

# SPINOZA ON HUMAN TELEOLOGY

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## INTRODUCTION

Does Spinoza allow human teleology or not? This is only one of questionable issues in spinozism to which the experts of Spinoza's philosophy offer different answers. Suffice it to quote the statement of E. A. Greetis: "I argue, contra Lin, that Spinoza is committed to a rejection of teleology, and contra Bennett, that Spinoza is consistent in his rejection of teleology"<sup>1</sup>. Why would human teleology be unacceptable for Spinoza, and does he really reject it radically or not?

Before I try to give my answers to this questions it should be explicated what is meant by „human teleology“. Shortly, it's about explanation of human acting insofar as it is done for the sake of some future goal.<sup>2</sup> Spinoza,

of course, doesn't deny that human imagines some future state as un/desirable but states that human does something on basis of the present pleasure/pain by anticipation of some future pleasure/pain, and that final cause is, indeed, efficient cause (present pleasure/pain) which moves to action. In another words, the present event would be, in a teleological explanation, explained by a future event but since the present event causes the future one, explanation must move from the present event, which is cause, to the future event, which is effect, not vice-versa. Spinoza is quite sparing of concrete examples in which we realize that what we are used to see as a final cause is actually efficient cause, so it pays to quote completely Spinoza's example about it:

What is termed a "final cause" is nothing but human appetite insofar as it is considered as the starting point or primary cause of something. For example, when we say that being a place of habitation was the final cause of this or that house, we surely mean no more then this, that a man, from thinking of the advantages of domestic life, had an urge to build a house. Therefore, the need for a habitation insofar as it is considered as a final cause is nothing but this particular urge, which is in reality an efficient cause, and is considered as the prime cause because men are commonly ignorant of the causes of their own urges; for, as I have repeatedly said, they are conscious of their actions and appetites but unaware of the causes by which they are determined to seek something (E3Praef).

Is it enough to say that all what is needed for a man, in order to build a house, is an urge

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1 GREETIS, Edward Andrew. Spinoza's Rejection of Teleology. **Revista Conatus – Filosofia de Spinoza**, v.4, n.8, Dez. 2010, 25.

2 Della Rocca will say: "[...] Such an explanation of an action which proceeds in terms of one's desires or goals and beliefs about the future is a teleological explanation within psychology". (DELLA ROCCA, Michael. Spinoza's metaphysical psychology. In: GARRETT, Don (ed). **The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 252). Let's quote three more definitions of teleological explanations: "[...] in a teleological explanation the event is usually explained by reference not directly to an effect of it but rather to an antecedent thought about an effect of it". (BENNETT, Jonathan. **A Study of Spinoza's Ethics**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 217); "[...] in Spinoza studies, as also elsewhere, by 'teleology' is most often meant a certain scheme of explanation in which items are explained by citing their (beneficial) future effects". (VILJANEN, Valtteri. **Spinoza's Dynamics of Being: The Concept of Power and its Role in Spinoza's Metaphysics**. Turku: Painosalama Oy, 2007, p. 186); explaining that teleological explanations we find in every thing as far as it strives to its preservation, S. Nadler stresses that such a behavior in human case is particular because it implies aware consciousness and so "teleological setup

becomes something different: intentional behavior that involves setting goals for oneself and then striving to achieve them". (NADLER, Steven. **Spinoza's Ethics. An Introduction**. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 199).

to build it which functions as an efficient cause or it was needed something more? By citing Spinoza's explanation of building a house I only touched what we are dealing with here. In order to be able to see whether his explanation is satisfactory or not, we must take look at Spinoza's arguments against human teleology, their validity, and the way how to explain numerous places in which Spinoza himself speaks of man's end or purpose of his acting.

Therefore I divided the article in three basic parts: 1) arguments against human teleology (naturalism, parallelism, causal internalism, scientific and enlightenment reasons); 2) implied human teleology in spinozism; 3) arguments for human teleology. I'll show that in Spinoza's philosophy there is a room for a human teleology, especially in cases which are of great importance for man's success in his preserving in being and increasing his power of acting. Namely, arguments that Spinoza himself exposes, or some other exposes on behalf of Spinoza (causal internalism) are not, by themselves, strong enough to exclude every possibility of human teleological acting. So, let's start step by step!

