

EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF SUPERVENIENCE: A DISJUNCTIVIST DEFENSE OF THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT

EXPLORANDO AS FRONTEIRAS DA SUPERVENIÊNCIA: UMA DEFENSA DISJUNTIVISTA AO ARGUMENTO DA CAUSALIDADE

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to provide a defense of Naive Realism/Disjunctivism, offering a new response to Michael Martin's Causal Argument that withstands its subconclusion that perceptions instantiate the fundamental property of hallucinations. To achieve this goal, we conduct a critical analysis of the argument's premise, which asserts that mere mental processes are sufficient for the instantiation of the fundamental properties of hallucinations. Our inquiries are directed at the reasons presented by proponents of the argument, which are based on the conjunction of two propositions. The first proposition states that experiences, in general, are exclusively caused by brain processes. The second proposition internal to the conjunction leading to the idea of the cerebral supervenience of hallucinations, and the object of the present study, is the conception that hallucinations are internal events, coupled with the notion that internal events are never non-causally determined. To contest this assertion, we present what we term the negative view of hallucinations, highlighting the idea that, from hallucinations, it is not possible to have "unsuccessful" demonstrative thoughts, with content different from counterparts in perceptual cases. However, it has been demonstrated that the causality of these thoughts, in cases of neurological correspondence, cannot be compatible with the restricted internality of hallucinations, at least considering the other propositions leading to the idea of supervenience.

KEYWORDS:

Disjunctivism; Naïve Realism; Causal Argument; Local Supervenience; Michael Martin.

RESUMO

O objetivo deste estudo é fornecer uma defesa do Realismo Ingênuo/Disjuntivismo, apresentando uma nova resposta ao Argumento Causal de Michael Martin que resista à sua subconclusão de que as percepções instanciam a propriedade fundamental das alucinações. Para alcançar esse objetivo, conduzimos uma análise crítica da premissa do argumento, que sustenta que meros processos mentais são suficientes para a exemplificação das propriedades fundamentais das alucinações. Ao questionar essa proposição, direcionamos nossos questionamentos às razões apresentadas por defensores do argumento, que se baseiam na conjunção de duas proposições. A primeira proposição afirma que as experiências, em geral, são exclusivamente causadas por processos cerebrais. A segunda proposição interna à conjunção que leva à ideia de superveniência cerebral das alucinações, e objeto do presente estudo, é a concepção de que alucinações são eventos internos, somada à noção de que eventos internos nunca são não causalmente determinados. Para contestar essa afirmação, apresentamos o que denominamos de visão negativa de alucinações, destacando a ideia de que, a partir de alucinações, não é possível ter pensamentos demonstrativos "malsucedidos", com conteúdo diverso das contrapartes em casos perceptivos. No entanto, demonstrou-se que a causalidade desses pensamentos, em casos de correspondência neurológica, não pode ser compatível com a internalidade restrita das alucinações, pelo menos considerando as outras proposições que levam à ideia de superveniência.

PALAVRAS-CHAVES:

Disjuntivismo; Realismo Ingênuo; Argumento Causal; Superveniência Local; Michael Martin.

1. INTRODUCTION

Naive Realism, despite presenting a variety of specific formulations (Machado, 2023), can be generally defined as the proposition that veridical perceptions are intrinsically linked to familiarization with mind-independent entities (Byrne & Logue, 2008; Fish, 2009; Hellie, 2013; Martin, 2004, 2006). In this context, familiarization (a term known in specialized literature in English as “acquaintance”) is considered an authentic and, therefore, factive relation (Snowdon, 1980, p.185-6; Martin, 1997, p.93-5; 2002, p.380-402; 2004, p.42-8), implying the existence of the related, more specifically, the entity independent of the relevant mind.

This view of perception is often argued to have some advantages over its main competitors, especially Sensory Data Theory and Representationalism¹. Firstly, it is supposedly in tune with our ordinary conceptions and intuitions about perceptions (Martin, 2002, 2006; Crane, 2006; Fish, 2009). Second, it is defensibly in tune with introspective data about perceptions (Crane, 2005; Nudds, 2009; Hill, 2009). Thirdly, it would also explain knowledge of the external world (Mcdowell, 1992, 2008). Fourth, it supposedly explains demonstrative thinking (Campbell, 2002, 2009, 2011). Fifth, it explains the conception of mind-independent things (Brewer, 2011). This list is not exhaustive, but it is enough to show why exploring Naive Realism is an approach that has appeal.

Despite these advantages, naive realism has historically been criticized in a few different ways. Specifically, the line of reasoning known as the “Causal Argument”, developed by Michael Martin (2004) in his influential article “The Limits of Self-Awareness”², is currently considered the main challenge to Naive Realism (Soteriou, 2016, 2020; Fish, 2010; Tim & French, 2021).

The main goal of this paper is to provide a new critical analysis of this argument, with special emphasis on exploring potential strategies that naïve realists could employ in response to it. However, first, in order to justify the approach we will follow, we will make an initial exposition of the argument, together with its standard approach in the literature.

1.1 The causal argument as an argument from hallucination

Firstly, it is important to recognize that the causal argument can be understood as a specific type of “Argument from Hallucination” (“Argument from Hallucination”), as defined by Snowdon (1992, 2005a). This category of argument generally consists of two steps: the base case, which involves characterizing a hallucination in a specific way, and the “spreading step”, in which it is argued that this characterization also applies to a corresponding perception. The underlying claim is that this compatibility poses a challenge to certain approaches to perceptions, typically Naïve Realism or Direct Realism.

¹Martin (2004, 2002), interestingly, separates these three approaches to perception according to two types of elements that they consider experiences to have. These elements are "objects of consciousness" and "mode of consciousness." "Objects of consciousness" can be purely mental (as in Sense Data theories) or external things (as naive realists and intentionalists claim), and the experiencer can be "conscious" of them in a relational way (i.e., through knowledge relation) or in a quasi-relational (i.e. representational) manner. This “quasi-relation” is precisely the one introduced by Brentano, which is instantiated by us and some object (called “intentional”), in such a way that it does not require (unlike real relations) the existence of the latter relatum. This type of relationship was already explicit in the work of Brentano, who, as Nunes Filho and Santos (2015, p.117, my translation) explains, already considered that the “intentional object [...] is only an intentional correlate and is distinguished by its mode of existence that reflects a being in consciousness, but which is not real in it; the intentional object is non-real (nichts Reales)”.

²However, from a historical point of view, he traced it back to Robinson (1985, 1994). Furthermore, Martin's argument is also defended by Sollberger (2007, 2008, 2012).

