Kalagatos Revista de Filosofia
https://doi.org/10.52521/kg.v23i1.16711

The incontinence and the intemperance in thomistic and aristotelian thought regarding foucault's political technology of the body: the non-absolute character of morality

A incontinência e a intemperança tomista e aristotélica face à tecnologia política do corpo foucaultiana: o caráter não absoluto da moral

Thiago Guagliardo KLOHN
Doutorando em Filosofia pela Universidade de Caxias do Sul.
E-mail: tgklohn@ucs.br

ABSTRACT

Here the issue of incontinence and intemperance is addressed from Thomistic and Aristotelian perspectives, with their motivations and validity questioned both in the Middle Ages and in the present day, while drawing a parallel with Foucault's political technology of the body as apparatuses of socio-political control. Furthermore, the absolute character of morality is challenged in order to invite the reader to reflect on the current difficulty of accepting, considering, and constructing a society with some updated and more ethical moral parameters, in order to grant respect and value to the multiplicity of types and preferences that constitute human nature in every social dimension.
KEYWORDS: Docilization of bodies. Morality. Incontinence. Political Power. Sexuality.

RESUMO

Aborda-se o problema da incontinência e da intemperança a partir dos pensamentos tomistas e aristotélicos, questionando-se suas motivações e validade, tanto na Idade Média como na atualidade, e traçando-se um paralelo com a tecnologia política de corpo foucaultiana enquanto aparatos de controle sociopolítico. Ademais, questiona-se o caráter absoluto da moral, a fim de convidar o leitor a se indagar a respeito da dificuldade presente para se aceitar, pensar e construir uma sociedade com parâmetros morais atualizados e mais éticos, no sentido de se respeitar e valorizar a multiplicidade de tipos e gostos constitutiva da natureza humana em qualquer aspecto social.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: docilização de corpos, moralidade, incontinência, poder político, sexualidade.

1 INTRODUCTION

In this article, far from defending any particular opinion about what I intend to discuss here, I bring it essentially closer to a philosophical reflection, in the sense of occupying it more with the raising of inquiries than, strictly speaking, with the presentation of answers – not that assertions and theses cannot themselves be philosophical. That is not the issue, but I limit myself to pointing out how, at times,

discussions of a moral nature, whether in social, marital, religious, political, or any other relations, may be nothing more than pretexts, or empty speeches, used to defend purposes unrelated to the edification of human ethics, as is often made to appear. In short, the idea for this text arises from Thomistic comments on continence, as presented in the *Summa Theologica*, passes through Aristotelian foundations on the same subject, found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, questions Foucauldian thought, described in *Discipline and Punish*, regarding the purpose of the disciplining of bodies through continence, but does not rest upon the content of any of these texts; rather, it makes use of them to inquire why we accept (or do not accept) the present fixed moral order (civil and religious), as imposed upon us by society, with respect to human sexuality. Obviously, this is a complex subject for such a limited scope, but let this not be an obstacle to at least sketching here this curiosity of mine, which also bears relevance in the present moment of human history.

2 FROM GREEK AND THOMISTIC THOUGHT TO A QUESTIONING REASON

The Thomistic point of view is undoubtedly one of the most important, from its emergence to the present day, when it comes to institutional religious and political morality, and likewise in the realms of personal piety, both for clergy and laity. His texts are often used in different – sometimes mutually opposing – contexts, such that it would not be incorrect to state that Thomas Aquinas has served, throughout the history of philosophy, both as a bulwark for conservatives and as a spear for progressives. That said, it is important to make clear that it is not my aim here to present a reading of Thomas Aquinas based on Aristotle, nor of Thomism (of whichever provenance or era), since, as De Boni (*in* Kuiava; Stefani, 2010) rightly points out, there is a considerable difference in the understanding of the order of things between Greek thought and that of Thomas Aquinas. That is, the former is materially anthropocentric regarding the hierarchy of beings, but cosmocentric-objectivist with regard to form, that is, in ontological terms concerning the conception of being. By contrast, Thomistic thought is, in content, theocentric (placing God at the summit of the hierarchy of beings – material theocentrism), yet anthropocentric in form in its conception of being (formal anthropocentrism), or, in De Boni's own terms:

> For Greek thought, the archetype that predominates when it comes to being is the cosmic-objective one, with other modes of being, among them subjectivity, deriving from it and understood only indirectly. For Thomas, the archetype that governs every understanding of being is the mode of being of the human being; that is, contrary to cosmocentrism, the being of the human is not reduced to one case among others – even if it is the most privileged. For Thomistic formal anthropocentrism, the being of all entities is envisioned from subjectivity, from the being of the human. […] Now, using medieval language, the intellectual soul constitutes

> the human being insofar as it is the form which, uniting with matter, places him in the degree of being which he holds (*in* Kuiava; Stefani, 2010, p. 389 – my translation).