## 1 ARGUMENTS AGAINST HUMAN TELEOLOGY

As I said before, Spinoza's works offer different reasons against human teleology. Basically, by antiteleological arguments it is meant to preserve the coherence of spinozism. In another words, human acting should be explained in terms of the same laws that govern behaviors of every other thing, starting from God and proceeding to a stone, i.e., man must not be "a kingdom within a kingdom".

### A) NATURALISM

Naturalism in spinozism expresses Spinoza's ambition to explain all things, in their being and acting, as those that obey the same laws. It seems that behind such a strategy lies the rationalistic tendency to understand and explain, as far as possible, all things. Such a tendency is more realized if everything is governed by the same laws then in case that some segments of reality follow their own laws. That's why the isolation of man and his emotions from the rest of Nature is unacceptable for Spinoza. Such an isolation used to be accomplished by his predecessors who

appear to go so far as to conceive man in Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. They believe that he disturbs rather than follows Nature's order, and has absolute power over his actions, and is determined by no other source than himself (E3Praef).

"Disturbing" the Nature's order refers here precisely to a man as an isolated case or exception who allegedly follows his own rules. Spinoza's predecessors didn't notice that the Nature is

always the same, and its force and power of acting is everywhere one and the same; that is, the laws and rules of Nature according to which all things happen and change from one form to another are everywhere and always the same (ibid).

The man (and God) is traditionally seen as isolated case in comparison to other things, but Spinoza's tries to see a man and his emotions in the same way as every other thing:

I shall, then, treat of the nature and strength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, by the same method as I have used in treating of God and the mind, and I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if it were an investigation into lines, planes, or bodies. (ibid).

If Spinoza is successful in his intention to describe human acts and appetites as those that are governed by the same rules by which are governed God, lines, planes or (inanimate) bodies, it will be no more possible to talk about man as "a kingdom within a kingdom", that is, as the one who "disturbs the Nature's order". Della Rocca therefore rightly concludes:

Such a unification of explanatory principles is the heart of Spinoza's naturalism about psychology: human psychology is governed by the same fundamental principles that govern rocks and tables and dogs. Thus no new principles are needed to explain human psychology beyond those principles needed to explain the rest of nature anyway.<sup>3</sup>

Namely, if a man would be governed by the special laws that are not reducible to general laws, those special laws would be inexplicable because they can't be deduced from the general laws. Because of their being heterogeneous

3 DELLA ROCCA, Michael. **Spinoza.** Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008, p. 6.

when compared to the general laws, we couldn't explain the nature of relation of man to the rest of Nature. Because of inexplicability of those local laws which holds only for man, man's acting and nature would also be inexplicable and so we would have "brute facts".

Let's sort all things into three groups: God, men, infrahuman beings (including mathematical entities). Spinoza gives several arguments why God can't act teleologically. First of all, Spinoza's God is not a being endowed with personality, reason and free will, and as such cannot imagine in advance what kind of things (or world) to create in order to be able afterwards to choose and to realize one of many possibilities. Then, God's teleological acting is incompatible with his perfection; that is, the doctrine of God's teleological acting "negates God's perfection; for if God acts with an end in view, he must necessarily be seeking something that he lacks" (E1P36App). Men are governed by the religious prejudice "for they say that God has made everything for man's sake and has made man so that he should worship God" (ibid.). That would mean that God "needs" worship of human beings. But, if he needs something he is not perfect. Teleological doctrine not only ruins God's perfection but it ruins the hierarchy of perfection levels in created modes. If we suppose that the man is a final purpose of God's creating than it looks the man to be the reasons for existing of prior ontological entities (infinite modes) and in that sense to be more perfect than they. However, Spinoza claims that the thing produced more directly from God is also more perfect (cf. *ibid*). Finally, the divine intellect doesn't make part of *Natura naturans* but of *Natura naturata* (cf. E1P31). It means that it is a God's product and not some kind of a primordial divine ability necessary for "choice" among different worlds before creating one of them.

As for infrahuman beings which make up the majority in Nature, Spinoza doesn't even try to prove that they don't act teleologically, and this is understandable: the beings that have no reason cannot, by definition, imagine future states of which they are aware and then opt for one of them. Besides, in the center of Spinoza's interest was the man and not biology or physics.

So, there remained only human for which we could possibly claim to act in view of an end. However, if it is clear that all other things don't act for the purpose then we should accept the fact that neither a man is an exception. He is not "a kingdom within a kingdom". Antiteleological naturalism is deeply rooted in Spinoza's substance monism, from which it follows that God is the only existing and acting substance. If it is shown that God doesn't act teleologically, then it must also hold for all other beings, including men.

