

**FROM SOCIAL IMMOBILITY TO OVERCOMING THE WILL TO KNOW:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN DISCOURSE BASED ON THE
FOUCAULDIAN CRITICISM**

*DA IMOBILIDADE SOCIAL À SUPERAÇÃO DA VONTADE DE SABER: UMA
ANÁLISE DO DISCURSO ARISTOTÉLICO A PARTIR DA CRÍTICA
FOUCAULTIANA*

Thiago Guagliardo KLOHN

Doutorando em Filosofia pela Universidade de Caxias do Sul;
mestre em Filosofia pela Universidade de Caxias do Sul.
E-mail: tgklohn@ucs.br

Idalgo J. SANGALLI

Doutor em Filosofia pela PUC-RS. Docente do PPGFIL e da
Graduação em Filosofia da Universidade de Caxias do Sul.
E-mail: ijsangal@ucs.br

ABSTRACT:

This academic paper succinctly is about the use of analogue models so as to justify exclusionary discourses and practices in the *Politics* by Aristotle – and by analogue models here it is not merely meant only any analogy to the natural world such as the way in which other living beings organize themselves in society, but to the use of any model structures of a moralistic nature, which lacks a more in-depth philosophical reflection. Thus, the motivation for writing this piece of work arises not only from the debates that are engendered by study of the aforementioned Aristotelian text, but from the realization that, nowadays, the failure to formulate ethical reasoning and discourses also comes from the absence of philosophical analytical rigour. This negligence occurs both accidentally by the untrained or unwary mind, but also intentionally by those who need justification for interests that unequivocally harm human dignity, such as the religious speech of the former federal deputy, who was impeached, Deltan Dallagnol, who inadequately substantiated his misogynistic vote and statement against women’s pay parity with men on the account of the Bible. Against these types of ethical and reasoning inaccuracies, this article, based on Aristotle, highlights the value of the Foucauldian for current political discourse and practice, as presented in *The order of discourse: inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, December 2, 1970*.

KEYWORDS:

Aristotle. Ethics. Political Philosophy. Social immobility. Power

RESUMO:

Este trabalho trata de maneira sucinta da utilização de modelos como analogias para justificar discursos e práticas excludentes na obra *A Política*, de Aristóteles – e por modelos aqui se entende não apenas a analogia ao mundo natural e à forma como outros seres vivos se organizam em sociedade, mas a utilização de estruturas modelares de cunho moralista, porém merecedoras de uma mais aprofundada reflexão filosófica. Nesse sentido, a motivação para a redação deste artigo surge não apenas dos debates que engendram o estudo do texto aristotélico supracitado, mas da constatação de que, na atualidade, a falha em formular raciocínios e discursos éticos também procede da ausência de um rigor analítico filosófico. Prática essa que se dá tanto acidentalmente pela mente não treinada ou incauta, mas, também, intencionalmente por aqueles que necessitam de justificativas a interesses que, inequivocamente, ferem a dignidade humana, tal como o discurso de cunho religioso do ex-deputado federal, cassado, Deltan Dallagnol, que fundamentou inadequadamente com a Bíblia seu voto e elocução misógina e contrária à paridade salarial das mulheres aos homens. Contra esses tipos de incorreções de ordem ética e de raciocínio é que este artigo, a partir de Aristóteles, ressalta o valor do pensamento foucaultiano para o discurso e a prática política na atualidade, tal como apresentado em *A ordem do discurso: aula inaugural no Collège de France, pronunciada em 2 de dezembro de 1970*.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE:

