

## Disability as a Philosophical Problem: "Deficient" Thinking and Its Instituting Power in the School Institution

*A deficiência como problema filosófico: o pensar "deficiente" e sua potência instituinte na instituição escolar*

Pedro Ângelo PAGNI  
PPGE/UNESP.  
E-mail: [Pedro.pagni@unesp.br](mailto:Pedro.pagni@unesp.br)

### Resumo:

Este ensaio discute a deficiência como um problema filosófico. Circunscreve, para tanto, a perspectiva de sua enunciação, como uma resposta à sua interdição parcial enquanto campo problemático da Filosofia e da Educação, com o objetivo de interpelar até que ponto essas áreas, ao ignorá-lo, não teriam explicitado suas próprias deficiências. Recorre às filosofias da diferença, em sincronia com as tradições nietzschianas e spinozanas, para propor essa enunciação, e, provocativamente, procurar ensaiar uma resposta a tal indagação. Sugere haver uma filosofia da deficiência que desafia a educação inclusiva, na atualidade, em virtude de sua potência instituinte na instituição escolar.

**Palavras-chave:** deficiência; problema filosófico; educação inclusiva; filosofias da diferença.

### Abstract:

This essay discusses disability as a philosophical problem. It frames the perspective of its enunciation as a response to its partial interdiction as a problematic field in Philosophy and Education, aiming to question to what extent these areas, by ignoring it, have revealed their own deficiencies. It draws on the philosophies of difference, in sync with Nietzschean and Spinozan traditions, to propose this enunciation and provocatively attempt to answer this inquiry. It suggests that there is a philosophy of disability that challenges inclusive education today, due to its instituting power within the school institution.

**Keywords:** disability; philosophical problem; inclusive education; philosophies of difference.

## **Disability as a Philosophical Problem: "Deficient" Thinking and Its Instituting Power in the School Institution**

This essay aims to discuss disability as a philosophical problem. In this context, rather than addressing disability as a medical phenomenon—due to its association with the dysfunctionality of the organic body—or as a sociological phenomenon—because of the barriers it faces within the social body—it seeks to consider it as a problematization of the scientific paradigms through which it has been conceived. It also explores other possibilities in the ways it has been approached by inclusive education. As disability inscribes itself in a paradoxical body without organs, forming part of a common body, as suggested by Pagni (2023), the paradox of this body fits into a broad philosophical problem, tracing back more than twenty-five centuries. This history elaborates and presents various responses about how the body relates to the soul, its care, and the hierarchy to which it is subjected in order to be identified as a person and recognized as human.

In such responses, the subordinate position of the body in relation to the soul is predominantly highlighted to characterize an ideal of man, around which others are discarded in a colonizing dispute, so to speak, to define which body will be established as the body of the human species. Roberto Esposito (2011) calls this mechanism, which articulates power schemes to subjectivation, the device of the person, noting the ambiguities of an inclusive-exclusionary nature within this framework.

Although it emerged with Human Rights and personalist philosophy, its historical genealogy is older, dating back to the ancient play of masks that spanned antiquity, the difference between Roman law of the person and the human, up to modernity, when aligned by the figure of the subject, it assumes a transcendental point of view whose echoes resonate in the present, enforcing itself as a reifying, naturalized device. The greatest example, according to the Italian philosopher, is when referring to the personalities that grace magazine covers in the present and the allure they evoke in their readers. These images would bring the reader closer to a certain exceptional quality, as they approach the persona featured on the magazine cover, drawing them into that apparently common universe in which it lives.

Conversely, through infinite tactics, this mechanism demands that, in order to achieve this proximity, the reader erase their singularity, renouncing the differences inscribed in their body that embody their individuality, so as to assume a face that disfigures it and with which they identify. The sensation is that, as Esposito emphasizes,

[...] by giving everyone the same “mask,” it ends up drawing the valueless sign of pure repetition, as if the inevitably antinomic result of an excess of personalization displaces the subject into the mechanism of a machine that replaces them, pushing them towards the faceless dimension of the object (2011, p. 10).

Thus, the device of the person assumes an ambiguous relationship with itself and with the other, sometimes determining the current processes of subjectivation. This device would be “[...] something related to the general functioning of the law, that is, the ability to include through exclusion” (Esposito, 2011, p. 22).

This would mean assuming that, by becoming a person and being legally included in the rights that would ensure a qualified life, this subject would immunize themselves from those who are not, from their bodies and their differences. Even if, to do so and to guarantee the exclusion of this other, they have to deny it in themselves, giving up their singularity for a mask, a face that, although mismatched, seeks to conform to their body. If one follows Roberto Esposito's interpretation of the device of the person, it becomes evident how, in the name of a certain universal regulation and security to identify with a face and conform to any subjective model, the differences inscribed in a body and the feelings aroused by the presence of another are erased, leading to inclusion at this exclusionary price.