## B) PARALELISM

Spinoza, in his philosophy which is primarily directed towards ethical issues and achieving blessedness, had to face difficult problem of mind-body relationship. As an important starting point of his own thinking on this issue, Spinoza had previous solutions offered by stoics and Descartes. The problem consisted in showing how human mind can affect emotions and moderate them. Both the stoics and Descartes offer solution unacceptable for Spinoza:

Stoics thought that the emotions depend absolutely on our will, and that we can absolute command over them. However, with experience crying out against them they were obliged against their principles to admit that no little practice and zeal are required in order to check and control emotions. (E5Praef).

Descartes basically represents the same position: a man, by his will, can affect the movements of his body:

He maintained that the soul or mind is united in a special way with a certain part of the brain called the pineal gland, by means of which the mind senses all movements that occur in the body, as well as external objects, and by the mere act of willing it can move the gland in various way. (ibid.).

This pineal gland is placed in the middle of the brain and is moved by the animal spirits. Interaction between mind and body takes place, according to Descartes, through above mentioned gland.

Spinoza thinks that Descartes didn't explain this interaction in a satisfactory way:

But he had conceived mind as so distinct from body that he could assign no one cause either of this union or of mind itself, and found it necessary to have recourse to the cause of the entire universe, that is, God. (ibid).

causes, through the attribute of Thought alone; and insofar as things are considered as modes of Extension, again the order of the whole of Nature must be explicated through the attribute of Extension only. (E2P7S).

Spinoza ironically criticizes Descartes for this offered solution and expresses his wonder how such a distinct philosopher could give “a theory more occult than any occult quality” (ibid.). But, what is solution that Spinoza offers?

Spinoza tells us that every concretization of a mode under attribute of thought we must conceive in its placement within causal-efficient series that exists within that attribute. The same applies to the attribute of extension. It follows that between mind and body can't exist causal interaction: “The body cannot determine the mind to think, nor can the mind determine the body to motion or rest” (E3P2). Therefore, what to an uneducated man seems to be the result of mind's affecting the body to move in this or that way or to be at rest is actually manifestation of from eternity predetermined and parallel causal series of ideas one after another and series of body's determinations: “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (E2P7). If a man is, indeed, one entity which expresses the unique substance, then his every action or passion must be conceived in terms of parallel manifestation of his mind and body. Because of underlying mind-body identity, among the states of mind and body there must exist strict correlation, but not interaction. However, why would parallelism be incompatible with human teleology?

Instead of Descartes' interactionism Spinoza offers parallelism. He moves, in this doctrine, from a deeper ontological fact that “thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same substance, comprehended now under this attribute, now under that” (E2P7S) and that every attribute is conceived by itself (cf. E1P10). Then he concludes that “a mode of Extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, expressed in two ways” (E2P7S); that is, there is unity and identity of mind and body (cf. E2P13S). If there is identity of mind and body, in what consists parallelism between them? The short answer is: in their being conceived and causation. It's about the fact that we approach something under this or that attribute (under which it is only conceivable) and not that it is dual in itself. Namely, the divine substance acts in way that it simultaneously produces a series of modes in every attribute (cf. Ep. 32). In another words, we can see the God's power as the power of thinking and as the power of acting, that is, “whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of God, all this follows from the idea of God as an object of thought in God according to the same order and connection” (E2P7C). Or, thought and extension are different attributes which, as such, have nothing in common (cf. E1P2). Things that have nothing in common cannot causally act one on another (cf. E1P3). Every attribute is conceived by itself (cf. E1P10) and mode by the attribute to which it belongs (cf. E2P6).

Obviously, the biggest problem for Spinoza is that teleology would imply interaction (or would lead to it) between mind and body in a way that mind, through its will, moves the body to a specific action. Spinoza doesn't allow such a interaction but the question remains: how to explain parallel behavior of mind and body which, it seems, follow different laws? As for mind itself, its particularity would be intentionality which cannot be ascribed to body as such. Spinoza describes body (after E2P13), in its acting, using pure categories of inertia taken from mechanical physics. Therefore the problem is: how to explain human acts which manifest obvious accordance between mind and body taking in account the fact that there is not, between them, causal and conceptual interaction and the fact that they follow, as it seems, different laws: intentionality and inertia?

