

"Disability" as a Philosophical Problem

A Deficiência" como Problema Filosófico

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Abstract:

The renowned “History of Philosophy” is characterized as a set of reflections of a philosophical nature. It is carried out in different periods and territories. In each of these periods and territories, there is a profusion of concepts and categories whose fundamental premise is to address a specific theme or problem. This functions as the starting point of every act of philosophizing, an admiring astonishment *thaumadizem* (θαυμαδιζέμ) in the face of everything that is how it is. Is “disability”, the person with a disability, and their existence intended as a philosophical theme or problem? Would it be capable of awakening an admiring astonishment? *thaumadizem*. Would it be capable of initiating an act of philosophizing? Within the history of philosophy, very few pages are dedicated to dealing with “disabilities” and often intend to explain that disability constitutes a disarticulation of the standards of nature and culture. This article proposes to think about disability as a philosophical object, turning to the control machinery that constitutes the bodies of people with disabilities in a restrictive way. Determining what a person's body can or cannot do and where that body may or may not be. Thus, these machines build a preconceived, ableist understanding of what “disability” is.

Keywords: History of Philosophy, disability, control machinery, ableism.

Resumo:

O que comumente se denomina de “História da Filosofia” caracteriza-se como um conjunto de reflexões de cunho filosófico, levadas a cabo em períodos e territorialidades distintas. Em cada um desses períodos e territorialidades há uma profusão das construções de conceitos e categorias que têm como premissa fundamental tencionar um tema/problema específico, que funciona como ponto inicial de todo ato de filosofar, um espanto admirativo – *thaumadizem* (θαυμαδιζέμ) – diante de tudo o que é como é. A “deficiência”... a pessoa com deficiência e sua existencialidade pode ser compreendida enquanto um tema/problema filosófico no interior da “História da Filosofia”? A “deficiência” é capaz de despertar um espanto admirativo iniciador um ato de filosofar? São escassas as páginas de escritos filosóficos que

tratam da “deficiência” e, quando tencionada, é com o intuito de explicitar que a “deficiência” se constitui em uma desarticulação dos padrões da natureza e da cultura. Minha proposta no presente artigo é pensar o *locus* da deficiência enquanto tema/problema filosófico, tendo como fio condutor algumas reflexões de Platão, Aristóteles e Lucrecio. Posteriormente, tencionarei as maquinarias de controle enquanto constituidoras restritivas dos corpos das pessoas com deficiência, as quais determinam o que um o corpo de uma pessoa com deficiência pode ou não fazer, onde esse corpo pode ou não estar. Assim, essas maquinarias edificam uma compreensão preconcebida, capacitista, sobre o que é “deficiência”.

Palavras-chave: “História da Filosofia”, problema filosófico, deficiência, maquinarias de controle, capacitismo.

Own body

To Fábio Passos, poet of the body

*My body
Has capybara shape
Symbolic reason
and emotion flooded with inaccessible places,*

*My body has black matter
that absorbs indifference
and discrimination
to transform them into light,*

*There's a lunar eclipse
An exotic warmth
marked by the spirit.*

*My body
has nonconformist ideas
Dilacerating arguments
and a mute pain,*

*My body
Got the current of the rivers
that are
in the articulation of revolting words,*

*has the manifestation of being
myself
raw.*

(Samuel Dimas)

The person with disabilities, per se, throughout what is commonly called the “History of Philosophy,” is not intended as a philosophical theme or problem. Disability does not find, within philosophical reflections, a theoretical reception. Capable of a nuanced understanding of disabilities as a

human possibility, as a lifestyle.¹ In the rare occasions when "disability" was brought up, it was to make explicit its monstrous power to² disarticulate the normalizing patterns of nature and society, inaugurating a typology of exclusionary and ableist thinking.³ Let us now turn to some examples. Brushstrokes from antiquity corroborate this assertion that there is a typology of philosophical thought that focuses on the