Aristóteles. Ética. Filosofia Política. Imobilidade social. Poder

1 INTRODUCTION

The present decade has been marked, more than any other, by the advancement and public accessibility of portable communication technologies and all the conveniences (and inconveniences) they provide us with. Thus, if on the one hand humanity continues its scientific development regarding nature and matter – no longer subjected to the religious or monarchical powers, as inaugurated from the Enlightenment –, on the other, it is evident how much the human spirit still lacks to evolve in order to overcome its crag for power and domination over its fellow man. It does not mean that there have been no advances in the ethical field. Philosophy itself, which also deals with this discussion, has helped humanity to understand itself and the need to develop in line with ethics, which by no means is a static, unchangeable, matter, but evolves along with the human knowledge. The problem is that the time for this human ethical maturation is not the same for everyone. Many people are not even interested in the subject itself, and that is (maybe) because they are controlled by their own inferior and artificial desires, as if they were a kind of supporters of a renewed behaviour mirrored in that type of epicureanism; epicureanism as such that has been unfairly labelled since antiquity as being short-sighted, indifferent to the suffering of others and focused on their own pleasures of food, drink and sex, *etc.*, alone. To sum up, there seems to be a certain contradiction in the individual human sphere, in their intellect, of a passionate ethical order, which cannot be resolved except by the person's own will and which attests against our ethical evolution as a species. However, in the course of human development, cities and laws emerge, roughly speaking, with relative awareness of this problem, to delimit power relations between people and their social organizations.

Considering this, Aristotle, as a philosopher, also dedicated himself to elucidating the motivations of human actions and how to best live – as stated in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (NE). He also explained the forms of government and social organization of his time in his *Politics* (Pol) and, from his point of view, defended what would be the fairest way of establishing a city-state, which for himself was the greatest representation of human development. However, in his social conception stuck to the idea of “order of nature”¹ as a justification to hierarchy and socially fixing life in the *Polis*, Aristotle does not understand the social mobility of people as adequate; from his point of view, people in the *Polis* should, therefore, accept their *status quo*, which was imposed on them by destiny itself at their birth, thus legitimizing the ontological structure of *physis* itself.

This article, however, questions the argumentative foundation of the Stagirite philosopher in the light of Foucauldian thought, which understands that discourses cannot be carriers of the full truth, but that, when presented in this way, they prove to be fallacious and instruments and/or justifications for the exercise of power and domination. Put differently, while Aristotle places the experience of the sensible as the validating foundation of a discourse and of a moral or fixed social order – a naturalistic normative moral theory –, Foucault suggests verifying the historicity of the subject carrying the discourse, and its cultural codes, as the bases for the imposition of any normative moral thought. This is so because it is not enough for the latter, in the face of any discourse, the assessment by reason in a merely “ratiocinist” way, *e.g.*, of a blind trust in syllogisms, as if only these, without the due analysis of their premises, without an understanding of the speech itself and of its utterer, would serve to determine the ethical validity of what is pronounced. It is, therefore, precisely the absence of such criticality in the analysis of speeches that makes it possible, even today, to use sophistry to manipulate the masses and to defend petty individual interests, as in the case of the media manifestation of a public agent of State.²

2 THE POLIS AND SOCIAL IMMOBILITY

Politics, by Aristotle, is one of the last works of the set that forms the *Corpus Aristotelicum* and it is classified as part of his practical philosophy, upholding ethics as an integral part of a broader architectural science called “political science” (NE I 2 1094b). In a more particular understanding, Aristotle work consists of eight books that do not have a strict sequential order. As for its content, it is generally an investigation of moral theory even though the *Polis* and its different structural political forms are constantly mentioned in it. It is also present in Aristotle’s work, though in a more discreet way, his cosmological conception of the universe not as a demiurgical product, as Plato understood it, but as an evolutionary organism moved by an immanent dynamic force that the former would call *physis* or nature (Pol I 1 1252b-1253a). Bearing it in mind, human happiness and its teleological fulfilment can

1 It is important to mention that it is not the purpose of this article to delve into the discussion of the naturalistic fallacy and the well-known criticism regarding it.

2 On May 29, 2023, the federal deputy, Deltan Dallagnol, in an interview given to the television program Roda Viva, on TV Cultura, delivered a misogynistic speech against salary parity between women and men, substantiating it with biblical references applied without the appropriate hermeneutic analysis. He stated at the time: “We cannot restrict the scope of biblical verses that say that within someone’s home there is leadership of men over women. It doesn’t matter whether you agree with it or not, whether I agree with it or not, what matters is that it’s in the Bible.” – our translation.

only be fully achieved or satisfied in the exercise of its social nature, which can only be experienced in the *Polis*. This is so because, accordingly to Aristotle, it is only in the *Polis* that the citizen is able to learn and practice a virtuous life, a life of a social and political nature, since the human being is essentially political in its nature and not merely by convention. Aristotle says: “These considerations show that a city is one of those things that exist by nature and that man is, by nature, a political living being” (Pol I 2 1253a – our translation).