After learning from Descartes that trying to explain the interaction mind-body leads to great difficulties, Spinoza proposes conceptual and causal isolation between modes that belong to one or another attribute:

as long as things are considered as modes of thought, we must explicate the order of the whole of Nature, or the connection of

Spinoza, when resolving this problem, fulfils some kind of leveling of mind and body by means of which he tries to diminish or neutralize the qualitative difference in their acting. In another words, he tries to “pull down” the acting of mind to inertial acting and he tries to “elevate” the acting of body to a higher degree which would be closer to that one proper to mind’s acting. In that sense, speaking of mind, it is significant what he says: “I acknowledge no difference between human appetite and desire. For whether or not a man is conscious of his appetite, the appetite remains one and the same” (E2AD1E). He understands, by “desire”, “any of man’s endeavors, urges, appetites, and volitions” (ibid.), but we must recall that he defined “desire” earlier as “appetite accompanied by the consciousness thereof” (E3P9S).

Actually, Spinoza was comfortable with erasing the boundary between appetite and desire because he could, that way, realize his naturalistic conception (everything is ruled by the same laws) in easier way. In that way, the qualitative difference between human conscious and intentional acting and “acting” of an inanimate being (although even in a stone there is some idea, whatever it means) would be reduced. In other words, Spinoza would be comfortable with explaining all things starting only from their appetite. All things have appetite, but only conscious beings have desire.

Afore-mentioned “leveling”, when speaking of body’s acting, Spinoza fulfils by convincing us that we actually don’t know what is the body, by itself, capable of, that is, without being guided and directed by mind:

nobody as yet has determined the limits of the body’s capabilities: that is, nobody as yet has learned from experience what the body can and cannot do, without being determined by mind, solely from the laws of its nature insofar as it is considered as corporeal. For nobody as yet knows the structure of the body so accurately as to explain all its functions, not to mention that in the animal world we find much that far surpasses human sagacity, and that sleepwalkers do many things in their sleep that they would not dare when awake – clear evidence that the body, solely from the laws of its own nature, can do many things at which its mind is amazed. (E3P2S).

Having shown that human mind doesn’t act moved by final cause but the appetite and that body, in its acting, has unimagined capabilities, Spinoza believed that he answered in satisfactory way the question of how any human act can be explained separately explaining acting of mind and that of body. Although we are accustomed to conceive mind as superior to body and as the one that takes initiative and leads body according to some end, Spinoza tried to show that there is not so big qualitative difference between mind and body as we are used to think. In another words, “there is no more any superiority of soul over body, than of the attribute of Thought over that of Extension”.<sup>4</sup>

### C) CAUSAL INTERNALISM

Whether speaking of human teleology in spinozism is justified or not depends largely on whether outside things or future events – which we are used to conceive as ends – can in some way affect the human present behavior, or such a behavior should be conceived mechanically; that is, starting exclusively from man’s appetite that acts as efficient cause. Spinoza is not completely clear about this, and that fact opens possibility of various interpretations. Shortly, insisting on causal internalism of human ideas that move to actions basically makes it impossible to justify speech about human teleology because in that case the things from outside or future desirable states have far less importance (if at all) and role in human behavior. We can mention two basic variants of causal internalism: 1) based on parallelism (Bennett); and 2) based on the interpretation of *comparata* (Greetis).

Bennett, starting from parallelism, developed, in Spinoza’s behalf, an argument against human teleology.<sup>5</sup> This argument starts from the statement that causal power of ideas relies exclusively on their intrinsic properties because the causal power of bodies relies exclusively on their intrinsic properties too. From “physical digression” after E2P13 it follows that “physical events are to be explained purely in terms of the shapes, sizes, positions,

4 DELEUZE, Gilles. **Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza**. New York: Zone Books, 1990, p. 109.

5 Cf. BENNETT, Jonathan. **A Study...**, op. cit., p. 219-225.

velocities etc. of particles of matter”<sup>6</sup>, which are intrinsic properties that are causally responsible for behavior of bodies. Causal properties on a level of human mind, parallel to these intrinsic properties of body, wouldn’t depend on representational properties of ideas, that is, on what they represent.<sup>7</sup> Their causal properties would depend on intrinsic properties that move to action although it is not clear what is exactly meant, in spinozism, by those intrinsic properties.<sup>8</sup>