¹ Based on the reflections of the Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges (1899–1986), Diniz formulates the hypothesis that disability is a lifestyle. This statement is without a doubt configured as a formulation that defies the standards of normality. For Borges, who began to lose his sight in childhood due to a genetic degeneration of the retina and, in 1950, could no longer see any object, blindness is a lifestyle. Diniz turns to this existential reflection of Borges and understands it as a possibility to deconstruct one of the most brutal forms of oppression: the contempt for the DEF body. "To say that disability is a lifestyle does not mean to equate it in political terms with other available lifestyles. There is something particular in the way of life of the disability, which is the body with injury" (DINIZ, 2007, p. 78). To think of disability as a lifestyle is to make DEF corporeality, which provokes astonishment in the "normotic," a powerful vehicle to claim the right to be in the world. Diniz explains that understanding disability as a particular lifestyle is a recent phenomenon. I would argue that more than a recent phenomenon, understanding disability as a lifestyle constitutes an attempt to change the paradigm about disability. The argument of disability in this horizon should not make it be considered as something that a person chooses to or not to experience (such as a minimalist, ostentatious, vegan, naturalist, or nomadic lifestyle). One does not choose to live with or without disabilities. However, what Diniz seeks to formulate, based on an approximation of the writings of Borges, is that one can choose how to live as a person with a disability. For this choice to be a real possibility, disability must be understood as a way of life, a lifestyle that, to be effective, requires the person with disabilities to turn to themselves. To rebuild their existence based on what Foucault calls self-care—a reconstruction that will require ceasing to be governed by the devices of subjugation that define disability as a personal tragedy. The care of oneself and the consequent ability of the subject to govern themselves are not, per se, sufficient for disability to be seen as a style of way since deciding how to live as a person with a disability is something constantly hampered. Since we live in societies where the rules of conduct have a strong weight of coercion, there is an effective construction of realities and subjectivities. To accept life and the DEF body as a "way of life" is to go against the current. It is of utmost importance to emphasize that disability should not be understood as a way of life but as "ways of life," plural. We should not intend disability from a homogeneous perspective. The category "disability" should point to the existence of a group of people with plural bodily expressions. In addition to the fact that there are several types of disabilities, there are other "forms of life" that affect the way the disability is experienced, aggravating the invisibility of DEF bodies. Thus, being a person with a disability while also being black, obese, belonging to the LGBTQIAPN+ community, living in regions without basic infrastructure, or having a low monthly income (not enough for essential expenses) means having an unhealthy life. Each of these characteristics, in a society governed by the "normotic," causes the existence of an unbreakable abjection. It is not the scope of my research to intend each of these "ways of life" of people with disabilities because, although it is fruitful, it would go beyond the field of investigation of this work.

² The notion of monster is basically situated within the legal notion, since it violates the laws of society as well as the laws of nature. The human monster performs infractions taken to their maximum point. "The field of appearance of the monster is, therefore, a domain that we can say is 'juridical-biological'. The laws built the figure of the monster to make explicit the greatest possible degree of difference between the exception, the aberration and the human. In this same space, the monster appears as a phenomenon that is both extreme and extremely rare. It is the limit, the inflection points of the law and is, at the same time, the exception that is only found in extreme cases, precisely" (Foucault, 2010, p. 17). The monster combines, in his figure, the impossible with the improbable. He personifies an image that is difficult to assimilate, as it escapes the standards of normality. "There is only monstrosity where the disorder of the natural law comes to touch, shake, disturb the law, whether civil law, canon law or religious law" (Foucault, 2010, p. 54). This description of the human monster indicates that we are facing a "deviation from nature," a term coined by Georges Bataille. Eliane Robert Moraes reminds us that the definition of a monster confronts us with unfinished beings, beings lacking essential parts. The human monster "[...] it is deprived or devoid of some capacity or organ that becomes indispensable in the very qualification of the human. Unfinished, the species thus described refer to a disturbance in the course of man's generation, to a natural accident" (Moraes, 2017, p. 135).

³ Although the term ableism did not exist in antiquity, one can retroactively identify this prejudice against people with disabilities in various practices and reflections. Ableism comes from the English ableism and means to mistreat or offend a person because they are disabled. Ableist discourses engender ideas that people with disabilities are inferior to those without disabilities and that they are incapable of performing certain tasks and activities. Ableism is a term that spread in the 1980s, in the United States of America, on the occasion of the movements for the rights of people with disabilities. For Itxi Guerra, ableism "is a word that is now beginning to be heard more frequently in social movements, but its meaning and what it implies is not often explored in depth. Ableism is the oppression that we disabled people face, and it arises from the ableist system, which is the social, political and economic system that discriminates, violates, marginalizes and murders disabled people because they are disabled. It is a system in which bodies and minds are valued according to the standard of normality, intelligence, excellence, thinness, usefulness, beauty.... This value is determined by capitalism (and the state). The idea of a 'perfect' person is created, one who produces profit for the system through his work and his erotic capital" (Guerra, 2021, p. 27).