### **Disability: A Philosophical Problem?**

According to such responses, in general, the disabled body is the most inhuman of humans, as it moves by vital forces, ungovernable inclinations, or inexplicable becomings. It is also the one that, even when adorned with the designation of person, denounces the excesses of its singular mode of being, which are uncontainable within a face, norms, and regulations. If the becomings emerging from this body were once exalted when associated with forms of divinity or literally discarded to be subjected to the governance of a life not worth living, in the long hegemonic history of Philosophy, at present, the disturbance they produce is decisive for the actors embodying them to be relegated to their own fate or, still, to be the target of rational, normative, and colonially overwhelming control. This happens precisely because they materialize their differences in relation to others and, by doing so, disrupt the usual referential codes, revive the memory of wounds, and urge the other to think of their uncoded and perhaps even uncodable signs. In this regard, Michel Foucault emphasizes:

The history of thought is the analysis of how a previously unproblematic field of experience, or a set of practices that were once accepted without question, familiar, and undiscussed, becomes problematic and sparks discussions and debates, incites new

reactions, and induces a crisis in behavior, habits, practices, or institutions that were, until then, silent. The history of thought, understood in this way, is the history of how people begin to concern themselves with something, how they become anxious about this or that—for example, madness, crime, sex, themselves, or truth.(Foucault, 2013, p. 46-47).

Disability contemporarily emerges as this field of problematization, inscribed in bodies and movements that express their aberration against social normality and the homogenization of existential singularities, becoming a problem for the subjects who embody it as well as for others, especially in an inclusive setting where they coexist with this "other," being affected by its strangeness. Beyond contemporaneity, it resonates with branches of Philosophy that, didactically speaking, envisioned in the dissidence of bodily instincts the great reason for living, as postulated in Nietzsche's Zarathustra (2018), and in the potentiality of liberating their forces driven by encounters with other bodies, as aspired to in Spinoza's Ethics (2017), a certain materialization of differences. For these philosophical branches, these differences would not only be products of a certain repetition but also traces of a denunciation of sterile domination and, at the same time, modes of singularizing existences and creating ways of communal life, regardless of a pre-elaborated human and societal form or one discursively conceived as philosophical or even historical truth.

Within these minority traditions of the history of philosophy in the West—and which, in various aspects, flirt with other cosmologies, appropriate or are appropriated in decolonial philosophies—disability inscribed in this body would be just one of the differences that characterize this process of singularizing a mode of existence and communion with other bodies. It would bring in its wake expressed marks of other ways of speaking, seeing, thinking, and relating to the world—some accumulated over hundreds of years, often erased by hegemonic culture. The circulation of these differences on the surface, gaining visibility through their presence in the world, could be phenomenologically apprehensible, as observed from Merleau-Ponty (1994) to Michel Foucault (2019), characterizing in what aspects disability differs from others and in which it approaches, making it more familiar and understanding the alterity it provokes in others, widely explored as that of an other—from Levinas (1988) to Butler (2019), including Derrida (1997).

The problem with this phenomenological perspective and the alterity it presupposes could be its point of reference, but it is not. After all, it is not always launched from the ontological viewpoint of a being whose essence is defined by medical norms or the framework of social normality; existence in the world presupposes mastering a set of capacities to be apprehended, so as to equate with others or to seek an identity within a broader spectrum of the human or the body-species of the population. This perspective is, indeed, guided by the search for a singularity that is achieved not through an interior

experience that is impossible to access a priori and, mainly, not generalized a posteriori or universalized due to its transcendence.

However, it is marked by its relationship with an outside, by the mystery or disconcerting affect that fractures the fixity of this being, inviting it to its own deconstruction and to an experimentation that would leave it outside itself: adrift and in a different relation with itself, with the world, and with the other beings around it. This experimentation could be mobilized by this other, both by the disability of another and of one's own body or the ghosts that this sign mobilizes within, were it not for the prohibitions imposed by the present, both aesthetically and semiologically. And if this were not the case, it could help to compose, through the artistic elaboration and conceptual decoding it demands, common links among their ethnicities—since they also become singular by forming a common world, in Deligny's terms (Miguel, 2024).

These impersonal compositions, ultimately, sketch other ways of being and existing in the world. They also compete with other highly personal compositions, or even to contradict a given, normalized, regulated structure, to prevent it from flowing, taking positions, moving, and altering the gravity of those that have become fixed, in a play of power and, at the same time, a potentialization of life in this world. The potency of this life—like any other—in its immanence, lies in keeping the becomings of this body politically alive, in a movement constantly initiated by events, spurred by the presence of singular bodies like those inhabited by disability, ontically or somatically. It is the provocation alongside other bodies that, with the presence of this somatic singularity, produces heterotopic, heterochronic movements, ways of being together, in response to an affect capable of creating, in a static, colonizing, dominant world, the same traces or wounds of the disabled body: bending it, to realize that the disability is within oneself, not in the other. These are the events that make this body a paradox to be thought about, in constant nomadism, evoking these ethical ends for and in itself, decisive for its political action in the world.

In this sense, the presence of these singular bodies, the events they mobilize in the possible relationship with themselves and with other bodies they encounter, make disability, as a sign inscribed in them, a philosophical problem as minor as the philosophies that articulate it. This would be the philosophical problem of disability from a minor perspective, provoked by the presence of the bodies in which it is inscribed, by their visibility, and by the struggles for their affirmation in the present time. This perspective would align with the philosophical tradition emerging with Nietzsche, Spinoza, and continued by contemporary philosophers like Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, and Guattari, among others, who reverse the Platonic tradition and modern philosophy of the subject. From this philosophical perspective, would it be possible to conceive of a philosophy of disability that, by its very nature, comprehends the deficiency

of Philosophy when it aligns with this minor register, and at the same time, postulates the contributions of this field to think about that problem?