The mind’s ideas have their intrinsic and extrinsic properties but these extrinsic properties can hardly be mapped on intrinsic properties of body without ruining parallelism mind-body<sup>9</sup>. This parallelism is obeyed when we conceive intrinsic properties of mind as parallel to the intrinsic properties of body, and this intrinsicity would be of crucial importance for human acting regardless of whether we interpret it from the point of view of mind or body:

my thought about possibly obtaining x is explained by my desire, my intrinsic state, because the representational features of thoughts are supervenient on their intrinsic features. The basic story is always intrinsic, not representational; so a derivative place is given to every thought about a possible outcome, including the thought ‘It would be good to obtain x’. Thus, desires explain value judgements on outcomes, and are not explained by them<sup>10</sup>.

After this Bennett’s remark, even more important and complex appears the question

6 BENNETT, Jonathan. **A Study...**, op. cit., p. 219.

7 Cf. BENNETT, Jonathan. **A Study...**, op. cit, p. 220.

8 M. Lin tries to shed some light on this problem by adducing Dretske’s example: the meaning of the words of a libretto is irrelevant for shattering a wine glass. In this case, representative property would be the word with its meaning (content) but for shattering the wine glass relevant would be the power and frequency of voice. The meaning or content are extrinsic properties while the power and frequency are intrinsic properties (cf. LIN, Martin. *Teleology and Human Action in Spinoza*. In: **The Philosophical Review**, 115:3, p. 317-354). H. Allison explains the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic properties in a sense that the former we have in case we conceive a thing in its essential properties and the later we have when a thing is conceived in its interaction with other things (cf. ALLISON, Henry. **Benedict de Spinoza: An Introduction**, New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 1987, p. 133).

9 Cf. BENNETT, Jonathan. **A Study...**, op. cit., p. 220.

10 BENNETT, Jonathan. **A Study...**, op. cit., p. 224.

can the things from outside (including future un/pleasant states) have causal influence on a man, or – speaking of human mind – causal power of ideas depends only on their intrinsic properties?

E. A. Greetis promotes causal internalism too, but he starts from non-teleological understanding of interaction that happens between man and external things. Namely, man, like every other thing, cannot avoid interaction with other things. In this interaction, there can be competition but also synergy of his power with powers of the other things. The more a man is under the influence of these external things the more he is subject to passions and the more depends on those things. His acts cannot be explained solely by his nature (because they don’t follow from it alone) but by natures of other things too. Spinoza defines the passion by words:

The essence of a passive emotion cannot be explicated through our own essence alone [...]; that is [...], the power of a passive emotion cannot be defined by the power whereby we endeavor to persist in our own being, but [...] must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared [*comparata*] with our own power. (E4P5Dm).

There is a question: whether, and in which sense, the power of some external cause affects our power when this one is compared with it? In another words, does external power affect our power in a sense of increasing or decreasing it; of specifying it; or only in a sense of its defining? Two principle answers are possible: one is close to teleological, the other is close to mechanical interpretation. Greetis promotes the later one,<sup>11</sup> and in his argumentation confronts Lin’s arguments and conclusion.<sup>12</sup> Let’s see first what Lin has to say about this issue.

Lin develops his argumentation as a response to Bennett’s conclusion that motivational or causal power of ideas would depend solely on intrinsic properties while the representational properties would be irrelevant because they are extrinsic:

no matter how extrinsic representational properties are the causal powers of ideas

11 Cf. GREETIS, Edward Andrew. **Spinoza’s Rejection...**, op. cit., pp. 29-32.

12 Cf. LIN, Martin. **Teleology and...**, op. cit., pp. 337-350.

can still, on Spinoza's account, depend upon them".<sup>13</sup>

That can be best seen in cases of passive emotions or passions. If the future events, that we conceive as ends and which are something external to man, can cooperate in causing an idea that leads to behavior, then not only the door is open to the teleology but Spinoza is, according to Lin, committed to teleological explanations of human behaviors.<sup>14</sup> Lin finds a fundament for his argumentation in above cited Spinoza's explanation what would be the essence of a passion and how we can and must explain it. He translates the controversial word *comparata* as "paired" and not as "compared".<sup>15</sup> He stresses in that way the role of external things which essentially co-cause human passion because such a passion arose through synergy of own power and the power of external things. Relying on some other Spinoza's statements on this issue (e.g. E3P56 and Dm), Lin concludes:

there are as many kinds of passive affects as there are kinds of external objects by which we are affected: affects are individuated by their external causes.<sup>16</sup>