That is, for Thomas, it is through reason, through the intellect, that the human being constitutes and recognises himself as such, and this is, according to his understanding, the supreme degree of perfection in all of nature, hence the superiority of humans over everything else that exists, or, as De Boni further clarifies: "He [the human being] is not, therefore, one among others, but the one who, through his intellect, is all beings, the one in whom all beings in a certain way gather together" (*in* Kuiava; Stefani, 2010, p. 390 – my translation).

It is not my purpose to discuss the subject of Thomistic hierarchies; I am solely interested in the philosopher's understanding that it is from a critical rational awareness of oneself and of the sensible reality surrounding one that the human being constitutes, recognises, and develops himself. Thus I must inquire whether it would not be precisely in this questioning rationality, which constitutes the human being and precedes all morality, that the solution may lie to the conflict brought by Thomas, Aristotle, and many others regarding incontinence and intemperance. Or, as I proposed to ask in this text: might such rationality be the lever that removes the obstacles to a new way of thinking about human sexuality on the level of interpersonal and social relations?

3 ARISTOTELIAN AND THOMISTIC CONTINENCE AND INCONTINENCE

Thomas Aquinas writes about continence within the medieval context of the thirteenth century, when the Church sought to strengthen its political power in alignment with feudalism and its suzerains. In this setting, individual and collective morality was a concern not only religious but also political, since the control of passions was seen as essential for the maintenance of social order – not very different from the ways in which control of the masses is still frequently exercised (Foucault, 2014a). Aiming at the perpetuation of the then-prevailing sociopolitical order, it was necessary to consolidate feudalism and, therefore, its rigid social hierarchy. Hence the Church seized the opportunity to encourage continence as a virtue that would help preserve social order, especially concerning conjugal fidelity and the control of instincts, since it, the Church, was the main spiritual and moral authority in Europe.

Addressing Thomas Aquinas's critical stance regarding the Church's political interest, along with its efforts to guide society according to Christian principles – which emphasised the need for virtues such as continence, especially in the control of bodily desires that might lead to the sins of concupiscence, lust, and gluttony – is not the aim of this reflection. However, it is possible that one of Thomas's main motivations for treating this moral issue was the rediscovery of classical Greek philosophy in the

intellectual centres of his time, particularly Aristotelian thought, which would gradually come to be integrated into Christian thought, including for systematic discussion of questions surrounding continence. Clearly, there is much more to be said about the context and motivations behind the Thomistic treatment of continence, but again, there is no space for such purposes in this article.

Amid all this, it should be remembered, as Thomas does in *On Kingship to the King of Cyprus*, that, consistent with his time, he was engaged in the elaboration of an ideal of moral governance. This explains why medieval rulers were encouraged to become examples of virtue – both to maintain order and to legitimise their power. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand why continence, as control of disordered desires, was an ideal that reinforced in common sense the image of wise and just leaders – might it be this dissimulative principle that underlies the present-day interest of politicians in presenting themselves as devout believers? In any case, regardless of what Aristotle said regarding continence, it was especially valued within the Christian ideal of holiness, being taught by the Church as a reflection of obedience to divine order and as a preparation of the soul for eternal life.

In summary, the Thomistic concept of continence is embedded in a broader effort to harmonise the requirements of Christian faith with classical philosophy, in a context where morality and politics were intimately connected. It is in this direction that Thomas discusses the question of continence across various parts of his vast work. In his *Summa Theologica* (ST), for instance, he examines the theme within the context of morality, virtues, and vices, drawing on Aristotle, especially the *Nicomachean Ethics* (NE) – though rereading the philosopher through the lens of Christian theology as understood in his time, since in that spatiotemporal framework the Christian faith, as taught by the Church, was the standard for judging true knowledge and what was morally right. And what did Aristotle say on the matter?

