We will not return home

Nós não vamos voltar para casa

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Abstract

This article is a test and another approach to freedom that, through the lens of Jacques Derrida, is liberated by being situated under the concept of graphe and by freeing itself from the constraints of any signifier, embarking on an unfinished journey. The intention is not to postpone freedom to a state of absence, but rather, if possible, to liberate freedom from any determinate meaning and from the constraints of any signified.

Keywords: Freedom, graphe, rigidity, being at home, immigration.

1. Introduction

Seeking-liberation always pointed out the dangers of its distortion by examining the pathology of freedom. However, the relentless movement of liberation movements throughout history and the various meanings of freedom indicate the indeterminate nature of the concept of freedom itself, which has endless potential for research. The general categorizations of negative and positive freedom, or prohibitive and affirmative freedom, merely lead to rigidity and the constraining of the meaning of freedom. Redefining freedom not only expands the geography of freedom but also simultaneously

determines and restricts its boundaries. Similar to Derrida's approach, freedom can be situated within the realm of writing and freed from the rigidity of meanings. At the same time, there are texts that, while acknowledging the presence of meaning within their own content, still constrain the concept of freedom. Naturalists, adhering to an essentialist and naturalistic perspective, tie the meaning of freedom to nature itself and seek to strip away all the products of civilization in order to return to humanity's natural state. Most liberation movements throughout history have been nothing but the imposition of one will over another, and the freedom envisioned by one group has meant domination over another group. Communism and naturalism are essentially aligned in their approach; one seeks to return us to the primitive commune, while the other aims to bring us back to a natural state—both of which are unattainable. Both envision these situations as the primordial home of humanity and seek to sweep away all cultural layers as ideological debris from our historical existence. Unintentionally, like Procrustes, they trim our stature to fit the dimensions of their envisioned home, so we may feel a sense of unity and belonging. However, libertarianism is not a natural trait but rather a cultural and ideological activity, and freedom in the realm of writing (graphe) is considered a cultural matter—not something fixed and attainable—but rather something that is liberated. Because the determination and attainment of freedom essentially means constraining and annihilating the concept. Assigning a specific form to freedom places it within the realm of discourse (logos), as Derrida discusses in his work on writing theory. Discourse (logos) is the grave of freedom. Cultural activity indicates that we shall never return home. An open society is the only way to achieve a more spacious house for the tall man to live in today, where every individual, even with a minor contribution, plays a role in its creation. An open society is sustained, not through its realization, but through the ongoing connection of the individual to the world and the process of writing (graphe), as discussed by Jeremy Shearmur and Karl Popper in political thought.

2. Research Background

Hegel (in The Philosophy of Right) and Isaiah Berlin (in Freedom and Its Betrayal), by discussing various types of freedom and examining the pathology and distortion of some liberation movements into authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, have demonstrated that the meaning of freedom, by determining the type of freedoms of systems, becomes a rigid and authoritarian concept. One must acknowledge that the relentless movement for freedom throughout history reflects the suspension of the meaning of freedom and the absence of its ultimate signified within the historical narrative. Derrida (of Grammatology) deconstructs the Western philosophical tradition that has formed as a result of the preference for logos over graphe. This tradition, which finds meaning within the text, leads to its rigidity.

However, Derrida, by placing concepts within the realm of graphe and prioritizing it, demonstrates that meaning is always in absence. The removal of the signified, a tool of human control, exposes the system to a state of deconstruction. With this perspective, if we consider sacred texts as having a singular and fixed meaning, they become subject to various interpretations, both secular and contextual, when placed under the graphe. However, in another sense, one could argue that sacred texts, when situated under the graphe and acknowledging the uncertainty of meaning and the proliferation of interpretations and the absence of a definitive meaning, remain in a state of abstraction within the sacred realm. At first glance, if we consider sacred texts as having a singular meaning, these texts always prevent any form of linguistic dissemination and lead to a rigidity of meaning within the grasp of the system, turning them into tools of human control. Thus, attributing meaning to sacred texts necessitates an authority to uphold their singular meaning, and this semantic authority inevitably brings it into contradiction, lowering it from the sacred realm to a terrestrial one. The authority of the church, as a factory of historical meaning-making, has always secularized Christianity in the face of historical moments, as the presence of Christ on earth symbolizes God's stepping onto the ground and the incarnation of the divine in the human form of Christ. Naturalism and socialism, despite their seemingly different orientations, both return us to a primal and natural home, emphasizing biological needs and devoid of any scientific or ideological classifications. They assume, as a matter of course, that a certain state is natural, fundamental, real, and original, and consider all other states as constructed, manipulated, and unreal.

