

PROXIMITY AND DISTANCE: SCHOPENHAUER IN WITTGENSTEIN'S THOUGHT

*PROXIMIDADE E DISTÂNCIA: SCHOPENHAUER NO PENSAMENTO DE
WITTGENSTEIN*

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ABSTRACT:

The article reflects Wittgenstein's relationship of proximity and distance with Schopenhauer's thought, in order to elucidate the limits of the presence of Schopenhauerian philosophy in Wittgenstein's thought. The reading of Schopenhauer's texts profoundly marks the intellectual formation of the young Wittgenstein. However, in his maturity, Wittgenstein distances himself from this influence. In any case, without Schopenhauer's ideas, one cannot understand Wittgenstein's philosophical work in its entirety.

KEYWORDS: transcendental idealism; schopenhauerianism; anti-Schopenhauerianism.

RESUMO:

O artigo reflete a relação de proximidade e de distanciamento de Wittgenstein com o pensamento de Schopenhauer, a fim de elucidar os limites da presença da filosofia schopenhaueriana no pensamento de Wittgenstein. A leitura dos textos de Schopenhauer marca profundamente a formação intelectual do jovem Wittgenstein. Contudo, em sua maturidade, Wittgenstein distancia-se dessa influência. Em todo caso, sem as ideias de Schopenhauer, não se pode compreender o trabalho filosófico de Wittgenstein em sua totalidade.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: idealismo transcendental; schopenhauerianismo; antischopenhauerianismo.

Introduction

It is known that Ludwig Wittgenstein [1889-1951] was a reader of Arthur Schopenhauer [1788-1860] and, as such, was influenced by him. The young Wittgenstein presents himself as Schopenhauerian in many of his conceptions, but over time Schopenhauer's influence gradually weakens to the point where, to a certain extent, it seems that the mature Wittgenstein opposes it. In this relationship of proximity and distance, this article seeks to measure the influence of Schopenhauer's philosophy on the formation of Wittgenstein's thought, which makes it possible to understand Wittgenstein's intellectual project in more depth.

Therefore, the text is divided into four moments. The first discusses Wittgenstein's contact with Schopenhauer's thought, an important biographical fact to support the discussion surrounding the philosophical relationship between the two thinkers and about the issue of influence. Afterwards, an attempt is made to establish relationships between the reflection of the young Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer's doctrine to show the proximity between both authors. Based on transcendental idealism, this close relationship configures the young Wittgenstein's Schopenhauerianism. Next, attention is drawn to the attenuation of this influence in the transitional period of Wittgensteinian philosophy. At the last moment, the distance of the mature Wittgenstein in relation to Schopenhauer's ideas is highlighted, which reveals his anti-Schopenhauerianism, resulting from the new direction that Wittgenstein imprints on his philosophical investigation.

1 Wittgenstein, reader of Schopenhauer

There is information in Wittgenstein's biography that he had his first contacts with philosophy in his youth. Among the authors he read was Schopenhauer, who deeply impressed him, as the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe [1919-2001] attests:

As a boy of sixteen Wittgenstein had read Schopenhauer and had been greatly impressed by Schopenhauer's theory of the 'world as idea' (though not of the 'world as will'); Schopenhauer then struck him as fundamentally right, if only a few adjustments and clarifications were made. [...] If we look for Wittgenstein's philosophical ancestry, we should rather look to Schopenhauer; specifically, his 'solipsism', his conception of 'the limit' and his ideas on value will be better understood in the light of Schopenhauer than of any other philosopher (1963, p. 11-12).

Reading Schopenhauer was part of Wittgenstein's formative itinerary while he was still in his teens, this being the fundamental data for establishing connections between the thinkers' ideas. Wittgenstein was a reader of Schopenhauer and, therefore, knowledgeable of his philosophy, and this even before he entered the university: "Like Nietzsche, Wittgenstein did not get to know Schopenhauer's works in an academic environment. He read it as part of the set of ideas that Viennese high society had made available to him" (Janaway, 2003, p. 151). This information is important to denote that Wittgenstein developed a personal reading of Schopenhauer, not an academic one.

Although the influence was important, to the point of Anscombe identifying Wittgenstein's philosophical ancestry in Schopenhauer, it is known that it was not the only one, but part of a broader set of ideas that enabled the development of Wittgensteinian thought. In a record dated 1931 from *Cultura e Valor* (*Culture and Value*), Wittgenstein himself recognizes the influence of Schopenhauer, as well as that of other authors:

I think there is some truth to my idea that, in fact, I only think reproductively. I don't think I ever invented a line of thought, I always took it from someone else. I simply took advantage of it right away with enthusiasm for my clarification work. This is how Boltzmann, Herz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Splenger and Sraffa influenced me (2000, p. 36).

For the development of his own work – the effort to achieve clarity in philosophy¹ – Wittgenstein claims to have taken advantage of the ideas of Schopenhauer and also of other representatives of different areas: philosophy, with Gottlob Frege [1848-1925], Bertrand Russell [1872-1970] and Otto Weininger [1880-1903]; physics, with Ludwig Boltzmann [1844-1906] and Heinrich Herz [1857-1894]; literature, with Karl Kraus [1874-1936]; architecture, with Adolf Loos [1870-1933]; history, with Oswald Spengler [1880-1936]; and economics, with Piero Sraffa [1898-1983]. Therefore, with the philosopher's testimony, Schopenhauer's influence on Wittgenstein is taken for granted.