Analogous to the epistemic crippling proposed by CRIP Theory for anthropology (Mello; Aydos; Schuch, 2022), it seems that the same movement is happening here with the Philosophy of disability. Perhaps, by considering the problem, we can explore how this area might learn other minoritarian ways of thinking, seeing, speaking, moving, and expressing oneself in the world. This refers to ways of thinking, even for those with intellectual disabilities or autism; to seeing in deep blindness; to speaking while being deaf, among others. There is still a rationality, a language, and an expressiveness that are scarcely described, portrayed, and mapped out. There is also a cultural accumulation of knowledge and practices within each of these respective communities, as well as philosophies that are formulated based on the singularity of their modes of being, their smallest gestures, and their ways of existing in the world—without needing Socrates' approval, as in Plato's *\*Meno\** (2001), to prove that they possess a human soul and perhaps to authorize their practice of philosophy. Unlike this Platonic rite of passage to attain the status of human and to deserve the attention of Philosophy, it is preferable to understand the creative meaning of this problematization, as Michel Foucault (2013, p. 114) argues:

A problematization is always a kind of creation, but a creation in the sense that, given a certain situation, it cannot be inferred that this type of problematization will follow. Given a certain problematization, one can only understand why this type of response emerges as a response to some concrete and specific aspect of the world. This is the relationship between thought and reality in the process of problematization. And that's why I believe it is possible to give a response, the original, specific, and singular response of thought to a particular situation.

It is this response that is sought in the current conjuncture, where the acceleration of time, the hierarchy of space occupation, and the centrality of life in production have become synonymous with a qualified existence, with efficiency as an imperative of productive life. Some contemporary philosophers have already demonstrated the possibilities of this response, even when their bodies or surroundings bear some form of disability. In the ontology of the accident that produces it, as Catherine Malabou (2006) describes, and in the event that their bodies embody, in the terms of Deleuze (2000) referring to the poet Joe Bousquet, a creative potential reclaims this ethical and political sense of philosophy as the art of existence, especially its transformative aspect in relation to the present moment, in light of philosophies of difference. From this perspective, when a subject engages with disability or another difference that accidentally inhabits them, they may or may not qualify the meaning of this singularization, and in such a

process, they expose the paradox, if not linguistically, at least expressively, on the public stage where it manifests.

In another context, this process of qualification was designated as a certain passage from the accident that produces disability to its assumption as an event by the subject who embodies it as a wound, with nothing reactive in this assumption, but active, as a potency that updates itself every time a life is affirmed (Pagni, 2023). In this way, the qualification of disability here diverges from any bias of empowerment according to hegemonic standards, where the exposed issue is ignored or susceptible to a quick fix to avoid excessive turmoil. It is this movement of affirming life that results in another mode of existence in the world, producing potentially creative meanings of communion with other bodies and possibilities of common life that this paradox can produce.

In such paradoxical production, the presence of bodies qualified by disability can lead their actors to turn inward, to open up to others, touching them through this power of life, and courageously inviting those still living to engage, each at their own pace, manner, and style, in order to perceive therein a certain multiplicity that permeates them, if not through disability, at least through another difference that makes it familiar. These (mis)paths of subjectivation processes, when affected by the strangeness of the other within themselves, provoke the actors to recognize that some of their differences can also produce this intensity of forces and affects, so they can modulate it, deriving from their reactive excesses a creative becoming, in search of a common link around which bodies can gravitate. Within them, actors reveal themselves in their most abrasive and fragile strengths, as if in the game they engage, common fragility is seen as a collective strength, as a more intense and broader assemblage. In this more aesthetic terrain, where they often find themselves and which is often revealed in moralizing institutional contexts, an ethics emerges as a result of this encounter of bodies, unpredictable yet relevant to life and common to the differences that inhabit them, even in a homogenizing or homogenizing environment such as social institutions, especially in schools.

### **The paradox of the disabled body as a philosophical-educational problem**

This same problem, as demonstrated on other occasions (Pagni, 2019, 2023), can be stated, however, in another way, even more radically, by the philosophy of education. If, in these terms, this problem is enunciated in its relation to the mentioned philosophical traditions, among others, in a process of excavation such as decolonial ones, for this field of education, both the presence of these bodies in everyday life and the events produced by their encounters with others who inhabit educational

institutions, promoted— it must be said!—by inclusion policies, there presents itself, analogously, as a paradox. This happens because the presence of these bodies—alongside others whose traces materialize this and, from an intersectional perspective, other differences—is seen as a problem by school actors, due to the strangeness they produce in relation to what remains of their common world, completely normalized, regulated, and disciplinarily controlled.

Attempts to address or minimize this problem, but rarely to philosophically consider it, have been to draw on the accumulated knowledge in some areas of education, self-described as scientific and producers of subjectivation technologies. The objective is to isolate this categorized deviant body, individualizing and clinically treating this organism according to a medical model, and pedagogically derived from some social models (Pagni; Martins, 2023). Generally, after this isolation which contradicts the principle of inclusion, when dealing with students with disabilities in regular schools, the deviation is, when possible, corrected or adapted to approximate the medical norm. At the same time, some barriers—especially physical and curricular ones, rarely attitudinal—are faced so that the presence of these bodies ceases to provoke discomfort and promotes their relative circulation, similarly to those bearing other differences, preventing the minority becomings they activate from emerging and their dissidence from the power of hegemonic forces from being expressed.