Giorgio Agamben (state of exception) refers to a situation in which governments, under the pretext of emergency, exceptional, or extraordinary circumstances, suspend the law and grant full powers to the executive branch. Over time, this situation transforms into a paradigm and a permanent rule. However, Agamben further emphasizes, by placing the law under graphe, that the relationship between law and reality practically necessitates the suspension of the law, just as in ontology, the relationship between language and the world requires the suspension of reference in the form of langue. So, all human conditions have been exceptional, and it is impossible to imagine an original and primary state that is not in breach of the law. The state of exception acts as the opening of a space where the norm and the application of the norm reveal their gaps, or it is a kind of **anomic zone** in which there is a rift between reality and the rule, a void that **the force-of-law** (cross out law) seeks to fill, to regulate reality, just as Foucault considers normalization as the imposition of will by regimes of truth. (Rabinow, Dreyfus: *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*)

The main issue with the study of freedom is the limitless capacity of this term, which allows individuals to define it in various ways. This is because the understanding of this concept evokes different actions in each person. However, what has been overlooked in the general classifications of negative and positive

freedom is that negative freedom, in its relationship with the objects of existence, has the potential to be transformed into natural and positive freedom. It can be seen as a type of natural freedom, meaning the freedom of instincts from the constraints of civilization, as well as civil freedom from the constraints of instincts. In other words, this term is in constant flux with different concepts and meanings. If we consider the first phrase— "the freedom of instincts from civilization"—as a type of negative freedom, we simultaneously regard it as natural freedom, and by defining the type of freedom as "freedom in instincts," we also classify it as positive freedom. This classification positions naturalists as proponents of a type of freedom that they continually seek to deny. Derrida, in his critique of Rousseau's approach, focuses on two works: "The Origin of Languages" and "Confessions." Meanwhile, Rousseau considers "imagination" in " Reveries of the Solitary Walker " as a complement to nature, and in the logic of " superman," which has a dual approach to culture as writing and graphe, he sees it as both detrimental and, in an equal sense, a substitute for anything authentic and natural. Thus, just as Lukács was certain of two types of ideological and class (genuine) consciousness, Rousseau also believed in two types of culture: false and authentic, which are substitutes and supplements to nature. (On the Origin of Languages, Jean-Jacques Rousseau)

Freedom, with its broad definitions and classifications, is not a concept that can be neatly wrapped up once and for all. As we have seen, natural freedom, negative freedom, and positive freedom all possess the potential to morph into a contradictory cycle, especially in their general categorization into negative and positive. The overlooked question remains whether negative freedom is the liberation of natural instincts from civilization or the liberation of civilization from instincts. Another neglected point is the potential for positive freedom to lead to totalitarianism, as noted by Isaiah Berlin. No situation can be imagined in which humanity achieves sufficiency from freedom; it is this unbridgeable divide between subject and object that stirs the human will to seek and desire another state—a desirable and ideal condition that grants a sense of being at home. Yet ultimately, it is humanity that grows to the point where its stature surpasses the ceiling of that home. The necessity of freedom bends human stature before the house, much like Procrustes (the giant of Sicily, in world history), bends human form before the house. However, it is ultimately humanity that constantly steps beyond its limits and embarks on a journey, much like Odysseus (Homer, in the Iliad and the Odyssey), embark on a journey from which there is never a way back home.

The relentless movement of the struggle for freedom in history indicates the delay of freedom and the absence of its meaning in today's world. Berlin refrains from making any statements regarding human progress. Instead of progress, he acknowledges that we have merely gained more knowledge (Isaiah

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Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*). Otherwise, we would be assuming a teleological future in which the freest people live. However, if we evaluate freedom in relation to human will and desire, the unbridgeable gap between mind and reality has always existed, even in the most natural circumstances. If we are looking for the freest people in history, we cannot imagine them as naturalists in the past or as eschatologists in the future. The freest individuals of the past were tyrants, and the freest individuals of the future will be fighters. Throughout history, freedom has taken on many different definitions. One can speak of two opposing fronts, each standing against the other in pursuit of their own freedom of will. The victory of either side means imposing their will on the other. It must always be kept in mind that my freedom does not equate to imposing my will on another who is bound. If freedom movements impose their will on those outside themselves, they have, in fact, placed freedom in the service of their party and ideological goals, leading to the oppression and loss of autonomy for millions, as seen during the Maoist regime in China and under Stalin in Russia. It should be noted that here, party freedoms mean the realization of party will.