Therefore, taking these premises into consideration – although not exclusively – the Stagirite sets out to defend and rehabilitate the Athenian *Polis*. He was also interested in establishing justice between personal relations and power relations, given that it was in the *Polis* that citizens could have their social and political responsibilities defined, just as it was there that a fair regime of government could be achieved, the purpose to which is dedicated the majority of the work *Politics*. The main issue, however, to be discussed in this academic paper, and that serves as a sort of warning, are some considerations regarding social immobility, which was also defended by Aristotle. So considering, it is clear, for instance, that no matter how virtuous and desirable the conception of citizenship imposed by Aristotle is presented, in the context of the Athenian *Polis*, it was of an exclusionary and elitist nature, far from the democratic ideal of our times. As a matter of fact, it is not the purpose of this article to go into details of an analysis of the Athenian morals and ethics regarding the “different” or the socio-anthropological minorities, as to say, in comparison to the Western culture nowadays. Such is the case especially because many aspects of human moral have already changed or evolved towards a more comprehensive, a more inclusive understanding, that all human beings, despite their differences, are bearers of universal and inalienable rights. In addition to that, it is a fact the idea of parity between women and men was even hypothesized by Aristotle in *The Republic*, as revealed in his criticism of his master, Plato:

In the *Republic*, there are few issues on which Socrates arrived at rigorous instructions: the community of women and children; the property regime and constitutional organization. The group of inhabitants is divided into two parts – farmers and defensive forces – and from the latter a third group is extracted, responsible for deliberating and governing the city. Not that he refers to farmers and artisans, Socrates never defines whether or not he is part of the government or participates in it, or whether or not he should own weapons and participate in war. But he thinks that women should join the fight with the guardians and receive an education identical to them; the rest of the work is full of digressions and a debate about the style of education of the guardians (Pol II 5 1264b – our translation).

To recapitulate, the point is that the citizenship defended by Aristotle was exclusive to an aristocracy, which today we would call idle, although the Greek meaning of *skolē* was different, indicating intellectual occupation and political debate among citizens, while they had the guarantee of all material sustenance necessary for life in the *Polis* through the work of others: slaves, women, artisans and farmers. In simpler terms, in the Athenian *Polis*, defended by Aristotle, only male people, adult, free, born in the territory of the *Polis*, and participant in the government and public administration, whether through assemblies, the magistracy and/or the courts, were considered citizens – therefore possessing deliberative, judiciary and legislative power, or, in the words of the philosopher himself: “there is no better criterion for defining what a citizen is, in the strict sense, than

FROM SOCIAL IMMOBILITY TO OVERCOMING THE WILL TO KNOW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN DISCOURSE BASED ON THE FOUCAULDIAN CRITICISM. EK24014

understanding citizenship as the ability to participate in the administration of justice and in government” (Pol III 1 1275a – our translation). Furthermore, the citizen, as already mentioned, was one who did not need to work to support himself economically and therefore had free time (*skolé* or *otium*, in Latin) to dedicate himself to the *Polis* matters. Therefore, children, very old people, women, artisans, farmers and anyone who did not have free time from work, and, additionally, slaves and foreigners, were not citizens in Athenian society. The only thing these people had in common was the obligation to be content with the condition they were in and to find a way to see virtue or happiness in it – “nature wanted it that way” for them to come into existence, and to accept this fate, for the subsistence of the *Polis*, and for the common good, that was what was left for them. Or in the words of Aristotle:

The city, in short, is a complete community, formed from several villages and which, so to speak, achieves maximum self-sufficiency. Formed at first to preserve life, the city rose to ensure a good life. This is why every city exists by nature, if the first communities were that way. The city is the end of these, and the nature of a thing is its end, since whenever the process of genesis of a thing is complete, that is what we call its nature, be it a man, a horse, or a house. Furthermore, the final cause, the end of a thing, is its best good, and self-sufficiency is both an end and the best of goods (Pol I 1252b-1253a – our translation).