This implies admitting that, regardless of the model and paradigm of inclusion adopted, there seems to be an adaptive limit to correcting the incorrigible, as Foucault (2010) would say, without considering that there are deficits in these bodies, not only incorrigible but insurmountable by the subject, to conform to social norms and regulations, which place them on the borders of biopolitics and portray these actors as a threat to the governable social body.

It has been a task of intersectionality to realize this analytics of power, as well as it can be – with specificities in mind – a task of philosophy of education to propose how deficient the field of Education is in understanding the presence of these singular bodies in the school context. Often, by subordinating them to an idea of human formation that presupposes their traces and potentialities, their capacities are colonized or diluted in communicative actions within intersubjective relations, assuming these occur without violence. Philosophy of education must be challenged to acknowledge its deficiency in order to understand such issues with the usual resources provided by certain traditions, forcing it to look sideways. Especially, it is recommended that philosophy of education focus on those school actors who experience this relationship with disability, whether in themselves, in their own bodies and the ensuing subjective production, or in their relation with the singular body that prompts, affects, and manages this folding onto oneself, in a radical alterity.

Provocatively, it's as if this philosophy of disability in education acknowledges the limits of the field of Education to address the paradox of the disabled body and discuss its own possibilities for an inclusive education that implies a radical transformation of epistemes, subfields, and pedagogical technologies within it. However, it seems necessary to also conceive a philosophy of disability in education, beyond the critique of institutional conditions and the analysis of micropower or micropolitics in schools. In this direction, it is necessary to think about how disability, as a paradoxical problem, could be transformed, from this potentiality, into a philosophical act capable of indicating the contours of lines of flight stemming from both the dissidence of these bodies in which it is inscribed and the events arising from their encounters with other bodies.

The elaboration of these contours of lines of flight does not occur in isolation from other fields of knowledge and practices; rather, it operates in conjunction with ethnography aimed at decoding self-narratives expressed by individuals whose bodies bear difference, literature and other arts that enable the fabulation of conceptual characters in relation to the insurgent role they play in the school scene, and ethology that maps the singular ethnos resulting from the encounters therein. Philosophy of disability in education could thus facilitate the production of cartographies that, together with these school actors whose bodies embody disability, collaborate in ethical work so that their insurgencies contribute to their radical or even partial transformation, aiming to showcase other possibilities of thinking, seeing, walking, speaking, and ultimately existing in school.

Thus, it would fulfill a micropolitical sense in shaping a common and critical body in relation to its adaptation to the governable social body, sometimes resorting less to a biopolitics of disability and more to a cosmopolitics, as outlined by Greiner, Godoy, and Mello (2023). Philosophy of disability in education would not act in isolation, detached from arts and sciences, but would collaborate with these mentioned partners, perhaps challenging pedagogy so that an aesthetic education, in the terms of "ab-use" coined by Spivak (2017), could emerge with this political bias.

As noted, the role of philosophy of disability in education presupposes coordinated action with the social model of disability, particularly through intersectionality, aimed at facilitating transformations brought about by the presence of disabled bodies and the formation of a common body in schools, marking it as an instituting paradigm. To achieve this, it is necessary not only to employ arts but also to engage in a sort of cartography of desires, as Deleuze (2005) would suggest, focusing on how instincts tend to become institutions, revealing the aberrant movements of these bodies marked by disabilities alongside bodies bearing other differences.

This cartography aligned with art and philosophy could collaborate so that this instituting movement, provoked by the presence of these bodies in institutions like schools – but not only in them

–, could mobilize its actors in a way to reformulate their molars and to stand up against a molecular control over their existences, creating escape lines for the latter and radically transforming the former. This is a possible response, not utopian, because it is already happening through the pulse of these bodies' presence in institutions and through the anarchic movements that govern their encounters. It is already happening when they aggregate in networks, shaping a common body through processes of dissidence, insurgency, and creation that inhabit, in alliance with other bodies, the heterotopic places and heterochronic temporality of these institutions, producing in this micropolitical territory a struggle for singular bodies to assert themselves, become visible, and gather around common agendas.

These are processes of formation of that body so little visualized by the institution committed to the formation of this governable social body that, by making them invisible, does not realize their instituting power, as indicated by Roberto Esposito (2021). Signs of this power are found in expressions ranging from interpersonal friendships, explored on other occasions (Pagni, 2019), to anarchic movements occupying schools, such as those that occurred in 2015 in the State of São Paulo, in a broad spectrum still poorly codified due to the very nature of its networks, movements, and normativity. In the absence of a normative code of lives that resist immunizing themselves from the contagion of the common, these encounters of singular bodies with other bodies vibrate in this common body, envisioning the possibility of living and, importantly, living better than before, without implying subjugation to economic order and rationality. In this sense, this common body forms community, empowering singular bodies, their aberrant movements, and the actors that shape them to become freer from the bonds that captivate them, thereby instituting other ways of being, thinking, feeling, and acting in contexts that may start in the school environment but spread to other institutions.