The pathology of freedom should not lead us to conclude that the dangers of freedom stem from various definitions and interpretations of it. On the contrary, the danger of freedom becomes apparent when it is interpreted through an essentialist approach, reduced to a single signifier and exemplification, and considered as a true and eternal reality of freedom's essence. If humanity acknowledges such a truth, there will be "no limit to the number of eggs that must be broken" for its realization (Isaiah Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*). In fact, if freedom is perceived as a rigid meaning within its sacred texts, individuals may even be willing to sacrifice their freedom to attain it.

3. Suspension of freedom

The meaning of freedom is always found in absence. The relentless movement of humanity's pursuit of freedom throughout history resembles the journey of Odysseus, where truth remains elusive. Freedom, like a snowball rolling down the slope of history, continuously gains new definitions and transforms into a massive accumulation of snow and avalanche. Believers in this essence hold that within this vast accumulation lies a core principle, which is obscured by layers of culture, civilization, ideology, and politics. However, peeling away these layers in pursuit of hidden truths leads us to the conclusion that within this vast accumulation of snow, there is nothing but snow itself. The truth represents the entirety of the layered volume that has been fragmented in the quest for an objective. Discovering such a truth ultimately results in its own destruction. In contrast to the ancient tradition of Logocentrism, which

considers writing and *graphe* as mere shadows or layers of logos, we realize that logos also sustains itself within *graphe*. The futile efforts of this tradition to eliminate *graphe* are continually undermined by its own actions. Destroying it is impossible, and denying it is absolute silence and swallowing the tongue. Yet, contrary to this, we have always witnessed that the denial of writing and *graphe* has always been accomplished by itself, which contradicts the deniers' views. It is as if we express a situation devoid of any words with the help of words; words can never aid in the death of words.

However, if we place freedom within the realm of writing and graphe, we will find that natural freedom is itself an ideological construct that has taken on many meanings and definitions throughout history. The intriguing point is that the more freedom is defined, the more its semantic geography expands; yet, with each definition and determination, it also sets boundaries and limits for human action. Those who define freedom simultaneously draw lines for themselves and others. In fact, the granting of freedom is also used in the sense of its deprivation, as defining freedom restricts human actions as well. One could even go further and argue that freedom is not a gift to be given, but rather something that is negative and must be seized. Here, naturalists might find common ground with us when we say that no system has the capacity to grant this gift; rather, every system can only take away a certain degree of it. Thus, the movement for freedom, as a graphe, becomes ideologically and culturally constrained within texts referred to as sacred texts, transforming into "a chain that the individual wraps around themselves in their struggle to attain it" (reference from our own article). If sacred texts represent the bondage of the word "freedom," paths such as silence (×) and inaction (×) are not obstacles in our way, because silence (×) itself falls under the graphe, and inaction (×) is a form of disobedience that is considered a subsequent and reciprocal action.

The absence of words cannot be imagined; the more we strive to define such a situation and fill hundreds of pages with expression, the further we move away from our intent. Silence (×), in the sense of not providing any words, is as inadequate as language itself in describing such a state. The only way to escape the current situation is to continue writing and graphe, creating a broader prison for the concept of freedom. The expulsion of culture and the adoption of silence (×), contrary to what naturalists believe, does not return us to the original home and natural state; the effort to return to that home is futile.

A person in an irreversible journey has disconnected the concept of homeland and being at home from the concept of natural homeland (birthplace) Odysseus (Homer, Iliad and Odyssey). Today, Odysseus is a migrant who feels alien in his natural birthplace. The stranger, in relation to the laws and culture that believe in the presence of the meaning of freedom within the sacred text of society, refuses to pass the

pen to another for the continuation of writing—texts that call themselves complete and within which an eternal meaning resides, allowing one to feel free only by surrendering to its will. This means that submission to a general and absolute will frees us from the constraints and attachments of existence, granting humanity a profound freedom that arises from a kind of lightness and disregard from others and the existing situation, well as a release from the anxiety and worries of human existence (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling).