It would not be simple to speculate why Aristotle defends the maintenance of this social order, which he understands on a natural basis with teleological assumptions. In a way, it is not difficult to understand the comfortable and cautious position in which he found himself for this purpose, having been born a man, free and an aristocrat in Macedonia, and enjoying rights in Athens as if he were a legitimate citizen, despite his *status* as a *metic*. Obviously, there were specific reasons for him to recognize the order of the Athenian society in his day as he did. However, it would mostly be appreciated that one of those reasons were, for instance, the sincerity to admit his wish to defend the maintenance of his own *status quo*, rather than to attribute the reasons of his arguments to a fateful cosmology, to the “natural order” of things. In other words, what is missing in Aristotle’s concept of an ideal society is a fundamentally philosophical argument that makes due judgment of the facts, as he himself advocates elsewhere:

The reason why a man, more than a bee or a gregarious animal, is a political living being in the full sense, is obvious. Nature, as we say, does nothing in vain, and only man, among all living beings, has the word. Thus, while the voice indicates pleasure or suffering, and in this sense it is also an attribute of other animals (whose nature also reaches sensations of pain and pleasure and is capable of indicating them), speech, on the other hand, serves to make clear what is useful and what is harmful and, consequently, the just and the unjust. It is just the man, among other living beings, that has these peculiarities: only he assesses good and evil, just and unjust; it is the community of these feelings that produces the family and the city (Pol I 2 1253a – our translation).

Thus, while for Plato, the universal concepts would be ideal, eternal, immutable entities, which would exist separately from particular things because they reside in the intelligible world, for Aristotle there would be no independent existence of the ideal universal in relation to the sensible thing. This does not mean that Aristotle

denies the universal idea, but that this philosopher rejects the existence of universals beyond things, as being in the world of Ideas (NE I 6 1096a). *I.e.*, for Aristotle, the universal would not be outside particular things, but contained within them (Stefani, 2018, p. 29). This is also why Aristotle does not consider it problematic to use examples from living nature to justify the inadequacy of social mobility within the *Polis*. The reason for this would be clear in nature itself, which reproduces this rigidity among different species of beings in a pre-established way. Stated differently, just as in a hive bees are determined, from birth, to be either workers, or guardians, or a queen – a fixed order of nature – so it should be in the *Polis*: members of different social strata should be content with them, each one performing their own function according to their abilities, in the best way, as nature had predetermined them. This underlies the ideal of justice: each thing or being in its proper place; its tendency towards its natural place, towards the end for which the nature destined it. Therefore, for Aristotle, it is also in respect of this order that the virtuous life is set.

But it is precisely in the comparison of the human species with other living species that an incoherence and a certain precariousness of Aristotle's arguments seem to emerge, even more so if we consider it from a contemporary perspective without such an onto-teleological basis. Inconsistency because, as he himself stated, human beings differ from other species by possessing the capacity to argue, being able to use words, discourse and philosophical reflection to determine the order of their world and their destiny, while other creatures follow a fixed natural law; precarious argument because it disregards an analysis of the will of this human being, of what each person, within their specificity, within their individuality and differences, will as such consider as an ideal of happiness or even virtue; This argument is also precarious because it disregards how each person would like to be seen in the *Polis* and how each person would like (or not) to participate in its political life as citizens with the same rights and opportunities. It may seem too exaggerated to demand from Aristotle such considerations that are the result of the modern civilizing process, but it seems to me that there is, in Aristotle, no philosophical reasoning in this regard or at least an attempt to present any argument that would question, for example, the practice of slavery. Although Aristotle indicated that he did not feel comfortable when analysing the slavery of those defeated in wars, he continues on the path of arguing for a "natural" order that must be respected; he proceeds to support a denial of social equity, of equal rights for all people. So much so that, in his critique of democracy, Aristotle reveals his discontent with the possibility of questioning the social order of the *Polis* of his days, preferring the obliteration of the voice of women and slaves, in order to avoid what he calls a tyrannical act:

The extreme procedures of democratic regimes are also characteristic of tyranny: granting full powers to women to govern the home and to denounce their husbands, as well as licenses to slaves for the same purpose. Certainly, women and slaves do not conspire against tyrants because they, if they lead a happy life, have a benevolent attitude towards both tyrannies and democracies (Pol. V 11 1313b – our translation).