body of the person with disabilities with an ableist bias. However, before going over some passages from the works of Plato, Aristotle, and Lucretius that bring the theme of disability into their philosophical reflections, it is crucial to explain how disabled people⁴ were called in antiquity. A denomination that brings at its core the accepted and shared understanding of “disability” in this period of human history. The archaic Greek dialect used the word *anaperos* (Ἀνάπηρος, ον) to denote the “deficiency”, the deformity. This word is subdivided into two roots: *aná* (ἀνά), whose meaning is “continuity” and *perós* (Ἰηρός ἄ, ὄν), which can be translated as deficiency. Therefore, *anaperos* would be a continuous, permanent disability that would go against the classical ideal of man. Consequently, “disability” should be banished from the walls of the polis so that the city would not stray away from its good order. Let us see how the body and, as an unfolding, the *anaperos* were examined in some texts of classical philosophers.

Let us start then with Plato (428 BC–348 BC). The body, in Platonic works, has an evil character, it bears illusions and deceptions, as well as desires, fears, chimeras, and foolishness of all kinds. The evil character of the body makes the appetitive part stand out from the rational part (*λογιστικόν*), leading men not to accept the place and activity that are, by nature, proper to them, within the ideal city. However, in Platonic reflections, the body, more precisely the beautiful and perfect body, plays the role of a spark that provides the knowable ascent of Love that affirms itself in beauty.

In Plato's *The Symposium* (*Συμπόσιον*), the question of the body revolves around the nature of Love. The dialogue develops between Socrates, Agatho, and Alcibiades about the speech given by the priestess Diotima of Mantinea about Love. The dialogue is based on the reaffirmation of Platonic metaphysics. The theory of forms is wrapped in the understanding that episteme is characterized as a vehicle capable of showing the philosopher what Love is. The Love that affirms itself in beauty, because in ugliness there is no Love, must be perceived, first, in beautiful bodies, and in an upward movement, it must reach Love itself. This dialectical movement is necessary since it is up to the philosopher to realize that the beauty of a body is, after all, in all beautiful bodies. Bodily beauty is the manifestation of the form of beauty. Therefore, there is a single beauty in all

⁴ The reader must remember that the term “person with disabilities” began to be used in 2006, after the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Throughout history, terminologies have been used only to explain the stigmas and prejudices (ableism) suffered by people with disabilities. In this regard, Teixeira reminds us that “The discriminations suffered by the disabled body and the social stigma that accompanied it over time were reflected in various nomenclatures about the body and the disabled individual as: crippled, invalid, incapable, exceptional person, special, disabled, person with special needs, and, finally, person with disability. It is worth noting that the adoption of these names did not change the social view of this body, which continues to be content with gaps in society, gaps that are built by the very action of these individuals” (Teixeira, *Deficiência em Cena*, p. 38).

beautiful bodies. After this first movement, the philosopher must see that the beauty in the soul is more sublime than that of the body.

After this observation, the philosopher can contemplate beauty in the crafts, laws, and sciences and will understand that they all have a single source: the Form of beauty. In this work, there is an amalgam between the idea of beauty and that of Love. Love is understood through the contemplation of what is beautiful. To do so, a progressive process of knowledge is necessary, a movement that leaves the apparent ideas of beauty behind. Ideas such as that beauty is present only in youthful bodies. Until the wise man is aware of what Love is in itself. To achieve this understanding, it is essential to overcome the obscurity of the visible world, where the images of beautiful bodies are. In this first dialectical movement, visible figures of beautiful bodies are used so that, by reasoning about them, one can arrive at the contemplation of the originals they reproduce. Thus, reasoning is based on the beauty that will lead to the understanding of Love.

Although Love is not present in beautiful corporeal realities because it is a deception for the soul, these serve as a starting point for seeking to achieve what one longs to have but does not yet possess, that is, Love. The bodies considered ugly and shapeless are, on the contrary, not a safe guide for achieving Love because the gods love beautiful things; they are not interested in what is ugly and shapeless. It is necessary to emphasize that when faced with the antagonistic pair of “beauty and ugliness,” one faces two overlapping conceptual layers. The first reveals an aesthetic dimension, and the second, an ethical-political dimension.