Of course, understanding the argument requires that we characterize this relationship. According to Martin (2004, p. 60), the fundamental property of something is defined as “that in virtue of which [that thing] has the nature it has”. Martin's (2004, 2006) explanation of fundamental properties presupposes a specific ontology. He postulates that objects and events generally have their natures defined by properties organized in a hierarchical manner (Martin, 2006, p. 361). This implies that each existing entity has a series of properties interconnected by the “being more specific than” relationship. Furthermore, within this ontology, each entity instantiates only a hierarchical series of properties, with the fundamental property being the one that represents the most specific property associated with it³.

Sollberger presents an alternative perspective on fundamental properties, approaching them from a phenomenological point of view (Sollberger, 2012, pp. 583-4). According to Sollberger, if F is the fundamental property of x (where x is a sensory experience), then x's possession of F determines the phenomenal character of x⁴. Despite their differences, both approaches commonly assume that the current conventional understanding of the fundamental properties of hallucinations involves either familiarization with mental images (for sense data theorists) or specific intentional contents (for representationalists) (Martin, 2004, pp.3-40).

1.2. The screening off: why would naïve realists view such spreading as undesirable?

In Section 2, I will explore in detail how the causal argument would manage to spread the fundamental property of hallucinations. However, before delving into this, it is essential to provide additional details about how the argument operates and why such a spreading would be undesirable for naïve realists in the first place.

The Causal Argument stage referred to as “screening off” aims to demonstrate this undesirability. Their strategy, as outlined by Martin (2004, pp. 58-63), is as follows. One begins by assuming that Naïve Realists attribute different fundamental properties to veridical perceptions compared to corresponding hallucinations (ibid, pp. 41–2). In other words, naïve realists must adopt a *disjunctivist perspective* (Hinton, 1967, 1973; Snowdon, 1980; 2005b, 2008; Soteriou, 2016, Sturgeon, 2008; Logue, 2012). This is because, according to Naive Realism, the fundamental property of perceptions involves familiarization with a specific environmental entity, a requirement that hallucinations can never meet (Martin, 2002, 2004).

³In this case, a similarity can be observed between Martin's definition of fundamental properties, especially in its essentialist, hierarchical and unicist tenor, and some contemporary projects of natural types, such as those of Ellis (2001, 2002) and Bird (2007).

⁴Naturally, here Sollberger presupposes some kind of “Principle of Sufficient Reason” for the phenomenal character of experiences. For general observations about this (type of) principle, see Frago (2015).

In this case, the line of reasoning suggests that we should not be disjunctivists. Whatever explanatory role the additional property proposed by naive realism could have on perceptions (in relation to their nature, phenomenology, etc.), the fundamental property of hallucinations, which would already be forced to be present in perceptions according to the argument, would fulfill the same function. Therefore, the naive realist's postulation of the additional property, corresponding to which perceptions involve familiarization with mind-independent entities, becomes theoretically and explanatorily redundant or unnecessary. Consequently, a version of Occam 's razor principle would guide us to abandon such a postulation. In other words, the presence of the fundamental property of hallucinations “screens off” the naive-realist postulation.

Note that the argument can remain neutral regarding the specific intrinsic nature of the fundamental property of hallucinations. What is important is the theoretical or explanatory *function* that these properties are supposed to have as fundamental properties.

1.3. Forms of traditional resistance against the Causal Argument

Most existing strategies for countering the causal argument focus on dealing with its “screening off” part. Since this part is based on the widely accepted methodological principle of avoiding unnecessary theoretical entities, the common approach is to dispute the claim that the fundamental properties of hallucinations can play the same explanatory roles as the aspect of perceptions as introduced by the naive realist and therefore , the fundamental property of hallucinations should not, from an abductive point of view , “take your job”. There are two main methods to accomplish this task.

The first strategy is the approach of Martin (2004, 2006), who argues that although there may be an extension of the fundamental property of hallucinations (and therefore it is instantiated by perception), this property is not the fundamental property of *perceptions* (Martin, 2004, pp.63-8). As a result, it does not play the theoretical roles associated with fundamental properties. Therefore, the explanatory function of the property introduced by naïve realists for perceptions remains “without competition,” and so there is no methodological obligation to abandon it.

Naturally, this approach places the onus on disjunctivists to indicate the nature of the fundamental properties of hallucinations and why, contrary to initial expectations, although it can fulfill an explanatory role specific to hallucinations, it cannot perform the same function when instantiated by perceptions. In Martin's specific case, the justification for this distinction lies in the fact that, in the case of perceptions, the property designated as fundamental to hallucinations would only be trivially instantiated and, therefore, could not fulfill any fundamental role. More specifically, Martin (2004, p.70-80) argues that the fundamental property of hallucinations corresponds to the fact that one cannot know,

introspectively, that such events are not perceptions. However, that such a property is instantiated by perceptions is just a trivial consequence of the fact that one cannot know false propositions (since the fact that perceptions are not perceptions is absolutely false). Consequently, the fundamental property of such events cannot be considered truthful. However, this triviality of instantiation does not apply to the hallucinatory case, allowing them to be considered as potential candidates for the fundamental property of hallucinations.

However, this line of reasoning raises certain concerns. Firstly, it seems implausible to claim that the nature of hallucinations, or what explains their phenomenology, is based exclusively on their being introspectively indistinguishable from certain episodes. In fact, this seems to reverse the natural order of explanation, which posits that hallucinations are indistinguishable from perceptions due to their inherent phenomenological similarity (Tye, 2007), rather than the other way around. Furthermore, Martin's specific approach has faced criticism from several scholars in recent years and is no longer a seriously considered alternative (Siegel, 2004, 2008; Farkas, 2006; Hawthorne & Kovakovich, 2006; Byrne & Logue, 2008; Smith, 2008; Sturgeon, 2008).

Indeed, one of the main concerns with this general *type* of approach is the challenge of finding a plausible property that satisfies both the criteria of being fundamental for hallucinations but not for perceptions. Over the years, no such property has been identified, and it seems unlikely that one will emerge in the future.

Logue (2013) presents an alternative approach that challenges the isolation part of the argument. According to this view, it is recognized that the fundamental property for perceptions extends to hallucinations and can fulfill the same explanatory functions that it has in hallucinations. However, Logue goes further and argues that naïve-realist properties have additional theoretical and explanatory virtues that are unique to them. From this perspective, veridical perceptions require a wider range of explanations compared to corresponding hallucinations. As a result, Logue denies that the explanatory property of perceptions is equivalently explanatory to the naïve-realist feature, asserting that the former does not “take over” the explanatory work of the latter.