To further explain, Aristotle's speech, criticized here, are based on premises assembled in order not to validate citizens' rights to the so called "excluded ones", but it is based on the resource of dialectical argumentation

(beyond any teleological and ontological aspect) that shares, apparently, a mere interest of maintaining a socioeconomic order. In that sense, Aristotle's arguments make use of allegorical representation (more specifically that of living nature) that can serve as justification by comparison. It is this inadequacy of achieving the "truth", which is a mechanism for exercising power, that Foucault will call the "will to know" and which will be briefly analysed below.

3 SPEECH AND POWER

Within the Foucauldian thought, an offshoot of the subjectivity paradigm, there is a certain concern for analysing a person's intentionality when delivering a speech. In other words, every speech, regardless of its content, is the manifestation of the desire for power of those who give it over those who receive it, it is a system of exclusion for the maintenance of the power of those who propose the speech, and which Foucault would call "will for real", as seen below:

Certainly, if we are situated at the level of a proposition, within a discourse, the separation between true and false is neither arbitrary, nor modifiable, nor institutional, nor violent. But if we place ourselves on another scale, if we raise the question of knowing what was, what is constantly, through our discourses, this will to truth that has spanned so many centuries of our history, or what is, in its very general form, the type of separation that governs our will to know, then it is perhaps something like a system of exclusion (historical, institutionally constraining system) that we see emerging (Foucault, 2014, p. 13-14 – our translation).

Well, for Foucault (2014), a true discourse is incompatible with the will to truth, as the latter ignores the former, masquerading as truth whatever is necessary for the benefit of exercising or obtaining power. It is in this sense that texts of a religious and/or legal nature (or philosophical sayings, such as the Aristotelian argument criticized here) are taken by Foucault as procedures of control and delimitation, as they bring within themselves, for the popular imagination, a permanent golden circle of "truth", or of the so considered "correct", or "fair", something that by their very nature makes them unquestionable, worthy of being listened to and obeyed. And this becomes more emphatic if accompanied by the old authority argument.

So considering, the public agent Deltan Dallagnol, as already mentioned, in his misogynistic speech, uses a text with a religious content and a fallacious syllogism to defend his point. On a similar matter Stefani (2018, p. 39) explains that all discourse is made up of arguments by which one intends to demonstrate something, prove an idea or persuade someone about something, with the conclusion being what one wants to prove or about what one wants to persuade, while the premises are the propositions that justify the conclusion. For that author, within Aristotle's own conception, a syllogism can be: scientific, when its premises express necessary relationships between facts; dialectical, rhetorical or ethical, when it contains premises that are reputed, or generally accepted opinions; or fallacious if its arguments start from premises that seem true but are not, or that appear to deal with

widely accepted propositions without actually being so, or that, even if they start from true premises, fail argumentatively to justify its conclusion.

Now, Dallagnol fails in his argument in multiple ways: firstly, the Bible, as a religious text, is not a rule believed and accepted by everyone, and cannot, therefore, be a parameter to justify a wide-ranging social agreement such as a law that dictate that women should earn less than men; secondly, the simple fact that the Bible contains verses stating that women must be submissive to men (assuming that this teaching is accepted by everyone as a social regulatory parameter) does not imply that a female person must have a lower salary to someone male; and, finally, the moral values mentioned in the Bible must be examined and evaluated from the perspective of the different periods of times and cultural contexts in which they were written and used before they can have any application in the present moment as moral rules – even religious ones. In addition to that, it needs to be take into account that even religious moral and its interpretation evolve in the course of history and of human scientific and ethical development. However, as the issue raised in this article is not of a religious or theological nature, we will stop delving into these details and focus only on the fact that, for some people, in the absence of arguments with due ethical and philosophical basis, it is a common thing to appeal for any text of a moralistic nature that may serve to support their objectives.