Psychology sometimes issues judgments of health and illness, assuming their meanings within the context of its own texts. In response to distressing situations, it prescribes anti-anxiety medications (in other words, anti-revolution pills) to revolutionaries, addressing anxieties stemming from dissatisfaction with the current state and reflecting a sense of powerlessness regarding that state. If this anxiety is not suppressed by such prescriptions, it leads to the emergence of social movements. An anxiety that, instead of finding an appropriate external response, is directed inward. Such an encounter with problems, trauma, and anxiety is not derived from external circumstances, but is found within the human being. Instead of changing the situation for the individual, it normalizes and conforms the person to a standardized state, much like Procrustes.

4. Freedom and denial

There is another form of freedom that can lead to the beheading of individuals, and that is the surrender of one's own skull and the relinquishment of personal will to a collective and absolute will. This results in liberation from any anxiety stemming from responsibility for the current state of affairs. As Ernst Cassirer notes in "The Myth of the State," similar to Sartre, he links freedom and responsibility, viewing freedom as a heavy burden and obligation for humanity. Freedom of will compels individuals to consider themselves responsible and accountable for their current circumstances (Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism and Humanism"). Nazism, by stripping away such will, effectively relieved its citizens of any sense of responsibility.

Cassirer then refers to a discussion by Stephen Rauschenbusch in " The Rise of Fascism," recounting a statement from a grocer: " You don't understand at all; we used to have to vote and make decisions about elections and parties, and we worried because we had responsibilities. But now we have no worries or responsibilities—we are free now." Hannah Arendt, in her book "The Origins of Totalitarianism," argues that the irrational nature of Nazism stems from the fact that modern individuals in industrial societies are often isolated, having severed class identities and familial ties. In their quest for psychological security, they become prey to exclusive political movements, delegating their individual will to a collective will in

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order to escape anxiety, worry, and responsibility. In doing so, they dissolve their identities within the collective. Arendt cites Eichmann as an example of someone who, freed from any sense of responsibility and ultimately from all forms of human freedom, committed heinous crimes.

5. Definition and limitation

Continuing the discussion on the definition and limitation of freedom, one can reference Derrida's concept of "hospitality," which is considered one of the major issues of "deconstruction". Derrida views community as a concept that positions an inner group against an outer group (Jacques Derrida, On Grammatology). By labeling the other as a "guest," it implies a form of surveillance and ownership over the other. Every community is defined and shaped by a set of shared elements such as nationality, ethnicity, religion, and culture. Through its definition and coherence, the community positions the "other" or the guest—who lacks these shared elements—against itself, rendering them as a marginal and peripheral other. This other is kept under control and surveillance, remaining a peripheral identity until they conform to the normative order of the inner group. Even hospitality, which may outwardly appear as a humanitarian acceptance, carries the implicit meaning that the guest has a transient and temporary identity, one that must soon vacate the home of the host.

Highlighting the concept of the guest brings to the fore the position of the host, along with their ownership and freedom of will over the guest. The guest, on the other hand, will undoubtedly not feel at home. One aspect overlooked in Isaiah Berlin's exploration of freedom is his division of freedom into two types: negative (freedom from) and positive (freedom to). He neglects a third type, which was referred to earlier, namely (freedom over) or, more accurately, the imposition of will over another person and the environment. As mentioned, freedom is a kind of imposition of will over destiny, circumstances, and others. As long as there exists "this irreparable division" between us, the notion of freedom will always encompass the imposition of will upon others. Dissolving the other equates to dissolving freedom and heralding an unimaginable end to history. The existence of the other is essential for the existence of freedom, just as Hegel posits in the master-slave dialectic, where the slave's existence is intrinsic to the realization of the master. It should be noted that Proudhon's work in "The Philosophy of Poverty" does not justify the existence of the subordinate for the superior; rather, he considers the existence of a different other as an undeniable necessity and rejects the imposition of will upon it to erase that difference. However, Heidegger's (Being and Time) solution to this conflict is based on the concept of the extension and empathy of beings.