For the Stagirite philosopher, continence (*enkrateia*) was the human capacity to resist one's passions, desires contrary to reason, in order to act according to what was considered right. Incontinence (*akrasia*), on the other hand, was the act of yielding to passions despite knowing they were not morally accepted, letting oneself be dominated by improper desires contrary to the voice of reason. It is worth recalling that, for Aristotle, incontinence generally referred to bodily pleasures such as tactile ones (sex) and gustatory ones (food), though it could also refer to ambition (concupiscence) and anger (impetuosity) (NE, 1145b–1147a). However, the philosopher understood incontinence both as a natural inclination towards certain passions and as a trait of character in one who is incontinent, or, in his own words: "No one possesses all the forms of incontinence, but of some people we say they are incontinent absolutely" (NE, 1148b–1149b, my translation). That is, while for some people the weakness of incontinence would occur only in certain circumstances and regarding certain objects of desire, one who had a constant tendency to yield to passions was called incontinent in the absolute sense.

For Thomas, the human being acts correctly through a double knowledge (the universal and the particular) which, when violated, constitutes incontinence (ST I-II, Q. 77). However, Thomas argues that there are situations in which a person, although possessing a "universal" knowledge of good and evil, is unable to apply it to the singular case at the moment of practical deliberation; this mismatch between the intellect and the rational appetite would constitute the vice of incontinence. Such circumstances, according to him, are cases of passionate actions or those carried out under the influence of drunkenness. Thomas explains:

> At times, a man does not consider what he habitually possesses because of some impediment, for example an external occupation or a bodily ailment. And it is precisely thus that one dominated by passion does not consider in particular what he universally knows, because the reason prevents such consideration. It does so in three ways: 1. through a kind of distraction, already mentioned above; 2. through contrariety: because passion frequently inclines one to the contrary of what universal knowledge affirms; 3. through a certain bodily alteration, which makes reason as though bound, unable freely to pass into act. For example, sleep or drunkenness also binds the use of reason through the bodily changes they cause. This happens in passions. Clear proof of this is that when they are extremely intense, a person sometimes loses the use of reason altogether. Many, through excessive love or anger, have gone so far as madness. Thus passion leads reason to judge in particular cases against the universal knowledge it possesses (Aquinas, 2003a, pp. 383–384 – my translation).

It is also not the purpose of this article to discuss, based on the above excerpt, the culpability of the acts of someone who, being intoxicated by sleep or chemical substances, acts incontinent. What matters here is that Thomas does not seem concerned with distinguishing incontinence as a character trait or a circumstantial attitude. For him, incontinence, in any of its forms, is a sin, since it is a voluntary choice to yield to disordered passions, because the "voice of reason" is always present, even if it "sounds more faintly" under circumstances such as those mentioned (ST II, Q. 156). Thus, for Thomas, the incontinent person is one who acts with knowledge but without mastery of the will; one who chooses to act contrary to reason despite knowing what is right. It is this tension between reason and passion indicated by Thomas (and appearing earlier in Aristotle) that serves to distinguish the continent from the incontinent. And while for Aristotle passions are natural tendencies of character (both in the continent and the incontinent), for Thomas they are an accident imposed by what Christian theology calls "original sin[1]". Therefore, for Thomas, the struggle of the incontinent is not only an ethical or rational conflict but a spiritual one; he associates incontinence with a moral weakness that can only be overcome with the help of divine grace and the virtues (ST I-II, Q. 49–54). In short, Thomas uses the same Aristotelian

[1]As a consequence of the disobedience of the proto-couple in the Edenic garden, partaking of the fruit that had been forbidden by the Creator God, the whole of humankind fell from the original state of grace and perfection in which it had lived, and came to bear forever, imprinted in its very nature, a tendency towards error and what is sinful.

foundations to treat the continent and the incontinent, but develops them with a more theological focus, emphasising the role of reason illuminated by faith and divine grace in overcoming such vices.

4 ARISTOTELIAN AND THOMISTIC INTEMPERANCE

Aristotle believed that there were two types of knowledge guiding human deliberation: one active or real, which governs human action; the other inactive or subdued by passions at the moment of action (NE 1145b–1154b). Based on this thesis, the philosopher explains the possibility – in the case of incontinence – of how someone can act contrary to reason. That is, as previously mentioned, the continent person is one who knows what is right and acts accordingly, following reason, even while feeling tempted to yield to passions. The incontinent person, however, is someone who knows what is right but allows reason to be subdued by disordered desires. In this sense, continence, for Aristotle, may be understood as a virtue, just below what he considers "moral excellence" (*aretê ethikê* – NE II.1, 1103a17–24), which is attained only when desires are harmonised with reason, as happens with the virtuous, temperate person who, therefore, acts correctly without effort or internal struggle.