In this case, therefore, what remains to be known is the real dimension of such an influence on the development of Wittgensteinian philosophy. The question is pertinent because Wittgenstein's thought underwent a significant process of change, which gave rise to the traditional division of his philosophy into two periods: the phase of the young Wittgenstein – represented by the work *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*², which is based on the analysis logic of language – and the phase of the mature Wittgenstein – represented especially by *Investigações Filosóficas*³ (*Philosophical Investigations*), in which the analysis of language becomes grammatical. Given this important movement of thought that ended up dividing Wittgenstein's philosophy into two distinct moments, it is necessary to investigate to what extent Schopenhauer's presence is remarkable in Wittgenstein's reflection.

In the literature, there are divergent opinions regarding the limits of such influence. For Hans-Johann Glock (2007, p. 426), Schopenhauer's reach is limited to the young Wittgenstein and who, still, served more as inspiration and even as opposition than as the production of concepts themselves. In turn, Bryan Magee [1930-2019] extends this influence to both periods of Wittgenstein's thought, although he emphasizes it more in the first phase, for which Schopenhauer was essential: “[...] if one were to

¹ Wittgenstein uses related terms such as clarification, clarity, clarity and enlightenment, related to the metaphor of light, to express his own conception of philosophy as an activity whose purpose is precisely to shed light on philosophical problems. This idea is maintained both in the initial and in the later phases of Wittgensteinian thought. In this regard, note aphorism 4.112 of the *Tractatus*: “The end of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory, but an activity” (2017, p. 167). In turn, paragraph 133 of the *Philosophical Investigations* reads: “The clarity we strive to achieve is, in any case, complete. But that only means that philosophical problems must disappear completely” (2022a, p. 108). As will be discussed throughout the text, what changes between one phase and another is the method to reach this objective.

² Hereinafter *Tractatus* or *TLP*.

³ Henceforth *Investigações* or *IF*.

remove from the *Tractatus* everything that derives from Schopenhauer, Frege and Russell, I doubt if much would remain” (1997, p. 314).

At least in part, such opinions do not withstand a deeper analysis of the issue. Glock seems to be mistaken in underestimating this influence as he considers it a mere inspiration and opposition, since direct references to Schopenhauer's ideas can be found in the young Wittgenstein. In turn, overestimating the influence, as Magee does, does not seem fair either, since the ideas that derive from Schopenhauer, as well as from other authors, enter Wittgenstein's thought through a process of reframing and readjusting the notions to his own perspective. philosophical. Wittgenstein did not have an academic reading of Schopenhauer, but a personal one, and he interpreted him as it suited him. This freedom of the author in relation to his influencers is expressed in the uncompromising attitude of directly referencing them in his texts, as expressed in the preface to the *Tractatus*:

How much my efforts coincide with those of other philosophers I don't want to judge. In fact, what I have written here makes absolutely no claim to originality in detail; and I also don't indicate sources, because it doesn't matter to me that someone else has already thought what I thought before me (2017, p. 125).

When considering the divergent opinions, as well as Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole, it seems more appropriate to say that Schopenhauer's influence is more present in the young Wittgenstein; in that sense he is Schopenhauerian. This position is reinforced by Severin Schroeder (2012, p. 367), Dale Jacquette [1953-2016] (2017, p. 59) and Christopher Janaway (2003, p. 151), authors who extensively addressed the existing connections between the authors. Subsequently, there is a progressive distancing until, finally, the late Wittgenstein assumes an anti-Schopenhauerian position, as Dale Jacquette (2017, p. 67) explains.

Having established the limits of this influence, it remains to be seen what Schopenhauer's effective contribution to the elaboration of Wittgenstein's thought consists of. To evidence it, it is necessary to enter into the thought of each phase of the philosopher, as will be done below.

2 Young Wittgenstein's Schopenhauerianism

Schopenhauer's influence on the young Wittgenstein's thinking can be identified in the texts from the beginning of the author's intellectual journey, especially in the *Tractatus*, which was the only book published by him while he was alive, in 1921. The work was made public with an audacious

objective: solve all the philosophical problems⁴ that, for the author, were based on a mistaken understanding of the logic of language. To this end, he develops an accurate logical analysis of language to show its functioning and its articulation with the world, in order to point out the conditions by which a discourse is endowed with meaning.

In the *Preface* of the *TLP*, the philosopher mentions the debt he owes to some prominent figures of thought: “I just want to mention that I owe to the great works of Frege and the works of my friend Bertrand Russell a good part of the stimulus to my ideas” (2017, p. 127). Interestingly, he does not quote Schopenhauer, which does not mean that he is absent from the ideas presented there. On the contrary, the *Tractatus* brings many references to Schopenhauer. To clarify them, the private notes that were published posthumously under the collection *Cadernos 1914-1916*⁵ (*Notebooks*), which gathers notes that precede the writing of the *Tractatus* (finished in 1919) and that anticipate many of his ideas, as these texts expose more clearly the relationship between both philosophers.