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Systems are structured based on cohesive common components and, by their definitions, set clear boundaries for defining human identity. For instance, political systems, with their specific definitions of what it means to be human, exclude those who do not conform from the thresholds of their legal institutions. According to Derrida, any system that is based on binary oppositions and founded on primary principles is a metaphysical system, whose foundational principles often achieve coherence through the exclusion of otherness and are defined by a type of dual opposition to other concepts. In his discussion of hospitality, he identifies concepts such as otherness and difference, bringing to the forefront the topics marginalized by the Western philosophical tradition. Essentially, deconstruction of dominant concepts is an effort to rewrite them so that the elements of the system can free themselves from its authority. It aims to suspend the meaning of the text, eliminate the signified (the ultimate tool of human control), and, in the absence of all signifieds, detach the text from their rigidity and the constraints of the individual authors' minds. This process seeks to achieve a form of liberation, energy, creativity, and freedom in the text, resulting from the release from the constraints of all signifieds. (Jacques Derrida, On Writing)

Agamben, in "State of Exception," cites "Henk S. Frenzel," arguing that anomic terror and anxiety result from an individual being in a threshold state, existing outside the system. In certain ancient legal institutions, such as the German term "Fried losigkeit" or the concept of "wargus" in English law, and in religious legal frameworks, individuals find themselves in a position outside the law and the system. This situation is the opposite of totalitarianism and equally dangerous. Individuals metaphorically referred to as "wolf-like" are cast out of the city, lacking any legal protection, leaving them with nowhere to quell their anxiety. They are in a constant state of flight: "He is wolf-like, neither fully a wolf to be protected by natural rights institutions, nor human to be covered by human rights frameworks; he exists in a legal void, and killing him is neither a sin nor considered murder. He is the other face of 'Homo Sacer' and the Vikings, severed from any relationship with the law, standing on the uncertain threshold between human and animal. He is neither human nor animal; he exists in both realms but belongs to neither. He does not revert to the natural state prior to law. He is not simply a wolf or a mere animal, but precisely wolf-like: a human who has become a wolf and a wolf that has become human." (Giorgio Agamben, Volume One of the Homo Sacer series) He is a migrant who, due to his marginal position, finds himself outside the legal framework of his own country. In the host country, he remains an unwanted guest and is not covered by legal institutions. His connection to his homeland has been severed, and amidst the tumultuous journey across the Mediterranean, in countries like Turkey and Greece, which serve as transit points, he is excluded from all legal institutions. He is no longer Iranian, Greek, Asian, or European.

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In addition to the legal challenges posed by institutions, there is a second reason that drives individuals to migrate from their homeland: cultural systems that, through their specific and systematic definitions of humanity, exclude others—such as sexual minorities, dissidents, and those of different gender identities—from their own homes. Such a system, with its particular psychological stance that views non-heteronormativity as a deviation, seeks to normalize the foreign "others" according to its own identity in a Procrustean manner. Such systems, by defining and determining their own identity, simultaneously constrain their own identity. Many individuals, by refusing to conform to such an identity, remain like strangers outside the system's house. However, the existence of these individuals does not negate the definition of identity in cultural texts; rather, it signifies the rejection of absolute meaning in texts that consider the definition of humanity as a completed project. Thus, sacred and complete texts never allow the other to question the existing text with an alternative reading or writing. Such closed texts will never open their doors to accept the other; from their perspective, the other is seen as a heresy, deviation, illness, and degeneration(decay). Even if we strive to diminish our distinctions and oppositions, these texts will never permit an extension of different forms within the existing system.

6. Writing and Freedom

Sacred texts establish and define boundaries for human identity, constraining any notion of freedom within their epistemic framework. The signifier of freedom can only escape the grip of these texts' specific signified meanings when we situate it under the concept of graphe, freeing its signified from the confines of logos. As long as the very concept of freedom remains shackled to a determined meaning, it becomes unimaginable. Freedom can only manifest in *graphe*; graphe is another name for freedom. This concept provides an expansive field as vast as the universe, making it impossible to conceive of a fixed meaning for it. This is not a matter of rendering freedom meaningless or destroying it; rather, it is about actualizing freedom in relation to its boundless nature. There is no longer any limit or endpoint to its meaning. Like the beginning of creation, it generates numerous meanings and signifieds within writing, and the dissemination and explosion of its life-giving essence liberate the signified—an instrument of control and surveillance—from the confines of the system. Reading these preliminaries might lead us to conclude that freedom is impossible and that freedom-seekers are traitors to freedom. However, this article offers a specific interpretation: freedom becomes shackled in the grasp of the signified. Yet understanding this interpretation compels us to strive to break free from these chains, as any instance or signified represents a home and a constraint for freedom. For the freedom-seeker, there is no destination, no home. In this

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sense. In a way, the freedom-seeker is like a homeless, identity-less gypsy, but the problem of freedom research lies in the very lack of a defined concept of it.