There is, according to Aristotle, yet another type of character to consider, one that contrasts with the virtuous person: the intemperate individual. This person, as described in NE VII, 3–4, acts according to wrongful desires without feeling remorse. In other words, while the incontinent person repents after yielding to passion because he still recognises the value of what is right, the intemperate person is incapable of repentance, having internalised habits that distort reason, making actions consistent with desires, even when condemnable. That is, the intemperate person does not recognise the wrongdoing of his conduct, viewing it as normal and justifying it as good.

For Thomas – taking Aristotelian thought into account – intemperance is a far more serious moral failing than incontinence, as it implies a deeply ingrained vicious disposition, that is, a morally wrong habit that hardens the conscience. Thus, while the incontinent person still maintains some respect for reason and feels remorse after a sinful act, the intemperate person is positioned further from virtue, acting with complacency toward his own disordered desires, or, as Thomas himself explains:

> Now, in the intemperate person the will inclines to sin through its own choice, resulting from a habit acquired through custom, whereas in the incontinent person the will inclines to sin through passion. And since passion passes quickly, while habit, on the contrary, is a quality difficult to remove, it follows that the incontinent person, once the passion fades, soon repents. This does not happen with the intemperate person, who even rejoices in sin, since the practice of it has become connatural to him through acquired habit. Hence Scripture speaks of the intemperate: "They rejoice in doing evil and delight in the most perverse things." It is clear, therefore, that "the intemperate is much worse than the incontinent", as the Philosopher says (2003b, p. 349 – my translation).

Thus, having established and clarified, based on Aristotle, the character of the incontinent and the intemperate person, Thomas goes on to explain in Question 153 of the *Summa Theologica* the nature of the sin of lust, usually associated with incontinence due to the inability to control appetites related to sexual pleasure, though that sin is not limited to such pleasures. In Question 154, Thomas deepens the relationship between incontinence and chastity and identifies precisely the sins which, according to him, constitute lust: fornication, adultery, masturbation, homosexuality, bestiality, sacrilege, rape, abduction, and incest.

What emerges from everything presented thus far is that, for Thomas, without the use of reason and divine assistance one cannot attain continence. This, because of original sin. But what is this reason, as presented by Thomas, if not the subjugation of the person's will to moral demands expressed as duties shaped by the understandings and values of an era and imposed by the Church through the generation of feelings of indignation and guilt in those who violate or oppose them? And what is original sin if not the human being's own animal condition? Without considering such questions, Thomas, with his theologically driven philosophy, serves (consciously or not) the purposes of the established powers of his time, which sought to control the masses by disciplining their bodies – a Foucauldian term rooted in the critique of religious phenomena and their moral discourses often constituted as instruments of domination allied to political power, rather than concerned with what properly pertains to them: the sacred (Foucault, 2014b). But what exactly does this domination through the disciplining of bodily appetites consist of?

5 THE FOUCAULDIAN DOCILISATION OF BODIES AND ITS PRESENT IMPLICATIONS

Michel Foucault (MF) argues that the body is also directly embedded in the political sphere, not only because the relations of power operating within that domain have an immediate reach over it, marking it, directing it, subjecting it to punishments, imposing labour, obliging it to ceremonies, and demanding signs of submission, but also because it is through such mechanisms that the human critical, questioning, and rational spirit is shaped. MF writes: "The articulation body–object: discipline defines each of the relations that the body must maintain with the object it manipulates. It establishes a careful gearing between the one and the other" (Foucault, 2014b, p. 150 – my translation). These relations may annul one of the parties or subjugate it for economic or other uses, even as a meticulously planned political instrument.