The August 2, 1916 entry in the Wittgenstein *Notebooks* mentions Schopenhauer only once: “One could say (a la Schopenhauer): the world of representation is neither good nor bad, but rather the subject who wants” (2004, p. 118). The reference is inserted in the context of the appropriation and reformulation of Schopenhauerian ideas by Wittgenstein, which also has repercussions in the *Tractatus*. The first idea taken from Schopenhauer, in the words of that same author, is the following: “The world is my representation” (2015, p. 3). The expression is at the beginning of Schopenhauer's main work, *O Mundo como Vontade e como Representação*⁶ (*The World as Will and Representation*), and precisely in the first paragraph of the first book. The passage expresses the conception that the world exists only as a representation because its existence is conditioned to the one who represents it, who is the subject. That is why the same paragraph continues: “[...] what exists for knowledge, therefore the whole world, is only an object in relation to the subject, the intuition of those who intuit, in a word, representation” (Schopenhauer, 2015, p. 3).

The world as representation is a Schopenhauerian idea that impresses Wittgenstein. According to her, the world is what is presented to the subject's experience and that depends directly on him to be what it is; it follows that the world cannot be morally valued in terms of good or bad. Such conception echoes the theory of knowledge called transcendental idealism, for which “[...] the materials of our

⁴ In fact, Wittgenstein believed he had really solved all the problems of philosophy, as he states in the *Preface*: “[...] the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me untouchable and definitive. Therefore, it is my opinion that, in essence, I solved the problems once and for all” (2017, p. 127).

⁵ Henceforth *Cadernos*.

⁶ Hereafter also *O Mundo*.

experience depend, with regard to their order and existence, to the knowing subject” (Janaway, 2003, p. 42). Elaborated by Immanuel Kant [1724-1804], for whom the world as representation is phenomenal, transcendental idealism is interpreted by Schopenhauer, for whom, this time, the world as representation is apparent⁷. It is precisely under this bias that the notion enters Wittgenstein's thought.

Transcendental idealism is the main mark of Schopenhauer's influence on Wittgenstein; this is evident in the note of October 17, 1916 in *Cadernos*: “As my representation is the world, so my will is the will of the world” (Wittgenstein, 2004, p. 126). Implicitly, such a conception is identified in *TLP*'s aphorism 5.621: “The world and life are one” (2017, p. 229). Severin Schroeder's interpretation of this aphorism is that Wittgenstein “[...] he uses the word “life” to denote a person's experience of the world, which is then identified with the world” (2012, p. 368). In this sense, by stating that world and life constitute the same reality, the philosopher reinforces the idea that the subject is the support of the world, since without the subjective experience there is simply no world.

When conceiving the world as representation, the figure of the subject that represents the world comes to light. In paragraph 2, Schopenhauer defines the notion of subject as follows: “He who knows everything but is not known by anyone is the subject. This is, therefore, the support of the world, the universal and always presupposed condition of everything that appears, of every object, since everything that exists, exists for the subject” (2015, p. 5). This is the second idea that Wittgenstein borrows from Schopenhauer. Similarly, the Wittgensteinian subject, called the metaphysical subject, is the one for whom the world exists without being a part of the world.

In *TLP* 5.633 Wittgenstein explains the metaphysical subject with the metaphor of the eye in relation to its visual field; the visual field (the world) is seen by the eye (the metaphysical subject), but the eye itself is not seen in this visual field. Schopenhauer had already anticipated this same metaphor of the eye in the first paragraph of his work: “It becomes clear and certain that he knows no Sun or Earth, but always only an eye that sees the Sun, a hand that touches an Earth” (2015, p. 3). In paragraph 7, the author adds: “[...] the world as representation, the only one considered here, appears only with the opening of the first eye, without whose medium of knowledge it cannot exist: therefore it did not exist previously” (Schopenhauer, 2015, p. 36). It is the subject, represented here by the image of the eye, who makes the world exist for himself as a representation; consequently, without a subject, there is no world.

⁷ In the *Nota do tradutor* to the second Brazilian edition, Jair Barboza justifies the option of translating the term *Erscheinung* as appearance, and not phenomenon, with the aim of punctuating Schopenhauer's distancing from Kant: “Kant, therefore, refers to *Erscheinung*, in its language phenomenon, something consistent; but it is precisely this consistency that Schopenhauer denies, comparing the world that appears to me – a mere representation submitted to the principle of reason – to the dream of a shadow, to the world seen through the veil of maya” (2012, p. X).

Therefore, Schopenhauer's eye that sees the Sun is the eye that sees Wittgenstein's visual field; both metaphors constitute representations of the subject for whom the world is a representation.

By not being in the world, but being its limit, the function of the metaphysical subject is to represent the world and, therefore, the world is his world. But what exactly does the notion of representation for Wittgenstein consist of? In the incorporation of transcendental idealism and in the compatibility with his philosophical efforts, the Schopenhauerian term “representation” enters as the related term “figuration”. Thus, according to Tractarian language, it can be said that the subject figures (“represents”) the world.