The instituting paradigm, according to Roberto Esposito (2021), can be understood through the ontological-politics of difference. For the Italian philosopher, instituting is, under certain historical conditions, "[...] the continuous creation of the new, the capacity to bring into existence what did not exist before, to give life to novelty" (2021, p. 34), historically articulating the past and the future. To achieve this, he argues for the necessity of the subject or, rather, subjects, because, as he states, "[...] without any subjectivity, there is no institution, no politics" (Esposito, 2021, p. 35). This does not mean returning to the modern figure of the subject as something pre-given and shaping subjectivity, but rather considering it as constituted through its own praxis, as a process of subjectivation that puts it into action and institutes it by creating something new for its dynamism. In his words, "[...] instituting thought sees subjectivity born from the institutional mechanisms in which it participates" (Esposito, 2021, p. 35-36), referring to an impersonal subject, formed in collective, multiple, plural action—not reducible to sovereign or state power.

It is not limited to the dialogue between two people, as the impersonal always requires a third person capable of mediating disparate interests and the clash between affirmations of differences, like a diaphragm, a filter that "[...] mediates the immediacy of face-to-face encounters, preventing the meeting from degenerating into violent confrontation" (Esposito, 2021, p. 36-37). This does not happen solely through the substantiation of a subject whose power grants them the position of a third party, with whom a 'we' is constituted, but through the assumption of "[...] a point of view that places each one's interest or desire within a broader horizon, objectifying what is purely subjective" (Esposito, 2021, p. 37). It is at this point that the diaphragm opens, elucidating the symbolic clash between what exceeds instincts, jeopardizing life itself or community life, what is absent from it for some excluded individuals, what impels towards something that includes them, and mobilizes that excess power towards what is common to all these actors.

In this institutional context, instituting thought emerges from the impersonal, from the suspension of self, where each operates as an agent of the institution or excluded from it, to find a vacuum, an empty place – without any consensualist utopia – where the position of one and the other can interchange and institute another position, new, updating the power of encounters of differences and their communion in the community. Here, historicity, impersonality, and conflictuality would be the conditions for biopower to prevail over thanatopower, in addition to bringing forth from what escapes this government and territorialization of a qualified life, biopotency. Without ignoring the past, envisioning the common and the intensity of body encounters, bringing forth the new, in this institutional context, in the present, would be one of the challenges of philosophy, law, politics, and education, as more than tools that evoke resistances to the resistance of bodies, other forms of subjectivation would emerge from the impersonal, catalyzing strength and circulating the virus of the common.

But what would this imply for institutions like schools, which conventionally, historically focused on appeasement before conflicts, albeit through force, to achieve a docile body, an obedient subject as the universal standard of a governable social body—or in other words, of the biopolitics of the population? Moreover, a school in the Western world, long after World War II, has been guided by a pedagogical governance of childhood to shape the citizen, almost entirely under the rhetoric of human dignity and its apparatus, even though admitting that this should be a requirement its public character must understand as certain impersonality? Consequently, in recent decades, schools have faced demands from international organizations and transnational or state-national policies to include those previously considered non-persons (immigrants, people with disabilities, transgender individuals, among others, in basic education; Afro-descendant or indigenous peoples, the elderly in higher education) in some form

of governance of differences termed inclusive education, or even more recently, operating more strictly with inclusion devices?

In institutions like these, a history of schools marked by inequality has been evident, leading to the systematic exclusion of entire sectors, particularly those who acted collectively from ethnicities, genders, sexual orientations, or disabilities. These were peoples who, when not excluded, were integrated into the school system, provided they were not given any compensatory devices or differentiated treatment, in order to submit as a singular body to the social body governed by biopolitics, thereby immunizing others from their differences, ensuring peace while these others felt, both physically and symbolically, the burden of normalization.

More recently, when included—not just integrated—meaning once provided with those devices ensuring differentiated support like racial quotas, specialized services tailored to their needs, demands, and achievements, there has been another movement of capture. This aimed to identify their social or identity markers, elevate their status as rights-bearing subjects, and immunize themselves like any other member, provided they erased their uniqueness in favor of a social body where common traits among ontological differences in encounters would be erased and neutralized. If this brief historical genealogy of the institution suggests a forced erasure of impersonality and conflict, which also characterized the school, the presence of singular bodies inhabiting it today, the networks they form, and the encounters they facilitate with other bodies, form a common body that challenges the social body, destabilizing it and provoking conflict. This circulation introduces a virus against which its autoimmunity seeks to prevail—and often does.

The presence of disabled or divergent bodies and their alliances, encountering other bodies in institutions like schools (Pagni, 2023), beyond their inclusion devices, has provided openings for conflict to be recognized within the institution and for instituting thought to emerge in its potency—or rather, biopotency. This notion is not used here to restore a transformative act undertaken by some new subject of revolution, but to envision, from the impersonality of these relationships, the learning of being-with and being-together, and symbolic exchange (like a gift), finally glimpsing a community yet to come. Perhaps it's possible, from this perspective, to outline for educational inclusion a paradigm less focused on immunity, personal appeasement, and more on community, impersonality, and conflict. Such a paradigm does not only correspond to a new utopia to be carried out by this subject called the multitude, but as a historical praxis, as these heterotopic bodies return, their differences and tensions produced by encounters with other bodies within the institutional territory. Perhaps these very bodies carry inscriptions, beyond their deviations and differences, records of accidents, and, who knows, the virtuality

of an event to be symbolically elaborated from their singularities, as well as from what they find in common, thanks to their exchange.