In fact, several theoretical or explanatory virtues are claimed to be unique to Naive Realism. Examples of these supposed virtues can be found in the logo at the beginning of this article. Indeed, if Naive Realism possessed no advantage over its non-disjunctivist rivals, such as Sense Data Theory or representational approaches, then, for dialectical-methodological reasons, the postulation of Naive Realism would have to be abandoned in favor of these theories. (Indeed, in such a scenario, the causal argument would be unnecessary to reject Naive Realism from the outset.) From the point of view of ontological economics, these theories would be more favorable, as they do not require the postulation of

a supplementary fundamental property, such as the Naïve Realism does along with the fundamental property of hallucinations.

Logue's strategy presents a more promising approach against the isolation part of the argument, it also brings important dialectical disadvantages to Disjunctivism. This is not only because of its lower ontological and conceptual economy compared to non-disjunctivist rivals (a burden that disjunctivists face from the start, as I have indicated) but also because it assumes a heterogeneous nature of perceptions. This ontological complexity can be seen as more compromising than simply introducing new entities into one's ontology. Furthermore, accepting Logue's strategy introduces another dialectical issue for disjunctivism, namely the need to recognize a “partial screening off” of the naïve-realist property. This is because some aspects that the property aims to explain, such as phenomenology, can now simultaneously be explained by the fundamental property of hallucinations. Furthermore, Logue's approach has the disadvantage of significantly restricting the set of candidates for the fundamental properties of hallucinations, as they can only be compatible with perceptions. As a result, disjunctivists are forced, for example, to reject approaches such as sense data theory inescapably.

In this case, it is undeniable that the causal argument presents significant challenges for naïve realists, even without taking into account its isolating part. For the mere admission of the transfer of the fundamental property of hallucinations to perceptions is a plausibly quite unwelcome move for disjunctivists. Therefore, it would be highly advantageous for naïve realism to find a way to counter the first part of the argument. Rejecting the base case is considered unacceptable, since, “of course, disjunctivists must offer an explanation of hallucinations” (Tózsér, 2009, p.56). Consequently, the only viable option for naïve realists is to contest the spreading step. This article aims to address exactly that goal.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, I will outline the basis on which the causal argument establishes the spreading of the fundamental property from hallucinations to perceptions, highlighting a premise on which disjunctivists must focus their resistance. Furthermore, in this section I present and quickly dismiss a flawed argument for this premise that is often cited as justification in versions of the causal argument. I will then examine the main source of justification that antidisjunctivists must emphasize to support this premise, as well as the aspect that disjunctivists must focus on to resist the causal argument. This analysis will provide two distinct reasons that collectively establish the premise. The main contribution of this article will be made in Section 3, where we will expose a form of resistance to one of these reasons.

2. SPREADING THE FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY OF HALLUCINATIONS TO PERCEPTIONS

The Causal Argument part proposes that the spreading of the fundamental property of hallucinations to perceptions occurs through two premises:

- (1) Everything internal to a hallucinator can also be reproduced in a perceptual case.
- (2) The fundamental property of hallucinations is locally supervenient.

(1) suggests that there may be equivalents that are intrinsically identical but differ in terms of whether they are a perception or a hallucination. This can be demonstrated by considering a typical perceptual scenario, such as your current perception of your laptop. In this situation, there are internal factors (B), which can be defined in terms of intrinsic aspects of what is under the skin of the organism⁵, and external factors (E) involved. External factors include light reflected from your laptop, which hits your retina, and so on. Now, let's imagine another scenario in which B is instantiated but E does not occur. Instead, an “artificial process” is employed, such as the use of electrodes, to replicate the internal factors. In this case, it is plausible to expect the emergence of a subjectively corresponding hallucination⁶.

(2) postulates the existence of a distinct internal kind that is sufficient for the instantiation of the fundamental property of perceptions. The argument holds that if the internal factors responsible for a hallucination can be replicated in a perceptual case, then the sufficient factor for such properties would also be present in the perceptual case, thus leading to the spreading of the fundamental properties discussed. This is basically the Causal Argument's strategy for making the spreading relevant.

Given that (1) is largely uncontroversial, disjunctivists seeking to dispute the spreading part of the causal argument should plausibly direct their attention to (2). The remainder of the article is dedicated to critically examining this proposition and what supports it.

2.1 The surgeon's argument

⁵Naturally, (1) focuses exclusively on neurological factors and does not cover mental aspects in general. This deliberate limitation is crucial to avoid presupposing the issue against the disjunctivist position.

⁶Some authors argue that we currently do not have empirical evidence to support this expectation (Rojas, 2020). While it is plausible that there is no concrete proof that such and such specific types of brain processes in and of themselves entail specific types of experiences (which would likely require more advanced technology than we currently possess), assuming the opposite—that a “external” factor could “interfere” with what we can introspect—seems inconsistent with our existing empirical knowledge about the interaction between the brain and the mind.

Why should anyone accept (2)? Before delving deeper into the topic, it is important to establish an assumption that underlies the causal argument. This assumption is based on the idea that “genuine causality is characterized by a pattern of causes and effects that demonstrates an implicit generality” (Martin, 2004, p. 57), aligning with a general theory of causality⁷. In this context, if a causes b, this implies (sets of) properties F and G, where all instances of F cause G (a “pattern”), a has F, and b has⁸ G. It should be noted that there must be restrictions on the specific nature of the properties F and G; otherwise this position would become trivial. These restrictions will be addressed when relevant to the present argument.

That said, before even beginning to analyze the relevant reasons for taking (2) seriously, it is necessary to address a reasoning that has been cited as its basis (Sollberger, 2007, p. 256; 2008, p.4), which quickly becomes shows inadequate. The argument is based on the supposed fact (supported by everything we know about the brain-mind relationship) that an extremely skilled neurosurgeon can induce hallucinations through direct electrical stimulation “whenever he wants,” *regardless* of external circumstances. Whenever the cortex is stimulated in the right place, a hallucination of the same type consistently accompanies it. This manipulative pattern suggests a general regularity between brain processes and hallucinations, leading to the inference that cortical stimulation alone may be the cause of hallucinations. Within the framework of generality outlined earlier, this supports the claim that (types of) internal processes are causally sufficient for the manifestation of properties in hallucinations. As its fundamental property must be in the list of causally determined properties⁹, the sufficiency alluded to in (2) is inferred.

Although apparently of strong appeal, this argument is flawed. To understand why, it must be recognized that it is based on the assumption that there is a general pattern involving only cortical stimulation and hallucination. According to this view, hallucinations consistently occur in the presence of a certain type of brain process, regardless of corresponding environmental factors. However, this assumption is false. If a sensory event is caused by B and B involves the process of traditional, non-

⁷So, strictly speaking, the argument could be challenged by adopting a particularist view of causality. However, this option may seem hopeless to disjunctivists (considering possible modifications of the argument), since, since the argument could be transferred to other possible worlds, they would have to argue that generalist causality is metaphysically impossible, which seems to be a unsubstantiated assumption.