There are differences among thinkers regarding the concept of representation. For Wittgenstein, this idea is rather a logical problem, not an epistemological one, as it is for Schopenhauer. Wittgenstein's effort pioneers what Bryan Magee characterizes as an important movement that was revolutionary for the history of thought: “This dethroning of epistemology – what Frege and his successors saw as the depsychologizing of philosophy – is now regarded by many as the revolution which inaugurated distinctively contemporary philosophy” (1997, p. 322). With this relevant change, from the point of view of logic, representation is seen as being the figuration (or image) of reality in language. It is precisely a kind of clipping of this reality that is present in language and that guarantees its meaning.

Wittgenstein focuses on the logical analysis of language in order to understand the conditions by which words refer to the world, that is, they represent it. From this investigation, it follows that language is composed of propositions that reflect the various existing arrangements between the elements of the world. In turn, propositions are composed of names, which identify simple objects. Thus, from the smallest to the largest of its elements, language is understood as a logical structure that connects to the world through thought and, therefore, can make sense of it. “The proposition is a figuration of reality” (2017, p. 135), says Wittgenstein in *TLP* 4.01. Thus, language represents the representation of reality.

For Dale Jacquette, even Wittgenstein's theory of linguistic meaning reveals the influence of Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism:

The Tractatus explanation of meaning presupposes a modified but easily recognizable Schopenhauerian distinction between the phenomenal appearance of meaningful signs in a language and their perceptually transcendent structures under Wittgenstein's sign-symbol distinction. (2017, p. 61).

The two aspects of language discussed above by the author, the sign and the symbol, presuppose the Schopenhauerian distinction between appearance and the thing in itself, and this is precisely the third idea of Schopenhauer embraced by the young Wittgenstein. For Schopenhauer, in paragraph 21: “Appearance is called representation, and nothing else: every representation, whatever its type, every object is appearance. In turn, thing in itself is just the will” (2015, p. 128). Appearance, as every type of

representation, and thing in itself, as exclusively the will, are the two distinct and inseparable faces of the same reality, which is the world. That is why, in the same paragraph, the author continues: “[...] every representation, every object, is the appearance, the visibility, the objectivity of the will” (2015, p. 128).

However, for Wittgenstein, the appearance corresponds to the perceptibility of the sign, and the thing itself signifies the transcendental of the symbol. The philosopher conceives the sign – which he calls the propositional sign – as a phenomenon of ordinary language that is sensorially perceptible to the subject through hearing (speech sounds) or vision (written words and even spatial objects) and which constitutes a fact of the world (in this sense, the philosopher is closer to Kant's concept of phenomenon than to Schopenhauer's concept of appearance).

The symbol, in turn, is the proposition itself that transcends the propositional sign. According to *TLP* 3.31: “To each part of the proposition that characterizes its sense I call an expression (a symbol)” (2017, p. 145). The symbol is the meaning of the proposition, unlike the form represented by the propositional sign. Not immediately perceptible, the symbol is behind the sign and therefore demands the analysis of the propositional sign to be apprehended. It is thought that projects meaning from sign to symbol; when thought, from the propositional sign comes to light the symbol, which is the proposition.

So far, at least three Schopenhauer contributions to Wittgensteinian thought have been highlighted. Schopenhauer's ideas of representation, of the subject and, finally, of appearance and the thing itself, find an echo in the thinking of the young Wittgenstein and are reflected, respectively, as figuration, metaphysical subject, propositional sign and symbol. With this, it has been demonstrated that the young Wittgenstein is Schopenhauerian as he makes use of transcendental idealism to adapt him to the investigation of the logic of language.

3 The transition period

Under the influence of Schopenhauer and other authors, especially Frege and Russell, the young Wittgenstein thought he had solved the problems of philosophy once and for all. However, the belief in the definitive solution of these problems emphasized by Wittgenstein is shaken a few years after the publication of the *Tractatus*. After a period away from philosophy, from 1929 onwards the philosopher returned to concern himself with it, however, this time, his investigation began to take on new contours, until it took on the features with which late Wittgenstein is known. Along with the gradual change in the author's philosophical orientation, his position towards Schopenhauer also changes.

In the book *Wittgenstein e o Círculo de Viena (Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle)*, a collection of notes taken by Friedrich Waismann [1896-1959] and Moritz Schlick [1882-1936] from meetings they had with

Wittgenstein in the period between 1929 and 1932, there is a comment dated January 2, 1930 which says: “Schopenhauer: every number presupposes all precedents as reasons for its existence. Wittgenstein: but also the following” (Wittgenstein, 2022c, p. 66-68). The succinct reference refers to paragraph 38 of Schopenhauer's doctoral thesis in philosophy, the work *Sobre a Quadrúplice Raiz do Princípio de Razão Suficiente* (*On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*). In this text, the author discusses the reason for being in time: “In time, every instant is conditioned by the precedent. So simple is the reason for being here, as a law of succession; because time has only one dimension, and because of that, there cannot be any multiplicity of relationships in it” (Schopenhauer, 2019, p. 297). From this unidimensional aspect of time, in which the present moment is conditioned by the precedent and so on, arithmetic is based. According to Schopenhauer:

On this nexus of the parts of time is based all counting, the words of which only serve to mark the singular steps of succession; consequently, also all arithmetic, which teaches absolutely nothing but methodical abbreviations of counting. Each number presupposes the previous ones as reasons for its being: I can only reach ten through all the preceding numbers, and only by virtue of this understanding of the reason for being do I know that where ten are, there are also eight, six, four. (2019, p. 297).