Furthermore, as Foucault (2014b, p. 29 – my translation) also maintains, in this context of domination and human exploitation, "the body becomes a useful force only if it is at once a productive body and a subjected body". And how is this subjection of the body achieved? According to MF, it is obtained both through instruments of physical and ideological violence. For him, the subjection of the body may occur directly – physically, even – yet without being violent; at times it is subtle and technically conceived and applied, without weapons or terror, demonstrating that there is indeed a "knowledge" of the body that does not necessarily concern its physiology, but the psychic mechanisms through which its impulses are tamed or imprisoned. This knowledge and control he calls a "political technology of the body", which is diffuse, fragmentary, and multiform, not easily located either at the institutional level or within a State apparatus, for it is not something explicitly stated. It is something that operates from within the individual who, while restricting his own freedom, monitors himself and self-punishes. Or, in Foucault's own words:

> The history of this micro-physics of punitive power would thus be a genealogy, or a contribution to a genealogy, of the modern 'soul'. In seeing in this soul the reactivated remains of an ideology, one would sooner recognise in it the current correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. One should not say that the soul is an illusion or an ideological effect, but affirm that it exists, that it has a reality, that it is continually produced around, on the surface of, and within the body by the functioning of a power exercised over those who are punished—in a more general sense, over those who are watched, trained, and corrected; over the mad, children, school pupils, the colonised, over those fixed to an apparatus of production and controlled throughout their existence. Historical reality of this soul which, unlike the soul represented by Christian theology, is not born sinful and deserving of punishment, but arises from procedures of punishment, surveillance, correction, and coercion. This real and incorporeal soul is not a substance at all; it is the element in which the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a knowledge are articulated, the cog in which relations of power give rise to possible knowledge, and knowledge reinstates and reinforces power's effects. Upon this reality-reference, various concepts were constructed and fields of analysis demarcated: psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.; upon it techniques and scientific discourses were built; from it the moral claims of humanism were valued. But we must not be mistaken: the soul, illusion of the theologians, has not been replaced by a real man, object of knowledge, philosophical reflection, or technical intervention. The man of whom we are told and whom we are invited to liberate is already in himself the effect of a subjection far more profound than he is. A 'soul' inhabits him and brings him into existence, which is itself a component of the domain exercised by power over the body. The soul, effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul, prison of the body (2014b, pp. 32–33 – my translation).

It is this imprisonment of the soul through the body that – so it seems to me – precedes the moral problem discussed by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. An imprisonment that does not arise from the simple fear of being considered incontinent or intemperate by society, nor from fear of the punishments of hell, as Christian religion planted in the minds of its believers, but from the denial of the possibility of questioning the very established order of human sexuality in the first place.

It is regrettable that, at times, our age appears to be an age of immediacy and ready-made answers, much as was the age of Thomas Aquinas. Thus, religion seems to have provided such ready-made answers in the Middle Ages just as it still does today, but not only religion, also the prison we impose upon ourselves in order to assume our passions[2] and question whether other proposals of social, marital, relational, or political organisation might not be viable. Who, after all, could provide a definitive answer concerning human sexuality? Who could declare what is right to feel and what is not? What is permissible to do and what is not? It is not a matter here of relativising human actions – those still require parameters by which they may be guided, so as to respect the individuality of bodies, their inviolability, and the freedom of conscience of each person –, but of questioning morality as an absolute value. Yet, for society (officially and institutionally) it still seems preferable to adopt ready-made formulas lacking proper philosophical depth, rather than accept the human being as he in fact is: unfinished, in formation, and complex; a being who is not born with original sin, but who at a certain point in existence is confronted with consciousness of self, the world, and others; a being who, through such self-awareness, builds himself as an ethical subject, failing which, in denying it, condemns himself as a brute.

In sum, before asking whether one is faced with a case of incontinence or intemperance, why not ask why society validates certain tastes and behaviours as vices or passions and not others? Put more clearly, why, in a plural society, must only one stance be accepted as correct while others are rejected? It is not a matter here of questioning, for instance, the validity of heterosexuality, homosexuality, or any other sexual orientation, for these concern matters of intimate life and values that pertain to the personality and individuality of each person. It is a matter of questioning how long a society that claims to be evolved – like our Western society – will continue to tolerate the denial of space and respect for such personal differences. After all, what distinction exists, if not merely a conventional one, between being a monogamous or a polygamous[3] society, for example? Or, still concerning human sexuality, what right has anyone to judge as wrong the engaging in sexual relations before marriage (or even extramarital ones) if those involved hold a different understanding of the matter? All such questions expose not only what is natural to the human soul – the passions, as philosophers and theologians have termed them – but also the arbitrary, temporal, and mutable nature of moral norms within any sphere of human social organisation, which therefore must be continually re-evaluated through an ethical-philosophical lens.