⁸The existence of generalizations of this kind in all cases of causation is implied by Hume's "rules by which to judge causes and effects." This was originally expressed in "where several different objects produce the same effect, it must be through some quality which we find to be common among them. For as like effects imply like causes, we must always ascribe the causality to the circumstances in which we discover the similarity" (Hume, 2007, p.174).

⁹ This assumption is a supplement belonging to my interpretation. In general, authors defending the surgeon's argument often move directly from the assumption that hallucinations are caused solely by brain processes to the claim that the fundamental property of hallucinations participates in the corresponding general causal pattern.

deviant causality, then that event is not a hallucination (Grice, 1961; Broad, 1962). Rather, it is a perception, and being a perception precludes classification as a hallucination. Therefore, the absence of specific external factors is part of what is sufficient for an event to be a hallucination. This implies that there is no general pattern between pure brain processes and hallucinations. Consequently, the corresponding causal conclusion cannot be drawn¹⁰⁻¹¹.

The lesson learned is that despite the presence of these manipulative facts involving brains and hallucinations, the existence of insights prevents their generalization to the conclusion that there is a universal pattern between pure brain processes and hallucinations. This sufficiency is not strictly maintained.

One might argue that we are not presenting a charitable interpretation of the surgeon's argument and that the relevant standard does not apply specifically to the "hallucinatory type"¹² but rather to the fundamental property of hallucinations or other properties that entail it. However, this cannot be the case due to the fact that the causal argument cannot proceed from the assumption that there is a pattern, or something that implies it, involving neurological processes followed by episodes with the fundamental property of hallucinations. This would imply that veridical perceptions sometimes have such a property, which is precisely the point that the argument seeks to prove, thus denoting a clear question-begging.

2.2. A more plausible way to obtain (2)

However, the surgeon's case argument is not the only route that leads us to (2). In the subsequent discussion, I present the main line of reasoning that supports (2).

To reach this conclusion, we start from the assumption that "mental typification is, at least partially, a causal issue" (Sollberger, 2012, p. 586). In simpler terms, each mental event is believed to be associated with a property that can be causally explained. This naturally follows from adopting a generalist view of causality and recognizing that mental events always have their causes.

¹⁰Note that the point here is not to deny that there might be types of events for which B would suffice. One could claim, for example, that there is a genuine regularity between brain processes and sensory experiences (understood in terms of having a certain phenomenology or being indiscriminable from a certain class of events). The crux of the causal argument is how to derive a specific conclusion about the causality of hallucinations from this pattern.

¹¹Other variations of the surgeon's argument, which do not rely on a direct causal inference from the supposed general pattern between brain processes and hallucinations, but seek to establish a favorable conclusion for the causal argument based on the supposed "independence of" external factors (i.e., "the occurrence of the [hallucination] only requires that S's brain be in a certain state" (Sollberger, 2008, p.4), face the same challenges mentioned previously.

¹²This corresponds to the "neutral" concept of hallucination that I am using (not to be confused with the fundamental properties of hallucinations). This concept is what allows us, for example, to say that different types of hallucination theorists (e.g., sense data theorists, representationists, and disjunctivists) study the same type of mental events (although they may disagree about their nature or some of their properties). As I will show in Section 4.2.3, this can plausibly be analyzed in terms of sensory phenomenology and deviant causality.

Furthermore, complete causation for mental events is assumed to occur only under the subject's skin. In other words, “[t]he causal work is *exhausted* by what happens locally between” (*ibid* , p.587, my emphasis) local neurological causes and the immediate mental effect. Therefore, taking into account the present generalist framework, only intrinsic aspects of brain processes and structures can causally explain properties in mental events. As a result, specific properties of the environment cannot (even partially) causally explain properties in mental episodes. This idea can be called the “internal constraint on the causation of mental events” or simply (IR).

(RI), however, leaves room for properties of mental events that are not causally explained. These properties are generally referred to in the causal argument as “non-causal constitutive conditions for the occurrence of certain perceptual types of mental effects” (Sollberger, 2012, p. 585)¹³.

Therefore, (RI) alone is insufficient to support (2). It could still be possible that the fundamental property of hallucinations is determined non-causally, which means that assuming that perceptions and hallucinations share the same (neurological) causes does not guarantee that they share the same fundamental property. Therefore, (1) requires an additional assumption: the fundamental properties of hallucinations are always only causally determined. This assumption can be called “Causal Exclusivity for Hallucinations” or simply (EC)¹⁴. (EC) is, for reasons of space, the object of this article, leaving the in-depth study of (RI) for another occasion.

3. RESISTANCE TO LOCAL SUPERVENIENCE: Against (EC)

Section 3 is entirely dedicated to the critical examination of (EC). Our central objective is to verify whether there are ways in which naive realists could oppose such a thesis, either by challenging the supposed justifications that the Causal Argument offers, or by presenting independent contrary reasons.

At this point, we will direct our attention to the second statement that supports the adoption of (2), which is (EC). In Section 3.1, I will outline the justifications offered by proponents of the causal argument for this principle. Section 3.2 will examine the reasons given in favor of (EC) and explore strategies that disjunctivists can employ to challenge it, thus resisting the causal argument by not accepting (2).

¹³This is one of the reasons why defenders of the current version of the causal argument believe it has a dialectical advantage over Robinson's (1994, 1985) causal argument. The premises of the present argument are, in this sense, considered more acceptable by the disjunctivist, as they allow for the possibility of perceptions inherently involving certain external objects. In contrast, Robinson's causal principle does not accommodate this possibility.

¹⁴The intuition that fundamental properties, in general, must be explained either causally or non-causally arises from the idea that otherwise the corresponding instantiations would be inexplicable.

3.1. Why (EC)?

The conjunction of two assumptions results in (EC). First, it is assumed that internal events are exclusively determined by causal factors and therefore do not involve non-causal constitutive conditions. In the current context, “internal” takes on a slightly different meaning from its previous use, which applied mainly to properties (types, factors, etc.) and was significantly reduced to neurological aspects. Here, “internal” is used in a locational sense and applies to tokens rather than properties. Specifically, it refers to a mental episode that is not located in the corresponding environment. Equivalently, it indicates that something is not, or does not have some of its parts, equal to some piece of the environment. This sense of internality is aligned with the conception of McDowell (1992, p. 36) or Putnam (1975, p. 227).

The second assumption is that hallucinations fall into the category of internal events, which will be referred to as (HI). The combination of (CI) and (HI) directly implies (EC)¹⁵. However, the question arises: Why should we accept (CI) and (HI) in the first place?

(CI) is partially supported by the idea that only external events, such as perceptions according to Naive Realism, involve non-causally constitutive conditions. Sollberger (2008, p.7-8) indicates that

[p]erception [according to naïve realists] implies the interaction of a broad, intricate network comprising both S and S's environment. If so, it seems natural to suppose that artificial stimulation of S's brain state need not result exactly in the same mental effect h as in genuine perception; after all, brain activation constitutes just one piece within this broad and complex network.