How to ensure that this exchange happens more as a gift, where reciprocity is its motto, rather than as an exchange that benefits some more than others, awakening the biopotency of encounters around this event, is still a mystery. However, it could be a point of intersection, as this experience of the outside, common to all, opens a rift in the skin that covers this body, evoking its connection to an inner experience, with the deviations, defections, and differences that inhabit it (symbolically), with the becomings that circulate there, perhaps teaching to learn to live with them and to produce a common body that, analogous to zoe in relation to bios, constantly rubs against the social body governed and governable by biopolitics.

This implies making visible, in institutions like schools, how this common body presents itself or not, along with the knowledge and performativities it puts into circulation, aiming at its formation in a place that has always seen it as foreign to its constitution, but which tendentially has been an expression of instituting movements. This is because it distinguishes itself but also evokes other becomings, producing a distinct symbolic field and a biopotency, if not implosive, at least virtually enigmatic, as a cosmopolitical future to be instituted by a multitude that is now there with renewed strength and an experience of isolation that has led it, more than just nursing its wounds, to recognize its strengths and, perhaps, learn to autonomously manage its excesses.

Due to its persistence as a source, object, and means of pulsional circulation and vital energy, disabled corporeality follows diverted flows within the organic body or is diminished by the social stigma it carries, based on its perceived usefulness to society outside of economic rationality. This applies both to its singular mode of existence and its common forms of life, which anarchically escape the social body governed by biopolitics of the population. This escape generates a unique intensity of life, directing desires arising from these singular bodies toward other objects, aiming to renew existence and thereby recreate common forms of life in different times and spaces, under a different aesthetic regime of sensibility, pleasure, and pulsional exchanges. It's much more about perceiving a life that, through its accident and becoming-event, affirms a singular existence in a body that, in turn (independent of consciousness), produces a certain strangeness in other bodies.

Although it may seem like a point of intersection with queer theory, the focus of philosophies of difference regarding this strangeness appears to be sharper, less known, and more radically thought than known, understanding it as a cartography, if not a seismography. This is because, for this approach, it is the dissonance generated by strangeness that vibrates like an energetic quantum (*energeia*), in a distinct tonality, through bones, muscles, organs, and epidermis accustomed to the normative register of

their functioning, their valuation in social regulation, and the structuring of hegemonic subjectivation. It is this vibration, felt through the affect of the strange and alien body—in this case, the disabled body—that causes affected bodies to incline and alter their gravitational axis. First, they turn towards themselves to make this strangeness familiar, and secondly, they find another axis of translation and, through the relation of minority becomings evoked within themselves and with others, a common axis of rotation.

Metaphorically, this rotation and gravity enable the disabled body to move, equally realizing that its inscription signifies an event that, in this dual minority becoming—within itself and in other bodies—ensures more than a presence in the world. It guarantees a common orbit shared by multiple bodies, inhabited by differences and constant (re)existence fostered by their encounters. In this realm, the occurrence of these encounters happens within this common orbit, capable of being registered through vibration, akin to multiple-toned tuning forks (if such a thing were possible) or a seismograph that records this intersection of forces and affections, aiming towards a certain rotational equilibrium. This movement of singular translation for each body differs in each of its atmospheres, each with its gravity in a constellation—or better put, by analogy, a community.

If this seismography—established as the starting point of cartography—appears to have been ignored by technologies and biopower devices, it does so because the biopolitics governing these bodies since modernity, with its restriction of biological life as an object of governance and its legitimation through scientific knowledge that subjugates them, has invisibilized the movement of this orbit and, so to speak, neutralized the potency of the common body facilitated by encounters of diverse singular bodies (Pagni, 2023). Likewise, philosophical anthropocentrism has not encompassed this seismic, erosive dimension produced by this dynamic energy pulsing within this common body, obscuring it through the configuration of a human more attuned to individual psyche and its individualization or to a social body circumscribed by a centralized, normalized corporeality that excludes all bodies mobilizing anthropomorphism and inhabiting the periphery.

## Final Provocations

Analyzing this anthropomorphism, conducting the heterotopology of spaces and the heterochrony of times inhabited by this peripheral corporeality within the territories of that institutionalized, centralized corporeality, and acting at its borders are joint strategic tasks of philosophy, art, and sciences. It is in this sense that, beyond Foucault's heterotopological dream (2019), greater openness to the cartography of desires and a certain seismography of intensities could be used as tools,

both by philosophy and the arts, to create war machines—using Deleuze and Guattari's term (2012)—with a clear political purpose in their use. Once connected to other machines, these could reshape inclusive education in schools or perhaps even render it unnecessary. After all, the differences inscribed in the body are not only social marks of violence but also excesses of an uninterdicted potency, not translatable into signs, forces that, regardless of their fragility, overflow their linguistic meaning in search of liberation and meanings that codify their existence, thereby interposing their presence in a common body.