[2]Here they are understood no longer as weaknesses or sins, but as constitutive aspects of our very human nature, which is complex, multiple, and evolutionary.

[3]Regarding this aspect of our sexuality, Ullmann clarifies by stating: "It is interesting to observe that, among humans, monogamy is the rarest form of relationship between the sexes. Of the more than 800 known and examined cultures (societies), 16 per cent are merely monogamous by law; 83 per cent permit polygamy, and the remaining percentage includes cultures with polyandry" (2005, p. 55 – my translation).

6 Final Considerations

Considering both past and present times, various social institutions such as the Church, the State, the school, and even the family, Foucault argues that such entities ultimately develop practices and discourses aimed at rendering bodies and minds docile, producing individuals shaped to correspond to the norms and expectations of a given social order. This notion of docilisation, when applied to the context of Thomistic morality and Greek rationality, reveals a tension between the control of individual desires and the pursuit of rational autonomy, and lays bare the foundations of that same normativity. Now, the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, when interpreted through the lens of his theological rationality, proposes a model in which reason, illuminated by faith, and the adherence to Christian virtues allow one to overcome vices and achieve not necessarily full moral perfection, but that which he considers necessary for beatitude. However, such a model may also be understood as part of a disciplinary strategy which, by regulating human desires, upholds structures of power and domination.

In modernity, when reason begins to question not only religious morality but also the social mechanisms that shape individuals, the opportunity arises to rethink the relationship between the body, morality, and freedom. In my understanding, this remains the same questioning rationality that Thomas believed to be the foundation of what constitutes us as human beings, and which, since the Enlightenment, has allowed the established order to be questioned, starting from the very institutions that had never previously been confronted. This same rationality is what invites us, in contemporary times, to deconstruct the systems that subjugate bodies and, as I suggest here, to re-signify the categories of the passions from which the characters of continence, incontinence, and intemperance are considered. That is, according to what I propose, the continent would remain the one who resists his passions; the incontinent, the one who yields to them but later repents; and the intemperate, the one who does not acknowledge his own errors as such. What would be updated, within our current understanding of sexuality, are the moral norms regarding desires and practices, not so that they serve once again as instruments of control, but so that they demonstrate respect for the different dimensions of the human being, understood and experienced in all their complexity and multiplicity, without the constraints of dogmatic moral orders.

In sum, by moving from Greek and Thomistic thought towards a contemporary questioning rationality, what I sought here was the natural (and evolutionary) path of human reflection, a reflection that shifts from attempting to control desires merely on their surface level, to an approach that values self-knowledge and critical autonomy as pathways towards an ethical existence at peace with itself. Such

an ethical existence is based not on submission to external impositions (such as those stemming from institutions) nor internal ones (personal religious or non-religious beliefs), but on freedom and responsibility achieved through self-knowledge, self-evaluation, and the willingness to change and evolve.

REFERENCES

AQUINO, T. **Do governo dos príncipes ao rei de Cipro e Do governo dos judeus à duquesa de Brabante**. São Paulo : Anchieta, 1946.

AQUINO, T. **Suma teológica**: os hábitos e as virtudes, os dons do espírito santo, os vícios e os pecados, a lei antiga e a lei nova, a graça. Vol. 4. São Paulo – SP: Edições Loyola, 2003a.

AQUINO, T. **Suma teológica**: as bem-aventuranças, os atos humanos, as paixões das almas. Vol. 7. São Paulo – SP: Edições Loyola, 2003b.

ARISTÓTELES. **Ética a Nicômaco – Poética**. São Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1991.

FOUCAULT, M. **A ordem do discurso**: aula inaugural no Collège de France, pronunciada em 2 de dezembro de 1970. 24 ed. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 2014a.

FOUCAULT, M. **Vigiar e Punir**: nascimento da prisão. 42. ed. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes, 2014b.

KUIAVA, E. A.; STEFANI, J. **Identidade e diferença**: filosofia e suas interfaces. Caxias do Sul, RS: Educs, 2010.

ULLMANN, R. A. **Amor e sexo no Grécia antiga**. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 2005.

KLOHN, Thiago Guagliardo. The incontinence and the intemperance in thomistic and aristotelian thought regarding foucault's political technology of the body: the non-absolute character of morality. ***Kalagatos***, Fortaleza, vol.23, n.1, 2026, eK26008, p. 01-11

Received: 11/2025
Approved: 01/2026