The attractiveness of postulating non-causal constitutive conditions for external episodes arises from the recognition that causality – which, as required by (RI), would involve only neurological factors – is insufficient to explain them. Instances of purely neurological properties alone cannot account for aspects that imply a connection with the environment, such as experiences that involve familiarity with objects in the environment. Attributing such sufficiency to neurological properties would imply attributing to the brain alone the divine power to create elements of the environment, which is clearly absurd. Therefore, to fully explain the properties of perceptions from this perspective, we must consider factors beyond what is exclusively within the subject's body.

¹⁵ Moran (2019, 2022) proposes an alternative reading of the causal argument, suggesting that the current premise does not assert that hallucinations are internal in the current sense, but emphasizes that their fundamental properties are *internally individuated*. According to Moran, the argument relies on independent intuitions about the supposed fact that the fundamental properties of hallucinations are internally individuated. However, this cannot be a correct interpretation of the causal argument. This is because, combined with the possibility of internal reproduction between true perceptions and hallucinations (premise (1)), this assumption would be sufficient to explain the spreading of true FPh perceptions. In that case, all of Martin's specific discussion of causality would become unnecessary, and the argument would lose its characterization as a "causal" argument.

For “purely mental” events, which lack this kind of environmental involvement, however, the regular causal processes carried out by the brain should be sufficient to explain them. Thus, no additional causal constitutive conditions are necessary. Therefore, through inference to the best explanation, we arrive at (CI).

When considering (EC), Martin (2004, p.58) is mainly based on the widely accepted belief that “hallucinations are internal events”. Martin argues that it is generally agreed that the occurrence of hallucinations does not introduce additional conditions into the external world beyond the subject's presumed state of consciousness.

Although this observation may initially appear to provide a satisfactory basis for (EC), it is important to consider some initial observations that may enhance our understanding of this alleged support. First, the discussion around the surgeon's case argument in Section 2.1 revealed that it is not entirely accurate to claim that the conditions for hallucinations are exclusively non-environmental. Adopting such a position would essentially deny the possibility of perceptions as a whole.

However, one might suggest a narrower interpretation of Martin's support for (HI), namely the intuition that hallucinations are *nothing more* than the supposed “state of consciousness of the subject” (ibid). This seems to be support for (EC), which is more specifically (according to current usage of “internal”) about the lack of identity of hallucinations (and their parts) with things in the environment, and not, more strongly, about the conditions for its occurrence.

In the context of Martin (1997, 2002, 2004), two types of “being aware of” are relevant to the present context: familiarization and intentional “relations”. Considering this, if we assume that hallucinations are merely the subject's state of consciousness, we align ourselves with standard theories of hallucination, namely the Sensory Data Theory or Representational Theories. In fact, both theories naturally consider the “consciousness” of hallucinations to be internal in the current sense. Familiarization with mental images and representational states, whether internally individuated or not, does not plausibly have direct counterparts in the environment (Rowlands; Lau; Deutsch, 2020). However, if the argument adopts these traditional explanations of hallucination, it may weaken its effectiveness against disjunctivists, who may propose alternative perspectives on hallucinations. Interestingly, Martin's own response to the argument involves a nontraditional explanation of hallucination, as discussed in the Introduction.

In this case, defenders of the antidisjunctivist view would benefit from establishing (HI) on a more neutral basis. This can be easily achieved, as it genuinely appears that when we experience hallucinations there is no element in the environment involved in the event or constituting the event. Therefore, this intuition tells us that none of its parts can be located in the environment, making them

non-environmental. This contrasts with perceptions, at least according to the naïve realist perspective, where events have elements that naturally belong to and can be naturally located in the environment (such as the external object of knowledge). However, when we ask about the environmental components of hallucinations, there seems to be no immediate answer available. In this case, we have an intuition that aligns with the claim that hallucinations (as opposed to perceptions) exist only in one's mind, or at least are not “out there” in the external world. Given its neutrality, this general intuition, which we can aptly label as the “Inner Vision of Hallucinations”, seems to be a more suitable approach to establishing (IC).

3.2. Resistance to (EC)

As mentioned previously, the following analysis will evaluate the adequacy of the reasons supporting both (CI) and (HI) and explore additional considerations that may lead us to question their validity. In Section 3.2.1, a disjunctivist perspective will be presented as a potential counterposition to these principles. Section 3.2.2 will examine the specific argument that antidisjunctivists could employ to weaken the attractiveness of (CI) and (HI). Finally, in Section 3.2.3, a possible objection to these arguments will be explored, along with possible refutations by disjunctivists.

3.3.1 The negative view of hallucinations

As previously announced, here I will present an alternative idea, which disjunctivists could raise as having at least the same force as (CI) and (HI), which can serve to impugn the causal argument by refuting (EC). This current perspective is that hallucinations have a negative component. Let's call it “Negative View of Hallucinations”.

This perspective suggests that hallucinations can be considered “ failed experiments ” when compared to veridical perceptions. In a broad sense, this translates into the idea that hallucinations are characterized by the absence of elements that are essentially present in corresponding perceptions. Thus, when we hallucinate an apple, this experience lacks certain elements (notably the presence of the apple) contained in a corresponding perception of an apple.

The negative view of hallucinations is not a new idea. Authors such as Macpherson & Batty (2016, p. 265, *my italics*) and MacPherson (2013) discussed what they call the “traditional approach to hallucinations”, which states that “you have an experience as if there were an object and its properties, but there is no (mundane) object and there are no (mundane) properties that you perceive [or are aware of] in virtue of having that experience.” Other authors including Thau (2004, p. 250), Tye (2014, p. 303), Johnston (2004, p. 135) and Moran (2022a, p. 14), share similar opinions and recognize intuitions about the negative nature of hallucinations.

The definition of the current proposal was deliberately broad and existential. However, it is possible to "unfold" it and explore several more specific perspectives that highlight particular elements present in the perceptions that are essentially absent in the corresponding hallucinations. Here I will provide a brief taxonomy of these options:

One perspective, the "actualist-intrinsic" view, suggests that hallucinations necessarily involve the absence of something that is considered intrinsic and real (that is, it does not merely involve a potentiality of what instantiates it, such as dispositions) in the corresponding perceptions. For example, they may involve a lack of a relationship with a mind-independent reality. On the other hand, the "actualist-extrinsic" view posits that hallucinations fundamentally lack something extrinsic (though possibly essential) to perceptions. It can be argued, for example, that hallucinations essentially deviate from the causal processes that occur in perceptual cases (Moran, 2019, 2022a, 2022b; Ivanov, 2022, 2023). Another perspective, "dispositionism", asserts that hallucinations lack the dispositions found in veridical perceptions. This may include the absence of certain cognitive dispositions (Mcdowell, 1986, 1991; Evans, 1982) or epistemological dispositions (Pritchard, 2012; Mcdowell, 1992, 2008) in hallucinations.