Furthermore, it is also important to highlight that Foucault (2014) warns about the tendency that discourses – as pretexts – have to continually reuse their content, generating a paradox in which the so-called “new discourses” are nothing more than comments tha, at some point, it has already been said differently. In these cases, such discourses end up serving an endless number of delimitations that can impede epistemic and even ethical advancement. From this perspective, any text that categorically establishes the state of being of things, whether religious or philosophical, is nothing more than the reproduction of a pre-existing “machinery of exclusion” (Foucault, 2014, p.19). Yet another criticism made by Foucault (2014) regarding the use of discourse as an instrument of exclusion and domination, and which could be applied to the Aristotelian question raised above, concerns the unquestionability of a syllogism due to the “rarefaction” of its content in the face of its authorship. Which means that an argument can sometimes be assessed and valued not by its content but by the importance given by the public to its author. In the example in question, from that perspective, because the defence of a fixed social order comes from Aristotle, its refutation would not be possible.

Finally, it is equally important to elucidate that Aristotle (from a Foucauldian perspective), while defending the maintenance of the Athenian socioeconomic order, and that based on his observations of animal life, would be correct in rhetorical or disciplinary terms but not in terms of philosophical argumentation as practical philosophy or according to ethics as it is understood currently. In other words, according to Foucault (2014), there is what he calls “discipline”, which is the knowledge that a given author of a discourse has about some subjects, or his domain over a set of methods, propositions considered true, definitions, techniques and other instruments of persuasion. He states:

Within its limits, each discipline recognizes true and false propositions; but it repels, outside its margins, an entire teratology of knowledge. The exterior of a science is more and less populated than one believes: certainly, there is the immediate experience, the imaginary themes that carry and endlessly redirect beliefs without memory; but, perhaps, there is no error in the strict sense, because error can only arise and be decided within a defined practice; on the other hand, monsters lurk around, whose shape changes with the history of knowledge. In short, a proposition must meet complex and difficult requirements to be able to belong to the group of a discipline; Before it can be declared true or false, it must find itself, as M. Canguilhem would say, “in the true” (Foucault, 2014, p. 31-32 – our translation).

What the above means is that, in comparative terms, Aristotle is relatively correct in his description and analysis of the living nature, *e.g.*, of the insect society that he takes as a premise to justify his exclusionary and elitist discourse. However, it seems that the Stagirite commits what Foucault would call, centuries later, a “disciplined error”, *i.e.*, Aristotle does not make mistakes in the way he constructs his reasoning in the face of the immediate knowledge that arrives from the sensitive world to his senses. His mistake (perhaps it was a strategic one in avoiding confronting what was socially established) would be in assuming such particular knowledge of animal life as a universal order (inductive reasoning) that should serve to hierarchically and socially fix the place of all beings in their biomes, including of human beings within a society.

4 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Aristotle’s political philosophical discourse, by reaffirming beliefs and values (perhaps personal) through comparisons with the associative nature of animal species – as a dedicated student of what is understood nowadays as biology –, can be contrasted to a Foucauldian analysis of discourse. In other words, when justifying the sociopolitical order of his time, based on the animal world, Aristotle displayed a “disciplinary” discourse, paraphrasing Foucault (2014), *i.e.*, a discourse that strictly complied with what was academically and politically required in terms of rhetoric in his times. However his discourse did not necessarily constitute a speech “in truth” as an argument with a philosophical and ethical foundation, as he does at other times when dealing, for example, with justice. From this perspective, then, it could be argued that his political discourse is rhetorically well articulated, but, at times, it lacks concatenated justifications within the rigour of ethical and philosophical reasoning. In other words, his claims for maintaining the *status quo* in the Athens of his time, based on the observation of nature, reveal, otherwise, a discourse that bears a “will to truth” particular to its author, a discourse that is so flawed as for the fallaciousness of the sophists, which he vehemently opposed at other times. In the same sense, it is worth remembering the following words by Foucault (2014, p. 34 – our translation): “It is always possible to say the true in the space of a wild exteriority; but we do not find ourselves in the true world unless we obey the rules of a discursive ‘police’ that we must reactivate in each of our speeches.” Otherwise, even a disciplinary discourse, apparently with philosophical aspects, can become a means of multiplying fallacies or coercive and restrictive functions, as observed in Aristotle.