For the philosopher, the reason for any number (in his example, the number 10) is that the previous numbers exist (in order for 10 to exist, 9, 8, 7 must exist before). Wittgenstein partially agrees with Schopenhauer: in fact, each number presupposes the numbers that came before; however, one must also consider the numbers that will come later, by which he means the whole system of numerals.

His position is clarified from the following observation about cardinal numbers, contained in *The Big Typescript TS 213*, a text that presents notes from the period between 1932 and 1933: “There are infinitely many cardinal numbers because we construct this infinite system and call it the system of cardinal numbers” (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 393e). Numbers exist because human beings have built a number system. This is what the existence of any number derives from, its *raison d'être*. Therefore, every number presupposes both the numbers that precede it and the numbers that follow it, that is, the numbers together.

In the same *The Big Typescript TS 213*, Wittgenstein makes two observations about Schopenhauer, the first being the following: “And here intention reminds us of the will (in Schopenhauer's sense as well)” (2005, p. 281). The mention appears in the context of reflection on the grammar of the psychological concept of intention. Just as in Schopenhauer the objectivity of the will is given in appearance (or phenomenon), it can also be understood that intention is a phenomenon that is shown in reality.

The second quote from Schopenhauer in the above text appears in a footnote in the context of reflection on the conception of philosophy: “Schopenhauer: ‘If you find yourself stumped trying to convince someone of something and not getting anywhere, tell yourself that it’s the will & not the intellect you’re up against’” (Wittgenstein, 2005, p. 300). Wittgenstein identifies that, in philosophy, it is difficult to change one's attitude, and that this is a matter of overcoming the will, and not of intellectual confrontation.

As a rule, philosophy is always trying to say something, that is, to produce theory. In turn, Wittgenstein considers the following: “[...] philosophy does not lead me to any renunciation, since I do not abstain from saying something, but rather abandon a certain combination of words as senseless” (2005, p. 300). This position assumed by the author stems from the overcoming of the will, which is a known theme of Schopenhauer's ethics (the denial of the will). The will resists changing one's attitude, but its resistance must be overcome. From this it follows that it is not a question of a difficulty of the intellect to be overcome, but a difficulty of the will itself.

In another text, the so-called *Yellow Book*, which is part of *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-1935*, a set of notes taken by his students Alice Ambrose [1906-2001] and Margaret Macdonald [1903-1956], Wittgenstein notes: “There is a truth in Schopenhauer’s view that philosophy is an organism, and that a book on philosophy, with beginning and end, is a sort of contradiction. One difficulty with philosophy is that we lack a synoptic view” (2001, p. 43).

In the above excerpt, Wittgenstein refers to the *Prefácio à primeira edição (Preface to the first edition)* of *O Mundo*, in which Schopenhauer announces that his book communicates a unique thought. Unlike a system of thought, in which one part supports the other, without the latter being the support of the former, the idea of a single thought, identified as being with philosophy itself, in Schopenhauer's words consists of the following:

[...] a single thought, however comprehensive it may be, retains the most perfect unity. If, nevertheless, in view of its communication, it is decomposed into parts, then the cohesion of these must in turn be organic, that is, one in which each part both preserves the whole and is preserved by it, none is the same. first or last, the whole gains in clarity through each part, and the smallest part cannot be fully understood unless the whole has been previously understood. (2015, p. XXV-XXVI).

For this philosopher, the architectural paradigm (system of thought) is passed over in favor of the organic paradigm (single thought), where in the parts one sees the whole, and in the whole one sees the parts. That is why he maintains that a philosophy book, with a beginning and an end, is a kind of contradiction with the unique thought it expresses, whose organic cohesion is such that it knows no beginning and no end. Wittgenstein recognizes Schopenhauer's position on the unique thought as true, but still adds that philosophy lacks the so-called synoptic view, also known as the panoramic view, a

Wittgensteinian concept that becomes important above all in the mature phase of his thought and which consists, precisely, in a broader view of the use of language.

Returning to the above excerpt from the *Yellow Book*, in its continuity Wittgenstein approaches philosophy of geography by using the image of a map to clarify the concept of panoramic view. The philosopher says:

We encounter the kind of difficulty we should have with the geography of a country for which we had no map, or else a map of isolated bit. The country we are talking about is language, and the geography its grammar. We can walk about the country quite well, but when forced to make a map, we go wrong. A map will show different roads through the same country, any one of which we can take, though not two, just as in philosophy we must take our problems one by one though in fact each problem leads to a multitude of others. We must wait until we come round to the starting point before we can proceed to another section, that is, before we can either treat of the problem we first attacked or proceed to another. In philosophy matters are not simple enough for us to say: "Let's get a rough idea", for we do not know the country except by knowing the connections between the roads (2001, p. 43).

Just as a map allows you to locate yourself within a country as it allows you to see the whole geography of the place, as well as allows people to move around that territory through the connections between its roads, so does the concept of panoramic view it serves for the subjects to locate themselves in this country that is the language and for them to move through its grammar (the "geography" of the language) as they see connections between the problems. As advanced before, the concept of panoramic vision is central to Wittgenstein in paragraph 122 of *Investigações*⁸.