3.2.2. From the negative view of hallucinations to the denial of (HI) and (CI)

Although simply adopting (some version of) the Negative View is not sufficient to refute (CI) or (HI), there are arguments that, on this basis, question their veracity individually or in combination. One line of thought arises from the dispositionist perspective within the negative view, which holds that hallucinations exhibit dispositions or causal roles that are absent in neurologically corresponding perceptions.

This line of reasoning is rooted in the acceptance of a "Disjunctivist Semantic Theory of Demonstrative Thought". According to this theory, when we perceive something, we have the disposition to form demonstrative thoughts (such as those containing expressions such as "This/This/That...") based on that specific perceptual experience. In contrast, in the case of (neurologically) corresponding hallucinations, the content of the corresponding thoughts generated is never identical (Evans, 1982; Mcdowell, 1986, 1991). In this case, for example, we are not in a position to form, when we hallucinate an apple, the same demonstrative thoughts as in a perception of the apple (which in this case refer to the apple inherent therein).

Fortunately for disjunctivists seeking to contest the causal argument, this perspective is supported by autonomous motivations. It is a widely accepted belief that "demonstrative" thoughts generated on the basis of hallucinations cannot refer to the corresponding external environment. When we experience hallucinations, there seems to be a certain "encapsulation" that prevents us from

demonstratively referring to objects in the environment. For example, in cases of "veridical hallucinations" (discussed in the next section), the experiencer is not expected to be able to demonstratively refer to the clock as would its perceptual equivalent. As a result, there is always a distinction between the referents - and hence the accuracy conditions - of demonstrative thoughts generated from perceptions and their equivalents in relation to corresponding hallucinations. In this scenario, the thought of "that" that a hallucinating subject has is, at best, intended to make a demonstrative reference that its intrinsic perceptual equivalent actually achieves. These types of thoughts are often considered to be pseudo-demonstrative thoughts (Evans, 1982, p.295), characterized by "failed reference" (Tye, 2014, p.303).

Although it is not logically obligatory for defenders of the difference of reference to also propose a difference of content (Dummett, 1973, p.110), this is a natural consequence. Given the unlikelihood of alternative "conjunctivist" accounts, which would attempt to explain the reference difference in play by appealing to elements other than content ¹⁶, perceptual disjunctivists are justified in abductively choosing the Disjunctivist Semantic Theory of Demonstrative Thought as their preferred explanation ¹⁷.

(Indeed, there are a number of disjunctivists who, despite their disjunctivist view, maintain an antidisjunctivist position when it comes to the causal roles of experiences. Scholars such as Martin (2002) and Fish (2009, 2008) argue that hallucinations and corresponding perceptions may possess the However,

¹⁶Relevantly, one might consider a descriptivist (neo-Fregean) version, which postulates that the content of a demonstrative expression or thought can be conveyed through a purely qualitative defined description. However, a significant challenge arises in finding a description that, when uttered by someone in a perceptual case, refers to nothing at all in a corresponding case of veridical hallucination. These cases are almost identical in their environmental and possibly internal aspects. The only necessary distinction between these types of cases, at least for the present antidisjunctivist, is that inherent in perception itself, which plausibly, for antidisjunctivists, only differs from neurologically similar hallucinations in being a distinct part of the causal chain. This suggests that the only description capable of uniquely capturing the environmental object in the perceptual case would be something like "the object that causes [in a non-deviant way] this exact event" (Searle, 1983). However, there are several problems with this suggestion. The first problem is a long-standing criticism faced by descriptivist views (Perry, 1977, 1979). According to this criticism, this kind of expression is not a plausible candidate for specifying the relevant thought. For experiencers may have no idea what may be causing their experience and may actually be unfamiliar with all the relevant concepts. If we asked someone pointing to a perceived clock what they were referring to, they would probably respond something like "I'm referring to that clock" and not mention anything about causality. Furthermore, as Kaplan (1989) argues, it seems that the two utterances (or thoughts) could not have "said" the same thing (and therefore have the same content), since one of them "talks" about the clock while the other does not. However, the most significant concern arises from the fact that this description, to accomplish the desired task, should plausibly have an indexical content itself ("the object that causes this experience"), which presupposes question-begging in the explanation. Similar concerns also apply to other conjunctivist options, where the supposed difference in reference or truth determination is attributed to the context associated with cognition, such as Burge's (1977, 2009) *de re* belief theory or approaches based on possible worlds.

¹⁷Unfortunately, there has not been much philosophical investigation devoted to discovering the true nature of "unsuccessful demonstrative thoughts" as opposed to successful ones. However, research conducted by Tye (2014) sheds light on possible options in this regard. Although Tye's discussion focuses primarily on the content of hallucinations, specifically what fills the missing object position in veridical experiences, I see no reason to assume a difference between the "attributed" elements in the content of experiences and the corresponding "thoughts of -that".

there is ample room to contest their position. For their argument is based on the supposed authority of introspection in determining the content of intentional states. incompatibility with externally individuated contents (Boghossian, 1994). Cases involving externally individuated content may resemble introspective counterparts with plausibly distinct externally individuated content, as illustrated by scenarios similar to those of Putnam (1975) or Burge (1979).

The Disjunctivist Semantic Theory of Demonstrative Thought commonly employs a causal framework to explain successful demonstrative thoughts. According to this view, it is generally held that demonstrative (successful) thoughts related to an environmental item X are generated through a combination of factors. First, a veridical perception (or illusion) of X is considered essential for the formation of successful demonstrative thoughts. Since “merely having the thing somewhere in your visual field” (Campbell, 2010, p.197) is not enough to specifically identify X among other objects one perceives, a corresponding attentional component toward X is often postulated. as necessary for the formation of demonstrative thoughts about X (Campbell, 2002, 2010). Finally, the presence of a volitional state and the absence of any pre-established defeaters (such as the world not ending after someone decides to refer to X) are also considered influential factors in the causal chain underlying demonstrative thoughts.

Of course, these theorists would also need to address the causal picture for “bad” corresponding cases, i.e., unsuccessful demonstrative thoughts as referring to X. Given the previous causal hypothesis, the natural position here is to argue that all but the first component (the perceptual event itself), are part of the present causal picture. Just as the occurrence of a perception and the other factors mentioned can compose the explanans of a causal explanation for a successful demonstrative thought, a hallucinatory episode, together with the three factors mentioned, can explain the emergence of a failed demonstrative thought. Although there may be other possible explanatory options for unsuccessful demonstrative thoughts in the theory, as I will explore in the next section, the present explanation, with its explanatory sufficiency and alignment with the previous framework, seems to be the most convincing choice¹⁸.