This is due to the fact that, in the Platonic affirmation, the gods are not interested in what is ugly and misshapen, and that love is what is beautiful. There is an explicit imbrication between the idea of beauty and goodness, between the aesthetically pleasing and the moral precepts determining human action in the polis. In other words, to say that the gods repel what is ugly makes perceptible the relationship between the cognition of beauty and a perfectly harmonious whole. Beauty, therefore, is the manifest form of good.

However, it is in the Republic (*Πολιτεία*) that the tension of the *anaperos* emerges with strength in the Platonic reflections. In Book V, from 460b onwards, the need for brave young men to be allowed to copulate with women in order to generate children who would have the characteristics of these “good” men in their constitutive formation begins to be discussed. It is on this argumentative fringe that the Platonic recommendations for the race of guardians, for them to be pure, become understandable. For this, the children of guardians must be taken to nannies to be well cared for, i.e, to “[...] a common home, where they will be entrusted to nannies who live separately, in a neighborhood of the city. For the children of inferior individuals and even those of others who have

some *deformity*, they will be taken to an unknown and secret whereabouts” (Plato, 2017, Book V, 460c, emphasis mine).

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The philosopher of Stagira, Aristotle (384 BC–322 BC), is faithful to his master Plato concerning the misshapen people. In his Politics (*Πολιτικά*), Book VII, in a passage that also deals with the care and education of children, the philosophical understanding of antiquity about people with disabilities is explicitly presented. Once again, it attests that, within the philosophical reflections of the first Ancient Greek thinkers, “disability” presents itself as a philosophical problem insofar as it is characterized as a disarticulation of the standards of beauty, strength, and usefulness. All of which are essential for a common good life.

In 1335b20, Aristotle brought to the center of his reflections the problem surrounding the constitutive characteristics of children who, after their birth, should be raised or abandoned to die. For Aristotle, “The creation of *misshapens* must be prohibited” (emphasis mine). Aristotle, in comparison to his master, Plato, managed to “refine” the understanding of misshapen children because, for him, they should not be taken to hidden places. Such children should be forbidden to be fed and, therefore, to remain alive.

Lucretius (94 BC–55 BC), the epicurean, proposes a perception of the body that differs from that of Plato. Fundamentally, in his work *De la Nature*, Lucretius presents an understanding that “everything is just body.” Therefore, we are faced with a bodily monism in which even the soul, being formed by a more ethereal compound, will be understood through a purely material process. The soul and the body form a single whole, pointing to the fact that one complements the other. This complementarity appears in the fact that, for Lucretius, it would be contradictory and nonsense to imagine “[...] a mortal substance united to another, which would have no beginning or end, to deliver together the same storms?” (Lucretius, 2015, book III, verses 802-806). Thus, there is a total inseparability between body and soul. The soul is born, develops, and disappears together with the body. These constituent parts of human nature are entirely identified.

Given the above, it is evident that there is, in Lucretius’s thought, a revitalization of the stature of the body in relation to the soul. However, not everybody is revitalized. Lucretius explains

that the inseparability between body and soul is apprehended only in conventional, not monstrous, bodies. The Epicurean understands that time can alter the nature of all things. However, this alteration is not capable of allowing monstrous beings, who are missing parts of their limbs or have flawed senses, to reach the biological maturity of their being. These beings would not be able to help and aggregate the formation of a healthy humanity. In Lucretius's understanding, monsters cannot exist since they are formed by discordant elements. They are not able to maintain harmony and union among themselves.

Many portents and monsters, then the earth tried to produce, born with strange faces and limbs, such as the androgynous, halfway between one sex and the other, bodies partly without feet or stolen from the hands, on the contrary, mute for lack of mouth, blind for lack of eyes, incapable of having their limbs glued to the body, such that they could do nothing or move anywhere, nor avoid evil or take anything useful. Other monsters of this type and portents he created, but in vain, because nature prevented their growth, not even the desired flower of age reached, nor did they find food, nor did they unite on Venus (Lucretius, 2015, book V, verse 840).