Finally, Wittgenstein mentions Schopenhauer in the text of *Observações sobre o Ramo de Ouro de Frazer* (*Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough*), from 1936: "How much truer in this, that the soul would be given the same multiplicity as the body, than in a watered-down modern theory. Frazer does not notice that here we have before us the doctrines of Plato and Schopenhauer" (2022b, p. 30). Here, Wittgenstein does not dialogue with Schopenhauer, but uses metonymy, a figure of speech in which one term replaces the other. In this case, Schopenhauer and Plato represent a general idea of philosophy. Wittgenstein's criticism is directed at the anthropologist James Frazer [1854-1941], who underestimated the magic of supposedly primitive peoples and failed to realize that Western civilization also has its own mythology. The philosopher makes it clear that magic, philosophy and science are part of the mythology of civilizations and that, therefore, they are similar to each other.

⁸ *IF*, paragraph 122: "The fact that we do not panoramically view the use of our words is one of the main sources of our lack of understanding. – Our grammar is not conducive to a panoramic view. – The panoramic presentation provides understanding, which consists precisely in the fact that 'we see the connections. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links. The concept of panoramic presentation is, for us, of fundamental significance. It designates our way of presentation, the way we see things. (Is this a 'worldview?')" (Wittgenstein, 2022, p. 104).

The aforementioned passage is preceded by the following: “[...] the difference between magic and science can be put in the following terms: there is progress in science, but not in magic. In magic there is no evolutionary course that is in itself” (Wittgenstein, 2022b, p. 29-30). If science distances itself from magic due to the idea of progress, philosophy, in turn, approaches magic by sharing with it the fact of not progressing, in the sense of not producing new knowledge, new discoveries. If, on the one hand, philosophy does not present something new (in this sense, it does not progress), on the other hand, it makes it possible to clarify existing problems, which is an end in itself to be pursued. Wittgenstein recognizes that there is value in this philosophical task, as he states next: “[...] clarity and transparency are valuable in themselves” (2000, p. 22).

From some of the texts from the transition period that have been exposed here, one can see a gradual change in Wittgenstein's philosophical orientation, which directly affects his relationship with Schopenhauer. Here, points of convergence appear, but also significant divergences that will culminate, in Wittgenstein's late phase, in his anti-Schopenhauerianism.

4 The anti-Schopenhauerianism of the mature Wittgenstein

The mature Wittgenstein set a new course for his thinking, as revealed in the text of *Investigações*, published posthumously in 1953. In the preface to this work, Wittgenstein reflects that the new thoughts “[...] could only show themselves in the right light through of the contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking” (2022a, p. 18). By demarcating the difference between the before and after of his reflection, and pointing to the connection between these moments, the philosopher indicates that the ideas in the new book result from a process of deepening previous questions about the same object of investigation, which is the language.

That said, it is understood that the traditional division of Wittgenstein's philosophy into two phases, although didactic, cannot be taken abruptly, as if it were a radical rupture. Instead, the opposition to the old way of thinking to which the philosopher refers stems from a transition process that denotes the continuous maturation of his ideas. After all, both before and after, Wittgenstein remains the same philosopher concerned with achieving clarity of philosophical problems.

What is new in the *IF* is the philosopher's approach to expressions used daily in ordinary language; the various directions explored in the book, such as portraits of landscapes composing an album⁹, reveal the author's exercise of understanding language from this perspective. Methodologically, it is a pragmatic

⁹ In the preface of *IF* Wittgenstein states: “The philosophical observations of this book are, as it were, a set of sketches of landscapes that emerged from these long and complex journeys. [...] this book is, in fact, just an album” (2022a, p. 18).

approach, interested in investigating and understanding the meaning of words based on current linguistic practices, which is the means with which people communicate in their concrete experiences. More precisely, he is interested in the rules that guide the use of terms and expressions to produce meanings. However, to account for the understanding of the functioning of this language, Wittgenstein elaborates an important conceptual apparatus, this time, focused on grammatical analysis¹⁰, and no longer logic.

Of the concepts that emerge in this movement, the most important is undoubtedly the language game. Wittgenstein understands that, like games, language is a regulated activity, that is, guided by rules, which are standards of correction that guide the use of words according to different meanings, depending on the uses that are made of them in an environment. to the many situations of everyday life.

Although it is a fundamental concept, Wittgenstein did not give it a precise definition¹¹, which also occurs in relation to the others, precisely because he understands that there are no previous and abstract definitions that can mean, in advance, what the concept is. Instead, the philosopher proposes that the meaning must be sought in the practical use of the word in a given context. A reversal of roles between meaning and use of language is noted here: in the *Tractatus*, the meaning of the word imposes its use, but in the *Investigações*, it is the use of the word that gives it meaning.

In the language games, the interlocutors make “throws” according to rules that determine the meaningful use of words. When the rules of the game (which Wittgenstein calls grammatical rules) are followed, the move is successful because usage produces meaning and establishes effective communication between language users in a given context. People understand each other, and make themselves understood, because they obey those standards of correction that are implicit in the language games.

