appears to be a favorable starting point for European integration. Nevertheless, the dangers follow from a situation in which a nation with a low population will also be in a position of a region in relation to Europe, with all the risks of nationally-relevant conflicts. We should note that a weaker national unit always separates from a stronger one in secessions and not the other way round.

The acceptance of a European identity seems unproblematic, leaving aside the issue of political power, providing that we

can assume that a European identity can be 'cultivated', just as nationalism can be cured. Such an approach, however, is too voluntarist, because the success of any education always depends on certain external determinants, and no identity, not even the European one, can be introduced by a decree without regard to them. Some of the determinants are that the citizens who are to accept the new identity share the same economic level, culture and value systems, and identify with the present and the past of the new unit. This is the crux of the problem.

The differences in the increase of economic level after 1989 can stultify the possibility of creating a West-East community based on shared interests (unless we call multinational corporations communities of shared interests). The prospect of a cultural community is no less dubious. The reason is that a possible pan-European and integrating impact is dominated by American (and possibly Japanese) imports. A visitor from another planet might say that the common features of the continent called Europe are primarily TV series like *Dallas* and catering of the McDonald's type! The historical dimension of the European identity is perhaps even more complicated since it seems that the 'West' is unwilling to integrate the past of the post-communist countries in the established image of European history, as can be seen in looking at any European history textbook published in France, Great Britain or Germany. The well-meant projects of the new concept of European history have had no impact on this fact yet.

The most often quoted issue is of the insufficient compatibility of the value systems as shown by the contrast of Western civil society and Eastern 'nationalism'. In this respect, the terminological arbitrariness, mentioned in the introduction, creates the largest problem. The abstract, undefined, but often repeated vision of the undifferentiated Eastern 'nationalism' blatantly overlooked the fact that separatism was gaining in force in many Western European countries and its agents are natio-

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nalists in the same way as, say, right-wing politicians in Hungary or Lithuania. The two groups, after all, share a positive relation to European integration. I have not mentioned the success of semi-fascist and racist political parties, for example, in France and Italy, because I perceive a fundamental difference in the differing levels of political culture, rather than in a qualitatively different 'nationalism'.

If we want to undertake a serious analysis (as opposed to statements consisting of journalistic clichés) of the issues concerning national identity of citizens of post-communist nation states and the extent that this identity is a threat to civil values and a hindrance to the inclusion in Europe, we have first to put aside the abstract scarecrow of 'Eastern nationalism'. As long as we persist in using such unclear terminology, we cannot arrive at any concrete solution to the problem. Thus, we have to start with concrete analyses not at the level of grand ideas, but at the level of real life.

I can, therefore, imagine a coordinated research project focusing equally on Europe, West and East, and exploring the foundations of national (and regional) identities of the nation-states' nationals, and the existing stereotypes. From what traditions do these identities follow? What have been the 'nationalist' demands? What phase of the nation-forming process are all these particular communities going through? Such research would also have to include the historical dimension.

As long as the opinion that, from the historical point of view, the European 'West' and 'East' are and have been two incomparable units prevails in the European Union, the discussions about European integration will remain mere propaganda. The Iron Curtain was created by Communism in defense against democracy. The historical irony is that, so many years after its fall, it still survives as a mental barrier, especially in Western mass-media, which helps 'the West' keep its exclusivity.