In this passage, Lucretius rudimentary explains some elements that would be, centuries later, present in the theory of natural selection elaborated by Charles Darwin (1809–1882) and Alfred Wallace (1823–1913). These elements, when used to understand phenomena circumscribed to human affairs, foster prejudice, discrimination, and genocide. Lucretius's formulation points to the fact that, in the bosom of nature, emerges monstrous beings; beings without feet and hands, without mouth and mute, blind, or any other limb. Monsters that, in his understanding, were created in vain because nature took it upon herself to paralyze growth, and they were aborted in their desire to reach the flower of age. It can be said that, in Lucretius's thoughts, there are already the germs of the understanding of the human monster: people with physical disabilities, considered aberrations that bring disorder to the laws of nature, breaking them. If nature does not stop their flowering, they must be kept invisible.

For this article, our analyses will be circumscribed around the philosophical writings of Antiquity, bringing “deficiency” to the surface of reflections as a philosophical theme or problem. In the excerpts of the works exposed above, some tensions delimit the body and existence of people with disabilities as disarticulations of a pattern. From my understanding, philosophical concepts and categories, especially those coined by contemporary thinkers, are prime conceptual tools to help us think about disabilities beyond a phenomenon that disarticulates patterns. These concepts and categories also allow us to build a conceptual framework about the mechanisms that have been (and still are) used for centuries to construct an invisible existence for people with disabilities. In addition, it intends to think about “disability,” *per se*, as a human possibility.

In this sense, I now turn to some reflections by the philosopher Judith Butler (1956–). The choice to use concepts coined by Butler is due to my contact with the documentary in which the American philosopher dialogues

with Sunaura Taylor (1982–), an American painter, activist for the rights of people with physical disabilities, and professor at the University of Berkeley, California. In this documentary, entitled *Examined Life* (2008), Butler points out that reflections on “gender problems” provide essential argumentative tools to think about the construction of the bodies of people with disabilities. The materialization of the “disability” in the body, of the “defect” in the body, has the scope of defining the boundaries that separate people with disabilities from the normal, the healthy, and the perfect.

This motto seeks to reaffirm that "disability" is a phenomenon that goes beyond the curve of the laws of nature and society. As an extrapolation, "disability" is not a rule but an exception, and, therefore, the exclusionary matrix reaffirms its refusal to construct spaces of visibility for plural bodies. Since the exception confirms exceptionality, i.e., sporadically, DEF bodies emerge in spaces of visibility, as a consequence, the world of appearances doesn't need to be prepared to receive them. Its *loci* are the rehabilitative institutions as well as the invisible social spaces.

In the preface to *Bodies that Matter*, Judith Butler invites the reader to think of the body as something constructed, this will immediately demand a resignification of our understanding of what construction is. For her, some forms of construction exert a constitutive tendency on the one intended to build, i.e., to be something without which it is impossible to think of the whole. “[...] We could suggest that bodies only arise, only endure, and only live within the productive constraints of certain highly regulatory gender [and "disability"] schemes” (Butler, 2020, p. 12). It can be asserted that there are productive constraints to certain highly regulatory “deficiency” schemes. The theoretical framework fostered by Butler leads to an understanding that the constitutive and restrictive construction of bodies produces the domain of intelligible bodies as well as the domain of unthinkable, abject⁵, and uninhabitable bodies. Bodies as those of people with disabilities.

The regulatory norms for the body work performatively to materialize the sexual and efficient difference between bodies. To consolidate the supposed heterosexual superiority and, for my purpose, to consolidate the superiority of normalized bodies over the bodies of people with disabilities. We are facing a matrix that excludes and produces abject beings, beings who are not subjects. For Judith Butler, abjection designates the “non-liveable” and “uninhabitable” zones of social life, populated by those who, due to exclusionary constitutions, are incapable of achieving the status of a subject (Butler, 2020, p. 18).

⁵ Butler's assertion that points in the direction that there is an excluding matrix from which individuals are formed as abject beings, the “not” subjects, is fruitful. “The abject designates here precisely those 'unliveable' and 'uninhabitable' zones of social life that, nevertheless, are densely populated by those who do not achieve the status of subject, but whose living under the sign of the 'uninhabitable' is necessary to circumscribe the subject's domain” (BUTLER, 2020, p.18). The abject is a state of exclusion, of repulsion, within the terms imposed by society on those whose humanity is questioned and, this time, desired not to be present in the social core. Their place is in the pockets of the periphery, where the Inhumans, the abnormals, are thrown.

This argumentative framework points in the direction of a need for differential construction: to affirm the construction of a human being, it is necessary to construct its opposite, the “less human”, the inhuman, and the humanly inconceivable, such as people with disabilities.