Given both causal frameworks, perceptual disjunctivists seeking to contest the causal argument would then refer to neurologically and environmentally coincident experiences, such as cases of “veridical hallucination” and its perceptual counterpart (as presented in the next section), which are the basis for the formation of demonstrative thoughts (successful and unsuccessful). Given the neurologically identical aspects of these experiences, they are also expected to involve the same states of attention and volition

¹⁸Here I assume that there is a significant distinction between unsuccessful demonstrative references and “vainly demonstrative” references, which are formed without any experiential basis. Langsam (1997) highlights that a crucial aspect of both successful and unsuccessful demonstrative thoughts is their connection to the underlying experience. This insight is essential to our current discussion, as it highlights the importance of the experiential episode itself, whether a hallucination, perception, or illusion, in the causal explanation of both unsuccessful and successful demonstrative thoughts.

¹⁹. Furthermore, the absence of obstacles necessary for the emergence of demonstrative thoughts (successful or unsuccessful) may be the same in both cases. Therefore, the explanatory distinction between these cases can be attributed exclusively to a difference in the experiential element, that is, veridical perception and hallucinatory experience, respectively.

The crucial point is that whatever is intrinsic to a perceptual state cannot be fully applied to what is intrinsic to the hallucinatory event and vice versa. In other words, there cannot be a portion within the perceptual event that is intrinsically identical to the entire hallucinatory episode, the converse being true. Based on the causal frameworks discussed earlier, such “intrinsicity containment” would suggest the absurd conclusion that there would necessarily be both unsuccessful and successful demonstrative thinking in at least one of these situations. In this case, hallucinatory episodes cannot be reduced, for example, to a mere intentional state that could be fully intrinsically reproducible in a corresponding perception.

Consequently, there must be a component to hallucinations that cannot be intrinsically replicated in the corresponding veridical perception at a neurological level. However, as stipulated, the present situations are internally identical. Therefore, there is no internal aspect within the hallucinatory case that meets the requirement of being intrinsically different from perception. Consequently, there must be an external factor present in the hallucinatory episode, but absent in the perceptions, that explains this necessary distinction. As such, disjunctivists can reject (HI) on the basis of the cognitive disposition of hallucinations. (The precise nature of this component, as attributed by disjunctivists, and how one might respond to the charge of locality in relation to external factors, which underlies (HI) according to the previous justifications, will be explored in more detail in the next section.)

The issue is that this portion cannot be internal. The situations evoked are internally identical. So there is no internal part of the hallucinatory case that could meet this difference requirement from the perceptual case. Therefore, there must be some external factor present in the hallucinatory episode, but absent in the perceptions, that responds to this necessary distinction. In this case, disjunctivists can deny (HI) on the basis of the cognitive disposition of hallucinations. (What exactly disjunctivists would attribute to this portion being is explored in Note 23).

¹⁹Antidisjunctivists could present a counterargument to the reproduction of the three factors in the two experiential cases by introducing two ideas that challenge the assumptions underlying the causal frameworks discussed earlier, particularly with regard to attention. First, they could propose a conception of attention that is not directed at mental items, such as experiences, but rather at mind-independent entities and their properties, such as clocks. Second, they may argue that attention is a real relation, distinct from intentional relations, and implies the existence of the entities to which attention is directed. However, this "disjunctivist theory of attention" is clearly incompatible with the premises of the causal argument. Analogous counterarguments using "disjunctivist theories of volitional states" can also be dismissed on the same grounds.

In contrast, it is relatively simple to refute (CI) by taking a negative view of the hallucination. When considering (RI), we would assert that only neurological factors can account for the instantiations of properties of hallucinations. However, the mere presence of these neurological factors is not sufficient for the manifestation of the negative properties associated with hallucinations. After all, if that were the case, then all the negative implications introduced by the current understanding of hallucinations would also apply to perceptions, which may be neurologically identical to hallucinations. Therefore, if we want to explain those differences (cognitive, eg) between perceptions and hallucinations, which may be neurologically similar, we would necessarily have to appeal to extra-neurological factors. Otherwise, we would have to expect, given their neurological similarity, that, say, such cognitive factors would be identical. Therefore, one can reasonably reject (CI), at least when combined with (RI), based on the negative view of causality. Consequently, to accommodate the intuition that hallucinations possess these negative properties, it would be necessary to propose causal or non-causal elements for hallucinations that go beyond what is confined to the organism's internal processes²⁰.

3.2.3. An objection against the disjunctivist use of the negative view of hallucinations

At this point, an antidisjunctivist could challenge at least one of the aforementioned statements by invoking Grice's (1961) concept of veridical hallucination. These cases involve experiences that are objectively and phenomenally similar to an ordinary veridical perceptual case, the only difference being the absence of a specific component in the causal chain that is typically present in perceptual experiences.

²⁰One concern that may arise from these observations is the potential involvement of negative causation, which some may view with suspicion. However, disjunctivists, following a contemporary metaphysical trend that embraces realism about negative causation, easily refute this concern by arguing against prejudice and highlighting the indispensability and irreducibility of negative factors in certain causal explanations (SHAFFER, 2000). These explanations often involve omissions and preventions, for which the corresponding ontology must admit the existence of negative entities (Lewis, 1986, p. 217). (Some scholars, such as Beebe (2004), attempt to avoid a direct correspondence between causal explanations and their putative ontological counterparts by allowing alternative conceptions. However, because not all information about something's causal history can be included in its causal explanation, the relevance must be established, and it is not clear how this relevance can be explained without a prior understanding of causality itself.) There are two common metaphysical concerns regarding negative causal explanations. Firstly, the idea that nothing seems to generate anything (Moore, 2009, p. 54-55). It seems absurd to claim, for example, that the absence of elephants caused grass to grow. Second, it seems implausible to introduce absences or negative entities into our ontology, which is generally understood to encompass what exists rather than what does not exist by definition. According to this view, including negativities in our ontology would imply accepting non-existences, similar to fictitious entities (Molnar, 2000, p. 84-5). However, a contemporary trend in metaphysics offers potential solutions to these questions by treating negative events as existing entities in our ontology, similar to traditional objects and positive events (Jago & Barker, 2012). A specific approach is to consider negative events as facts with negative properties (Hommen, 2014). These negative elements, although irreducible and distinct from positive entities, are considered to exist within the corresponding ontology. This perspective also helps disjunctivists explain how hallucinations could be localized in the environment. When considering negative events as instantiations of negative properties by positive traditional particulars, one can postulate, for example, the absence of familiarity with mind-independent things (or the factors that non-causally explain the corresponding perceptions), which, according to the argument above, they have to constitute hallucinations, within the environment. In this case, it would be asserted that the corresponding properties are instantaneously by the environment.