In "The Unfinished Search," Popper's concept of an open society emerges from the interaction between individuals and "World 3" (or, as Popper suggests, begins with it, since the open society never reaches a final form). This idea aligns with *graphe*, which encompasses all of humanity's endless products. Popper emphasizes that each individual grows only through their distinctions (or *differences*) in interaction with "World 3." These differences contribute, albeit modestly, to the formation of the open society, providing individuals with solace and a sense of peace. Popper, by proposing "piecemeal and gradual social engineering," inadvertently moves toward a vision he referenced in his recent work—the connection between individual freedom and socialism. One could argue that "piecemeal and gradual social engineering" represents the socialization of freedom and the formation of an open and free society, where individuals make this possible through their differences. There will be no ultimate conclusion or endpoint; such a plan, by allowing individuals the freedom to facilitate an open society, will always be open to any new and differing definitions. It is a house as vast as the universe, inhabited by all its residents. Thus, we find that *graphe* and existence are other names for freedom. Such a design, despite its coherence, is incomplete because universalizing freedom in defining such a game system draws every newcomer into determining its identity and accepts every outsider within itself, an indefinable and open system.

7. Play and Freedom

In contrast to such a framework, which cannot be termed a system, there exist coherent, well-developed ideological systems that feel threatened by the acceptance of any form of otherness. Popper's openness to the unfamiliar reflects a joy and vitality that Bakhtin (in "The Dialogic Imagination," "Laughter," and "Freedom") associates with liberation from ideology and dogmatism. Foucault juxtaposes the rigid seriousness of ideology with the concept of play. The notions of play and laughter become liberating concepts that free individuals from the traps of dogmatism regarding changes in systems. Bakhtin's dialogism can also be viewed as a form of graphe, where the individual's participation in the "Third World" is considered, allowing us to discuss play, freedom, and graphe under a unified discourse.

Agamben also discusses celebrations, mourning rituals, and anomic conditions where all laws and norms are suspended, allowing individuals to interact with the law in a kind of game. If we consider the law under the concept of graphe, it can be said that in such conditions, the law, after being annulled, continues to exist in a new form. Agamben, in continuing the discussion of the "state of exception," refers to Walter Benjamin, who argues that the issue is not about a transitional phase that never reaches an end, resulting

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in an endless process of deconstruction that hauntingly preserves the law. Instead, it is about the incapacitation and deactivation of the law. As Benjamin puts it, "One day humanity will play with the law as children play with useless objects, not with the intention of restoring their legitimate and proper use, but to free them from that use forever." What comes after the law is neither a more authentic consumable value prior to the law nor a new use that is born only thereafter; the use that has been tainted by the law must liberate itself from its value.

The task of this release rests on study or play, and this measured play is a way toward that justice which one of the pieces published after Benjamin's death describes as a condition in which the world is good—good that cannot be possessed absolutely and does not attain a legal status (Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," as quoted by Agamben).

8. Immigrant and the Nostalgia for Home

According to Marshall Berman in "The Experience of Modernity," if we consider Goethe's "Faust" as a kind of story and tragedy of growth and development, where Gretchen, Faust's beloved, meets a tragic end in a small, isolated, and religious world, we can alleviate our longing and nostalgic regret for the worlds we have lost. A focus on the home is a look back at the past—a journey backward through time that modern individuals sometimes view with nostalgic yearning. It reflects our childhood and the historical past of our society. For Berman, the product of modernism is the highways that allow people to rush forward without stopping, leaving no moment to pause and reflect on the past. We can only catch a fleeting glimpse of what lies behind us through the side mirror, and this gaze differentiates modernism from sentimentalism. The latter does not seek to merge with the past but aims to immerse the present with elements of the past, transferring contemporary values and perspectives into old homes. This may lead to a repetition of the tragic struggles that once drove them from their houses due to the deep incompatibility with their house's.