According to this scheme, it is evident that the theory of figuration has no more space in Wittgenstein's concern, at least, as the only possible way of understanding language. The world as representation, borrowed from Schopenhauer to think of language as a figuration of reality, loses its

¹⁰ According to Glock: “[...] Wittgenstein began to use the term 'grammar' to designate both the constitutive rules of language and the investigation or philosophical organization of these rules” (1998, p. 193). Philosophical grammar is interested in making explicit the “grammatical rules”, which are the correction criteria for the use of words in language games.

¹¹ In paragraph 71 of *IF*, by taking the concept of game as a starting point, the philosopher justifies the imprecision of concepts in general by rebutting the contrary criticism, for which a concept must have a delimited definition. Thus, Wittgenstein introduces the debate: “It can be said that the concept of ‘game’ is a concept with blurred edges. – But is a blurred concept really a concept?” (2022a, p. 75). What he advocates is that a blurred concept (= undefined, imprecise, not delimited) is as much a concept as a precise concept and, to confirm his thought, he makes an analogy with the use that is made of photos that, although they may be of low quality, they are still useful photos for some purpose: “Is a blurry photograph really the image of a man? Besides, is it always possible to replace, in an advantageous way, a blurred image with a sharp image? Is the blurry image often just what we need?” (Wittgenstein, 2022a, p. 75). Although conceptual precision is desirable, this is not always possible, which does not prevent the use of the imprecise concept with some benefit, as someone could counter-argue. Even in this situation, the imprecise concept can serve precisely the intended use of it, such as an unclear photograph that can serve a certain purpose.

strength as a close observation of language as used daily by human beings reveals that, in the various practical uses, words acquire and lose meanings in language games. And so, in paragraph 116 of *IF*, Wittgenstein summarizes their efforts:

When philosophers use a word – “know”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition”, “name” – and seek to capture the essence of the thing, one must always ask: Is this word true? actually used like that, at any time, in the language that is its place of origin?
We bring words back from their metaphysical usage back to their everyday usage (2022a, p. 101).

The text above highlights the importance of the everyday use of words for Wittgenstein's investigation and, in turn, the refusal to make a philosophical use (in the text, the “metaphysical use”) of these terms. Note also the generic reference to philosophers, in order to criticize a traditional way of doing philosophy that, when asking about a supposed essence of words, turns its back on the concrete reality of the ordinary use of language. Among these philosophers one can safely include Schopenhauer who, as a representative of the metaphysical tradition, makes a philosophical use of words, which is exactly what Wittgenstein opposes. Thus, it can be interpreted that, in the mature phase of Wittgensteinian thought, there is an abandonment of the Schopenhauerian heritage as a consequence of the incompatibility of this philosophy with the proposal outlined here.

However, Bryan Magee believes in the survival of Schopenhauer's influence on the mature Wittgenstein, to the point of considering that the concepts of form(s) of life and family resemblance, which play fundamental roles in the theory of language games, were taken from borrowed from the German philosopher (cf. Magee, 1997, p. 326). However, as argued by Severin Schroeder, this thesis does not hold. This is because, with regard to the notion of form(s) of life, the author is unaware of any occurrence of the term *Lebensform* (form of life) in Schopenhauer's writings; the closest expression to this is *Form des Lebens* (form of life) which, in turn, concerns the present time: “[...] the form of life is the endless present” (Schopenhauer, 2015, p. 325). That said, Schroeder concludes about this notion that it “[...] [...] has nothing whatsoever to do with Wittgenstein’ s concept of a “*Lebensform*” which means roughly the way we live and interact with other people” (2012, p. 378). Although similar in their written form, such ideas are completely different in terms of content, which is why there is no possible connection between the two philosophers.

As for the concept of family resemblance (*Familienähnlichkeit*), the following should be considered: although there is such an expression in Schopenhauer, as in paragraph 28 (cf. 2015, p. 179), it does not constitute a concept in itself. Schroeder adds that it is a compound noun common to several other German-speaking authors, and “[...] there is not a trace of this philosophical idea in Schopenhauer” (2012, p. 378). Again, there is a difference in relation to Wittgenstein, for whom family resemblance plays

an important role in his thinking. Therefore, by this notion it is also not possible to infer a supposed inheritance from Schopenhauer.

The opposition to the transcendentalism of youth, assimilated from Schopenhauer to formulate the theory of figuration, gives way to the grammatical analysis of language in its daily use. The attentive look at the plurality of linguistic practices is the invitation that Wittgenstein makes in paragraph 66 of *IF*: “[...] don't think, look!” (2022a, p. 71-72). The philosopher calls for “not thinking” in a very specific sense, which corresponds to the usual way in which philosophers do philosophy by privileging abstract ideas and building theories; instead of “thinking”, the proposal is to look what happens to the language around the subjects, its use in the midst of their daily activities. Wittgenstein's attitude is to challenge this attentive gaze, which puts him in a position contrary to that of philosophers such as Schopenhauer and others.