To illustrate this, consider Grice's example: imagine that you are looking at a clock, and all the usual processes of light reflection, retinal stimulation, etc., occur, giving you the perception of a clock in front of you. However, at a later time, your visual cortex fires spontaneously in a way that reproduces the exact neurological events that occurred earlier. As a result, it still visually appears that there is a clock in front of you, and you may not even realize that you are experiencing a hallucination.

This pair of cases is commonly presented to demonstrate that the analysis of the *concept* of hallucination, as we commonly use it, involves a negative requirement related to causation. The only reasonable distinction between these cases lies in the presence or absence of a specific component in the causal chain that we would normally expect in normal perceptions. One case involves a “deviant” type of causal history, where one part of the causal chain is missing, while the other case follows a “non-deviant” causal chain that aligns with our expectations of environmental objects reflecting light, hitting the retina, etc. However, the intuitive difference we attribute to these cases, specifically that one is a perception while the other is a hallucination, appears to be independent of specific perspectives on perceptions and hallucinations. This does not necessarily depend on one's position regarding metaphysical factors, such as the “fundamental property” of experiences (which can vary between different philosophical positions), or even empirical factors, as neuroscientists and doctors may have differing opinions on the matter. It is “recognizable by anyone, whatever their education, who can be considered to have the concept(s) in question” (Snowdon, 1981, p.176). In this case, no additional requirements beyond the acquisition of these concepts appear to be necessary to make this differentiation. Given this minimum requirement, the most plausible explanation for the difference in attribution lies in the distinction in meaning between the relevant predicates. One of them requires the familiar “non-deviant” type of causation, while the other requires causation that deviates from this norm. Therefore, this pair of cases serves as a valuable lesson in “concept analysis” (Snowdon, 1990, p. 121)²¹.

Based on these considerations, antidisjunctivists could propose a hypothesis about the negative aspects of hallucinations, as explored by the negative view of hallucinations. This hypothesis would argue that these negative properties of hallucinations do not arise from intrinsic qualities inherent in the hallucinations themselves. Instead, antidisjunctivists suggest that these negative properties result from external conditions that accompany hallucinations, especially the negative causal factors discussed earlier, which have been shown to be conceptually implicated by the very notion of “hallucination.” According

²¹This is actually a widely accepted position. See also Strawson (1979), Steward (2011) and even Grice (1961). Furthermore, it is possible to develop this line of thought further by following Broad (1962, p. 190-1) and analyzing “hallucination” as encompassing two essential concepts. Specifically, hallucination can be understood as mental events that have sensory phenomenology and deviant causation.

to this hypothesis, these external conditions give hallucinatory episodes the disposition for the emergence of unsuccessful demonstrative thoughts. More precisely, it could be argued that the explanation for failed reference encompasses not only the three “ordinary” elements discussed earlier, but also sensory phenomenology, which is intrinsic to hallucinations, as well as the fact that these events have deviant causation.

This causal theory of unsuccessful demonstrative thoughts can also be defended as having initial advantages over the one proposed by disjunctivists in the previous section. First, it has the advantage of being economically motivated, as it does not depend on any additional assumptions about hallucinations beyond those we already make when simply conceptualizing them. Furthermore, it is compatible with (HI), which, as I have shown, is independently justified. At the very least, anti-disjunctivists would argue that alternative frameworks are evidentially underdetermined compared to the framework proposed by disjunctivists, which would prevent them from advocating for them due to the potential arbitrariness and ad hoc nature of the proposed accounts.

First, disjunctivists could criticize this strategy on the grounds that antidisjunctivists, in their current reasoning, are presupposing the issue against them. As stated in the Introduction, it is part of the motivation of Naive Realism (and therefore Disjunctivism) to provide an explanation for successful demonstrative thinking. Therefore, antidisjunctivists have to admit that the naïve realist view about demonstrative thinking should already have additional reasons beyond its main rivals, including a causal theory of demonstrative thinking. In terms of dialectical advantage, causal theory has the initial advantage, as it can initially explain perceptual thought in purely physicalist terms, benefiting from its reducibility to natural theories. Consequently, antidisjunctivists cannot begin by presupposing that demonstrative thinking can be explained in terms of the causality of experiences.

Furthermore, disjunctivists could explore more deeply the intuitions underlying the relevant negative view of hallucinations. They could argue that these intuitions are not about what is external to the hallucinations (even when we usually refer to them through representations of these aspects), but rather are aimed directly at the episodes themselves. In fact, it appears that these events alone, even when we abstract from any accompanying external conditions, have negative components. Therefore, one could argue that all these intuitions about hallucinatory events do not require additional information to consider them negative. Your intrinsic identity can be intuitively perceived as inherently possessing these negative aspects.

Furthermore, as we noted, disjunctivists have an additional reason to challenge (EC). Even if antidisjunctivists were able to argue that negative dispositions in hallucinations are in fact due to external factors, they would be forced to admit that hallucinations are not uniquely internally determined, whether

causally or otherwise. As I demonstrated in the previous section, this amounts to rejecting (CI) and (RI), which are fundamental aspects of the justification behind the causal argument.

4. Final Remarks

This article has mainly addressed resistance to the notion that hallucinations are locally supervenient, which serves as a premise in the dissemination part of Martin's Causal Argument. Specifically, forms of resistance were presented that disjunctivists could employ to contest the main reasons supporting this notion.

This principle was built on two fundamental ideas, (RI) and (EC), the focus of this study. (EC) has been defended as based on two propositions. Firstly, he proposed that hallucinations are intrinsically internal events, occurring within the subject and without any external location. Second, he postulated that internal events are exclusively constituted by causal factors. An argument derived from the perspective of naive realism and the natural explanation of both successful and unsuccessful demonstrative thoughts highlighted that assuming external hallucinations implies an argument against disjunctivists.

Furthermore, the Negative View on Hallucinations illustrated the inconsistency of attributing hallucinations exclusively to internal factors, especially when considering the causal exclusivity claim presented earlier. This inconsistency arises from the fact that hallucinations commonly exhibit several negative characteristics. If these principles were combined and assumed to be true, it would make these negative aspects of hallucinations inexplicable.

By this, we conclude that there are, when there are ways to challenge the justification offered by the causal argument for (CE), at least one source of resistance to the causality argument that prevents the acceptance of the expansion of the fundamental property of hallucinations to perceptions, which is an unfavorable outcome for Naive Realists. However, further studies are recommended to verify the possibility of resistance to such an argument also based on the second part of the set of justifications suggested for the Local Supervenience thesis, (RI).

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