Often, the presence of any mode of existence conferred by this alternative sense can amplify the sensation of greater liberality and existential creation, sometimes disturbing in relation to both time and space, as well as in managing the monotonous processes of subjectivation and desire produced by institutions and capitalist machinery as a whole. The singular body from which multiple processes arise, with its minority and animic becomings, produces these lines of flight in managing both the molar and molecular aspects of the social body, confronting its unifying senses to bring forth the plural, the unique that does not pair, and the pairs that diverge from the monotony of a single, universal reason. Hindered from emerging politically due to their ethical depreciation and strategically implemented aesthetic diminution in the micropolitics of subjectivity and desire, that body does not cease to exist: it overflows and, errantly, creates lines of flight. Nor does this same body cease to encounter other bodies, typically peripheral, envisioning therein a certain connectivity that gives consistency to interwoven senses with these latter, among them, expressing traits and forming the common body.

The question, however, is how to shape this common body emerging from the periphery into the center of institutionalized corporeality, in a context where individualization has been the result of this strategic biopolitics of population. This, in turn, has led to individual isolation and immunization against anything that could bring the contagion of communal virus. According to Roberto Esposito (2010), this is the current strategy of immunization, individualizing singular bodies and isolating them to prevent their friction with other bodies and the contagious force of their encounters—or, more precisely, with the community that congregates them—by undermining the capacity of gift-giving and particularly the (bio)potency of communal exchanges. This is achieved through the formation of a rationalized sensibility and an imagination prefigured by image, to the extent that it becomes indifferent to other bodies and imagines them only as objects of love-hate, threat, or redemption, as something that potentially enhances or detracts from life. Rather than an object that, in relation to oneself or others, evokes a demand for what is lacking or an existential deficit, it is instead about a singular subjectivation, a way of life that demands not fitting into preexisting molds, overflowing them, and precisely because of this excess, generating common becomings in one another.

Today, the perception of these becomings and common agencements is clouded—limiting the seismographic perception and thus avoiding possible cartographies—not so much due to the absence of these encounters or the lack of one's manifestation to another, but rather due to the excess in which they occur. Often, this excess blurs the most significant encounters or empties the differentiation of the joyful from the sorrowful, to the point of producing an indifference among them and an indifference to everything concerning others. Following Paolo Virno's path (2022), there is currently a prevailing sense of powerlessness stemming not from lack but from an excess of stimuli, encounters with other bodies, and affects produced in our world, resulting in numerous incidents with hardly any becoming events.

This current situation challenges even more the cartographies produced by disabled bodies in their encounters with peripheral corporeality and others that highlight this (bio)potency, demanding from each of us a certain alterity. Even when worn down, alterity deserves to be resignified, in the sense that, ultimately, what we manage to describe of this otherness, when we are not part of this peripheral corporeality or, even if we are, lacks affirmative representational references and a means to communicate with the one, their image being a product of imagining how it would be, based on our own sensitive references to fragility.

In the laborious work of healing where this otherness touches us, sensitivity could make the potency of their fragility familiar, offering one of the few paths for processes of subjectivation to escape a world where this imagining has been captured by media and social media frames (Berardi, 2024; Butler, 2017). In this aesthetic and ethical terrain, where these mediums become war machines, producing a mixed semiology (a-significant and significant), in Guattari's terms (1992), one way for this alterity to unfold would be through this common faculty of imagining (Garcés, 2022; Spivak, 2017). Moreover, why not invoke the literary tool mobilized by Deleuze (1997) to create the people that are missing. Yet, before fabulating in this creative direction, this people is already here, disabled bodies are already engaging with other bodies, within and beyond institutional settings, already engaging in philosophy, forming a philosophical and educational trench, dug with their own hands.

The aim is to work in this more empirical terrain with the available tools, drawing from both the philosophies of difference and intersectionality, theoretically composing them as a flexible framework that recreates itself with each experimentation. It is this creative process and theoretical composition that is recommended so that in each institutional trench, disabled bodies and all those whose presence brings their differences and singularities inscribed advance towards forming a common body capable not only of dissenting from governable social body but also of rebelling in this institutional micropolitics, contributing to potentially instituting and transforming movements within institutions such as schools.

Thus, the aim is not only to make the fields of Philosophy and Education, particularly Philosophy of Education, acknowledge their own deficiencies, but primarily to make their practices pulsate and propose to their knowledge an encounter with a radical experience stemming from their own experimentation. This involves grappling with the accidents that affect their participants and the communication they engage in with the events they embody. In this direction, the problematic field would cut across both areas and contribute to reversing the scientific paradigm on which inclusive education rests. Simultaneously, thinking about the paradoxes inscribed in bodies with the actors who embody disability and their presence in institutions would be crucial strategically for the struggles they face in current micropolitics, recognizing the knowledge they have historically created, the practices and technologies they often experience in the school institution, using it to dissent, to rebel, and also to create.

To envision in this creation the artistic-philosophical potential of an institution that embraces, rather than expels, the instituting movements it carries, within the immanence of life whose expressiveness transcends it and sets it in circulation, in institutions such as schools, is to bring conflicts, sometimes persistent, into this institution. Yet, within their shadow, one can foresee concrete signs of transformation, to welcome this missing people—or, it would be better to say, this people that was missing. In this context of struggles and striving for such inclusion, one can argue that inclusion is not a substantive, nor an adjective of education, but an infinitive verb where to include is, more than its objective, a game of life and death.