If we imagine modernism as a journey forward on a freeway, we must acknowledge that the modern Western individual is a migrant in the dimension of time, altering the spatial environment beyond their future times as they move forward in time. In contrast, the modern individual in the East is a spatial immigrant, leaving their homeland to settle in a modern place across the Mediterranean waters. The current of Western modernity is a form of immigration that moves forward in time, seeing its home and utopia as belonging to tomorrow. In contrast, Eastern modernity is a spatial immigration, envisioning its utopia in a different geography. Their common ground lies in a somewhat indeterminate space; both exist

outside the laws of their respective times and places. Both perspectives are forward-looking; both are driven away from the safe homes of their past. Perhaps if a modern place, similar to today's promised paradise for migrants, had existed a century ago, people would have left their homelands to change their circumstances without the costs of life and resources. Like the peasants that Marshall Berman quotes from Baudelaire, referred to as the "family of eyes," this family stands mesmerized on a boulevard across from a café, watching the glorious victory cups of two lovers. This scene, quoted from Baudelaire and noted by Marshall Berman as the primal archetype of modernity, recounted in the piece "The Miserables" in the book " The spleen of Paris." The narrator, sitting in a café with his beloved, resonates with such eyes and is moved by the sorrow that their cups are far larger than their thirsts. However, his beloved finds those eyes to be bloated and unbearable, wanting to compel the café manager to drive them away. Today, these eyes are the bloated eyes of people from the East, captivated by such a world from behind the screens of televisions and media. This modern world is not grounded in any solid foundation; it is fickle and ever-changing. As Marx said, "All that is solid melts into air." This mutable café, of course, aims to attract customers, not guests—seeking hands that pay rather than hands outstretched in search of help. Media that, like cafés, engage in superficiality serve as a marketplace for politicians—not to win hearts, but to attract and accumulate capital. According to Julian Young in " The Philosophy of Tragedy: From Plato to Žižek," the reason for Plato's opposition to poets was their entry into the café world (an eternal scene of modernization), which demands a heavy price and jeopardizes all traditional values. Conservatives are precisely those migrants who want to transfer all the traditional values of their homeland into the modern world under their coverings. They desire the amenities, concepts, and other valuable achievements of modernity, but the fear of losing their past values compels them to take their villages and homes with them when they migrate to the city. If Marshall Berman, in nostalgic longing, invites us to reflect on Gretchen's sorrowful life, we Easterners must also recall the interior architecture of old homes, where kitchens were separated by walls that concealed women like a veil, keeping them hidden from view. In such contexts, women were seen as symbols of honor and reputation. Their bodies were viewed as sexual and provocative entities that needed to be negated through clothing and the barriers between the kitchen and the living room. In turn, women in such situations felt so ashamed of their existence that they avoided being seen.

One of the differences between us and the family of Baudelaire's eyes is that those astonished and bewildered eyes are now aware of class divisions and are filled with a sorrowful knowledge. What complicates this situation further today is that café dwellers have migrated into the boxes of television and media, and from the other side of the display, they are unaware of the astonished and fixated eyes looking back at them. They are oblivious to those eyes behind the screen that observe them. If entering

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those lavish Parisian cafés once signified status and social class, today, the very cafés have migrated to other cities and countries, allowing astonished and impoverished classes to suppress their bewilderment within them and fill the social divide through the display of their presence there. But there is no longer any sign of the eternal lovers from Baudelaire in the café; they too have migrated to the ever-changing world of media to maintain their social status. The position of the astonished eyes behind the windows of Parisian cafés from the past century has now been recreated behind televisions and media. The café windows are the modern, shifting media, and the audiences of media shows are the same bewildered eyes of yesterday. Today's migrants determine their destination precisely through media and television; they do not aim to travel to Europe but instead seek their exact destination within the magical boxes of the media. If Plato expelled poets from his Republic, as Julian Young states in "The Philosophy of Tragedy from Plato to Žižek", his reason for opposition was their engagement with rhetoric and the tendency to use language for deception. Today, the media play a similar role. Today, the aware, protruding eyes have raised imaginary victory cups in cafes without addressing their class divides and achieving any real gains. The media has become a mountain of Olympus where the gods do not allow just anyone into their assembly. It is only these gods shape the fate and dreams of the people in the Olympus of the media

9. Conclusion

If we free freedom from the grasp of any signifier under graphe, and if we also consider freedom as a kind of unity and being at home, then the quest for freedom becomes a migration without a destination or home; it is a rugged and open path.

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