As seen, Schopenhauer's influence dissipates in the mature Wittgenstein, at least in terms of the direct impact of his ideas on the philosopher's new conceptions. There is not the former enthusiasm regarding Schopenhauerian thought, as is evident in a note dated 1939 in *Cultura e Valor*:

It could be said that Schopenhauer is entirely a rude spirit, that is, although he has a subtlety of spirit, at a certain level this is suddenly exhausted and then he is as rude as the rudest. Where genuine depth begins, Schopenhauer's ends.
It could be said of Schopenhauer: he never seeks his conscience (Wittgenstein, 2000, p. 60).

Schopenhauer is for Wittgenstein a rude, crude, shallow spirit. The apparent indisposition towards Schopenhauer is understood as the attitude of someone who has exhausted the possibilities of thinking from the author, which is why he no longer deserved to be studied by him. In this regard, Schroeder ponders the following: “Some of the ideas of a “shallow” philosopher may well be useful and memorable – as Wittgenstein would always remember and occasionally refer to some of Schopenhauer’s tenets or observations – but one doesn’t feel the need to go back to them” (2012, p. 378). In Schopenhauer's philosophy, the mature Wittgenstein no longer finds the possibility of thinking, which is why he leaves it aside.

If at the beginning of Wittgenstein's philosophical itinerary, the contribution of the German philosopher was remarkable, especially regarding transcendental idealism, in the late phase, Schopenhauer is simply ignored because he was no longer useful for the development of his philosophical investigation. With the gradual transformation of Wittgenstein's philosophical perspective, which is opposed to his old way of thinking, by extension, the philosopher ends up opposing Schopenhauer's doctrine, which is an effect arising from such a movement of thought. Schopenhauer's thought represents a view of philosophy

that Wittgenstein radically diverges from – after all, Wittgenstein proposed to bring words back from metaphysical use to everyday use.

In considering these factors, one might think of the mature Wittgenstein as an anti-Schopenhauerian philosopher. However, this opposition must be understood precisely within the limits exposed above, as Wittgenstein does not elaborate his thoughts from a direct criticism of Schopenhauer, but from a revision and gradual change of his own way of thinking. Furthermore, Schopenhauer is of less interest to Wittgenstein as an author, and more as a representative of the metaphysical tradition and his philosophical work to which he was opposed. Although there are several other philosophers who share this same tradition, Schopenhauer serves as a reference because, without a doubt, he was the closest to Wittgenstein's intellectual formation.

Final considerations

In the course of developing Wittgenstein's philosophy, the philosopher departs from Schopenhauer, however, not only from him, to problematize the limits of language as limits of thought itself. He thus reconciles the transcendental idealism, which impressed him so much in his youth, with the resources made available to him by the advancement of logical studies at the time. Although he did not intend to do something new in philosophy, Wittgenstein ended up bequeathing an original thought to posterity, which paved the way for a new way of philosophizing and which influenced several later authors. In his own way, the young Wittgenstein was a Schopenhauerian and drew on Schopenhauer's transcendentalism to solve his own philosophical problems through the logical analysis of language.

But as he starts to review his previous position, considering that he was wrong on some points, the late Wittgenstein follows a different fate. By leaving aside logical analysis to adopt the grammatical analysis of language, which reflects a methodologically pragmatic approach to its object of investigation, Schopenhauer's thought becomes incompatible with this movement of thought and, thus, by abandoning transcendental idealism, becomes, consequently, anti-Schopenhauerian.

Although he seems to have adopted, in his maturity, an attitude of distrust towards Schopenhauer, one cannot deny the author's decisive impact on Wittgenstein's thought, who remains the philosopher who was profoundly influenced by this author. That is why Wittgenstein's name is customarily placed in the wake of his influences. After all, even taking a distance serves to reaffirm that, at some previous moment, there was an approximation of the author, who knew him enough to consider the reasonableness of his arguments. Whether praising or criticizing (albeit indirectly), the relationship

with Schopenhauer, between proximity and distance, proves to be fundamental for understanding, with greater amplitude, Wittgenstein's own philosophical project.

An important point to be highlighted, and which may give rise to new investigations, is that Wittgenstein's anti-Schopenhauerianism is not total, but mitigated. From the point of view of epistemology, the mature Wittgenstein opposes Schopenhauer by abandoning the influence of transcendental idealism. Despite the philosopher clearly expressing, on some occasions, his disappointment with Schopenhauer, at least there is one element that unites them, which is related to the authors' concept of philosophy and method: Schopenhauer's idea of a single thought seems to find echo in the Wittgenstein's concept of panoramic view, as Wittgenstein himself makes the connection between both concepts in his transitional period.

Schopenhauer conceives philosophy as a single thought, and not a system of thought, in order to emphasize the organic cohesion that exists between the parts of the whole, and not the architectural cohesion in which one part supports the other, but the other does not support that one. In the organic conception of philosophy, each part conserves the whole, and the whole conserves each part. Thus, the whole gains in clarity as the part is understood, and the part is clarified as the whole is understood. In turn, Wittgenstein understands that clarity is obtained from the concept of panoramic vision (paragraph 122 of IF), whose lack is the cause of conceptual confusion. By dwelling on the grammar of a particular word, understanding is gained by having a view of the whole context, the panoramic view of language use.

If this does not constitute a trait of direct influence, at least it represents an important element of rapprochement between such different authors. With this, one glimpses in the mature Wittgenstein an anti-Schopenhauerian thinker, but not entirely.

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