In such a game, affirming the singularity of bodies, their differences, is a condition for an ethically democratic existence, freer in its essence. Politically, the social democracy sought should prevail not only as a government (quantitative) of the majority, but as a majority that changes its configuration in relation to how it exercises power, whenever coexistence with minorities forms a common body capable of forcing it towards such inclusion and, consequently, transforming the governable social body, its norms, and regulations. This would be the renewing, vital force of all social democracy, radicalizing it and seeing inclusive education as one of the strategic vectors of power to effectuate it, beyond just within institutions. It aims to amplify the singular ethnicity of disability and other differences, proposing to circulate the face of this missing people and embody their battles for a better life for every being, regardless of their qualification or socioeconomic value.

This is how, in this interpretative key, inclusive education would assume its inherently political, radical micropolitical, and desiring face, by those actors who participate in it, who have been welcomed by it, producing from its core a strategic, positive, powerful, and creative trench for the constant and variable improvement of democracy.

## References

- BERARDI, Franco B. *O terceiro inconsciente: a psicoesfera da Era viral*. São Paulo: Autonomia; GLAC, 2024.
- BUTLER, Judith. *Quadros de Guerra: quando a vida é passível de luto*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2017.
- BUTLER, Judith. *Vida precária: do luto e da violência*. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica, 2019.
- DELEUZE, Gilles. A literatura e a vida. In: DELEUZE, Gilles. *Crítica e clínica*. São Paulo: Ed 34, 1997. p. 11-16.
- DELEUZE, Gilles. *Lógica do sentido*. 4. ed. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2000.
- DELEUZE, Gilles. Instinto e instituições. In: DELEUZE, Gilles. *A ilha deserta e outros textos: Textos e entrevistas (1953-1974)*. São Paulo: Iluminuras, 2005.
- DELEUZE, Gilles; GUATTARI, Félix. Tratado de nomadologia: a máquina de guerra. In: DELEUZE, Gilles; GUATTARI, Félix. *Mil Platôs: capitalismo e esquizofrenia*. V. 5. 2.ed. São Paulo: Editora 34, 2012. p. 11-118.
- DERRIDA, Jacques. *El monolingüismo del outro*. Avellaneda: Manantial, 1997.
- ESPOSITO, Roberto. *Bíos: biopolítica e filosofia*. Lisboa: Edições 70, 2010.
- ESPOSITO, Roberto. *El dispositivo de persona*. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu, 2011.
- ESPOSITO, Roberto. *Institutio: sobre crises e valores das instituições*. Florianópolis: Rafael Copetti, 2021.
- FOUCAULT, Michel. *Os Anormais: curso no Collège de France (1974-1975)*. 2. ed. São Paulo: WMF Martins Fontes, 2010.
- FOUCAULT, Michel. Discurso e verdade: seis conferências sobre a parrhesia (Berkeley: outubro a novembro de 1983). *Prometeus: Filosofia em Revista*, Natal: UFRN, Ano 6, Número 13 – Edição Especial, 2013.
- FOUCAULT, Michel. *O corpo utópico: as heterotopias*. São Paulo: N-1 Edições, 2019.
- GARCÉS, Marina. Imaginación crítica. In: GARCÉS, Marina (coord.). *Ecología de la imaginación*. Artnodes, n. 29. UOC, 2022.
- GREINER, Christine; GODOY, Ana; MELLO, Fernanda. *Corpos CRIP*. São Paulo: N-1 Edições, 2023.
- GUATTARI, Félix. *Caosmose: um novo paradigma estético*. São Paulo: Editora 34, 1992.
- LEVINAS, E. *Totalidade e infinito*. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1988.

MALABOU, C. *Ontologie de l'accident*. Essai sur la plasticité destructrice. Paris: Léo Scheer, 2009.

MELLO, Anahi G.; AYDOS, Valéria; SCHUCH, Patrice. Aleijar as antropologias a partir das mediações da deficiência. *Horizontes Antropológicos*, Porto Alegre, v. 28, n. 64, p. 4-19 (apresentação), 2022.

MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice. *Fenomenologia da Percepção*. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1994.

MIGUEL, Marlon. *Fernand Deligny e as ecologias do humano*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da UFRJ, 2024.

NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. *Assim falou Zaratustra: um livro para todos e para ninguém*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2018.

PAGNI, Pedro A. *Biopolítica, deficiência e educação: outros olhares sobre a inclusão escolar*. São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2019.

PAGNI, Pedro A. *Retratos foucaultianos da deficiência e da ingovernabilidade na escola: do governo das diferenças a outro paradigma de inclusão*. Marília/São Paulo: Oficina Universitária/Cultura Acadêmica, 2023.

PLATÃO. *Mênon*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora PUC-Rio, 2001.

SPINOZA, Benedictus. *Ética*. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica, 2017.

SPIVAK, Gayatri Chakravorty. *Una educación estética en la era de la globalización*. Ciudad de México: Siglo XXI, 2017.

VIRNO, Paolo. *Sobre la impotencia: la vida en la era de su parálisis frenética*. Buenos Aires: Tinta Limón, 2022.



PAGNI, Pedro Ângelo. Disability as a Philosophical Problem: "Deficient" Thinking and Its Instituting Power in the School Institution. *Kalagatos*, Fortaleza, vol.21, n.3, 2024, eK24059, p. 01-19.

Received: 08/2024

Approved: 09/2024