The body of people with disabilities does not matter, has no meaning, and is not capable of materializing within the social body. To have an existence that matters is to be able to materialize and, therefore, to have meaning. The body’s materiality is not certain but acquired or not. Given the above, one can precisely understand Butler's assertion that there is no subject prior to his constructions. Subjects have lives that do or do not matter, depending on their constructions. However, Butler warns that the subjects are also not determined by such constructions (Butler, 2020, p. 214). There is always the possibility of reformulating the terms by which bodies are determined; a possibility that presents itself as a Herculean task given the effectiveness of the devices that construct bodies hastily. These devices build ableist societies, which deny people with disabilities the possibility of experiencing their existence in a “different” way, expelling them into pockets of (in)visibility.

DEF corporeality is allocated in these pockets, meaning that people with disabilities are unable to access their bodies as these are marked with the seal of the *shapeless* and the monstrous. These marks symbolize that these bodies can only perform in *loci* predetermined by biomedical knowledge: in hospitals, rehabilitation clinics, or in the seclusion of their homes. This happens because they are defective bodies, which need to be repaired and, if this is not possible, should be kept in hidden places. Your nakedness? Abject! The person with a disability is not allowed to experience the aesthetic potential of their bodies stripped of clothing, which gives them the “green card” to enter the “normal” world, which accepts only normalized bodies as beautiful. The nudity of the person with disabilities is not naturalized, on the contrary, it is denaturalized, as it affronts the laws of nature and the aesthetic standards.

In one of the chronicles that make up *Urubus* by Carla Bessa, the author contrasts the performance of the foreigner's nudity—a full-body nudity that is not just sex—and the Brazilian nudity, which is just sex: a second entity made up of the buttocks, chest, and genitals.

I saw it right away. That he was a foreigner. The foreign body is recognized by the naturalness of nudity. It's full-body nudity, it's not just sex. When the Brazilian is naked, he is abducted from the rest of his body, the naked Brazilian is just sex. And sex is a second entity. It's as if a saint was lowered, you know? Or a character, a mask. In any case, he is not the person he usually is. The naked Brazilian's body has no arm or leg, no head or thought. It's just ass breast sex. Just cock, pussy. And that obligation to be sex while being naked. Of being other, the fantasy. A carnival thing. Dionysian. A bit of an animal thing, if you think about it. Nudity covers Brazilians with libidinage, with the desire to be sex for the other, no matter who. It is a compulsion; the person feels impelled. She has been programmed for this since she was a child, for this bacchante servility (Bessa, 2020, p. 89).

DEF nudity is not allowed to be natural, full-body, or subsumed under sex. It is abject and (in)visible. The naked body of the person with disabilities has no arm, no leg, and no head, but also no buttocks, breasts, or sex. It is only “uninhabitable,” “unlivable,” and humanly inconceivable.

For the DEF body and DEF nudity to be habitable, livable, and conceived, it is necessary, in addition to architectural, attitudinal, communicational, and aesthetic accessibility (which ensures the body's coexistence with other bodies in the common world), that the person with disabilities knows themselves⁶. Then, they are capable of taking care of themselves in a movement that will lead the individual to build a subjectivity beyond the control devices.

This reconstruction requires the ceasing of the devices that subjugate and define “disability” as a personal tragedy. Self-care and the consequent ability of the subjects to govern themselves are not enough for “disability” to be seen as a lifestyle since choosing *how* to live as a person with a disability is something constantly hampered. Especially since we live in societies in which the rules of conduct have a hefty weight of coercion that effectively constructs realities and subjectivities. To accept life and the DEF body as a “way of life” is to tense normalizing standards against the grain.

For “deficiency” to be thought of as a philosophical theme or problem and as the initiating point, as an admiring astonishment — *thaumadizem am* (θαυμαδιζέμ) — of reflection, it is necessary, as a priority, to question the control devices that restrictively constitute DEF bodies. From this first argumentative turn, one can bring deficiency, in itself, to the surface of philosophical discourses. Bring the possibilities of existing differently in an ordinary world. In ways of communicating, moving, seeing, listening, and reasoning beyond the impositions of normalizing standards, which foster a single way of existing and, thus, do not allow human plurality to manifest itself in the common world.

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⁶ Within Foucault's reflections, “the self is a relation. The self is not a reality, it is not a structured thing, given at the beginning. It is a relationship with oneself” (FOUCAULT, 1990, p. 97).

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