FROM SOCIAL IMMOBILITY TO OVERCOMING THE WILL TO KNOW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN DISCOURSE BASED ON THE FOUCAULDIAN CRITICISM. EK24014

Therefore, Aristotle errs – from a Foucauldian argumentative ethical perspective – in advocating for nature the determining authority of the social order in the *Polis*. This syllogistic, which cannot be taken in a simplistic manner, fails just as badly as social domination, exclusion, injustice and other forms of violence that can also be exercised through discourse. Unfortunately, that was also the case of the gratuitous reproduction of prejudiced and/or hateful speeches given by the former-deputy, Deltan Dallagnol, to justify his vote against salary parity between men and women. Similarly, the Aristotelian thought criticized here is the result of a fallacious rhetorical syllogism, not because it starts from false premises, but because it constitutes an inductive argument that is satisfied to give a universal conclusion simply from particular cases. Meanwhile, Dallagnol’s aforementioned argument is fallacious because it consists of premises that are not absolute and because of the inconsistency of his deductive argument – the impeached deputy is mistaken in believing that the mere listing of premises, without due cohesion and coherence between them, contributes to a true conclusion. In this regard, it is worth remembering that: “In a deduction, if the premises are true, the conclusion is necessarily true, which does not occur in induction and that the argument may contain true premises, but the conclusion may not be true” (Stefani, 2018, p. 42 – our translation).

Faced with the problems that arise from similar fallacious syllogisms, Foucault proposes an ethics of the intentionality of the author and the reproducer of a discourse in the face of an epistemological concern about what the discourse is about. This is all in opposition to the mechanisms of exclusion and social domination empowered by discourse. Foucault defends this point in the following terms:

Respond to them, first of all, by proposing an ideal truth as a law of discourse and an immanent rationality as a principle of its development, also leading to an ethics of knowledge that only promises truth to the desire for truth itself and only to the power to think it (Foucault, 2014, p. 43 – our translation).

And, further down:

And if we want, I don’t mean to erase this fear, but to analyse it in its conditions, its play and its effects, it is necessary, I believe, to opt for three decisions to which our thinking resists a little, nowadays, and which correspond to the three groups of functions that I have just mentioned: questioning our will to truth; restore the character of an event to the speech; and suspend, finally, the sovereignty of the signifier (Foucault 2014, p. 48 – our translation).

Therefore, the measures to ethically and philosophically validate a speech would also be: questioning the will to truth of its author or reproducer and by doing so it would become clearer that no speech is accidental and that the power of censorship, control and exclusion is latent in all speeches; and, finally, in the acceptance that no discourse is limited to its transmitted content, to its “signifier”, but it extends its influence much further, up to the intentions and to the “meanings” imposed by its author or reproducer.

REFERENCES

FROM SOCIAL IMMOBILITY TO OVERCOMING THE WILL TO KNOW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN DISCOURSE BASED ON THE FOUCAULDIAN CRITICISM. EK24014

ABBAGNANO, N. **Dicionário de filosofia**. 5. ed. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2007.

ARISTÓTELES. **A política**. Ed. bilíngue, tradução e notas de António C. Amaral e Carlos de Carvalho Gomes, Lisboa: Vega, 1998.

ARISTÓTELES. **Ética a Nicômaco – Poética**. São Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1991.

FOUCAULT, M. **A ordem do discurso**: aula inaugural no College de France, pronunciada em 2 de dezembro de 1970. 24 ed. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 2014.

PLATÃO. **A república de Platão**. Tradução: Enrico Corvisieri. São Paulo: Nova Cultural 1999.

PRAGMATISMO POLÍTICO. **Mulheres violadas**. Disponível em:

<https://www.pragmatismopolitico.com.br/2023/05/deltan-dallagnol-existe-lideranca-do-homem-sobre-a-mulher-esta-na-biblia.html>. Acesso em 01 jun 2023.

STEFANI, J. **O conhecimento em Aristóteles**. Caxias do Sul: Educs, 2018.



KLOHN, Thiago Guagliardo; SANGALLI, Idalgo J. FROM SOCIAL IMMOBILITY TO OVERCOMING THE WILL TO KNOW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN DISCOURSE BASED ON THE FOUCAULDIAN CRITICISM. *Kalagatos*, Fortaleza, vol. 21, n.1, 2024, eK24014, p. 01-11.

Received: 11/2023

Approved: 02/2024