Greetis conceive human interaction with external things completely different, which is clearly evident from his insisting on different translation of "comparata":

As we saw in his translation of E4P5Dem, Lin translates *comparata* as "paired". Using this translation, he determines that causal powers of a passion derive from both the person's nature and an external object's nature, i.e., the power of a passion is our power *paired* with an external object's power. Lin's translation is adequate, however, "*comparata*" is most commonly translated as "compared". Translating "*comparata*" as "compared" seems to change the meaning of the passage – form Lin's interpretation – to the following: the power of a passion is our power *compared* with an external object's power, in other words, a passion is defined as the person's essence, or power, *as it is affected by or in relation to* an external object.<sup>17</sup>

13 LIN, Martin. **Teleology and...**, op. cit., p. 337.

14 Cf. LIN, Martin. **Teleology and...**, op. cit., p. 338.

15 LIN, Martin. **Teleology and...**, op. cit., p. 338.

16 LIN, Martin. **Teleology and...**, op. cit., p. 338.

17 GREETIS, Edward Andrew. **Spinoza's Rejection...**, op. cit., p. 29.

His strategy basically consists in showing that we must, when explaining human behavior, take into account *conatus perseverandi* which is, as basic strive for self-preservation, crucial for human acting,<sup>18</sup> i.e., appetite which is that strive when refers to mind and body and which "is therefore nothing else but man's essence, from the nature of which there necessarily follow those things that tend to his preservation, and which man is thus determined to perform" (E3P9S). Desire, which is that appetite with awareness thereof, pleasure and pain, that are passions through which man passes in greater or lesser perfection (cf. E3P11S), are, indeed, three basic passions, but they are nevertheless something derived from *conatus perseverandi* which is alone, properly speaking, basic.<sup>19</sup> If the *conatus perseverandi* is basic *in re*, then it is also basic when we describe passions. Such considerations make Greetis to conclude:

A passion is *not* – as Lin argues – something separate from the nature of a person, which receives *its* causal powers from the nature of both an external object and the person. Desire is a person's essence and therefore cannot gain some of its causal powers from – or have its causal powers *paired* with – an external object's powers: a thing's causal power simply *is* its desire or essence.<sup>20</sup>

Greetis nevertheless allows that external things have some role in determining the passions. He relies on Spinoza's statement that all desires are based on the three basic (desire, pleasure, pain) and that each of them "appear under various names according to their various contexts and extrinsic characteristics" (E3DA48E). Greetis' considerations about passions prevent the speech about human teleology because external things and future events have no causal influence on individuating the passions. In that way, he steps on Bennett's side and concludes:

passions do not have wide causal powers – Bennett is correct in thinking that Spinoza

18 GREETIS, Edward Andrew. **Spinoza's Rejection...**, op. cit., p. 30.

19 Cf. GREETIS, Edward Andrew. **Spinoza's Rejection...**, op. cit., p. 30.

20 GREETIS, Edward Andrew. **Spinoza's Rejection...**, op. cit., p. 30.

rejects all teleological explanations because causal powers rely on intrinsic properties, i.e., causal powers are a thing's essence.<sup>21</sup>

#### D) SCIENTIFIC AND ENLIGHTENMENT REASONS

Spinoza lived and worked in a time when scientific revolution flourished. One of the basic features of that revolution was insistence on explaining the thing's behavior by use of efficient causes according to inertia model borrowed from mechanical physics. Things are to be explained starting from the present towards the future. In such a context, efficient causes are suitable because they "push" from the present while final causes would "pull" the acting from the future.<sup>22</sup> In another words, teleology "turns Nature completely upside down, for it regards as an effect that which is in fact a cause, and vice versa" (E1App).

Very important role, in the scientific revolution, had mathematics too. Through its evidence and coherence, it was paradigmatic for other sciences, including philosophy. It achieved such success and status because it is not concerned "with ends but only with the essences and properties of figures" and has, as such, "revealed to men a different standard of truth" (ibid.). Spinoza invites us to get know, as much as possible, the essences of things for we shall, that way, understand better which effects follow from those essences. Strictly speaking, all the things, with their acting, follow from divine essence in a strict and determined way:

from God's supreme power or infinite nature an infinity of things in infinite ways – that is, everything – has necessarily flowed or is always following from that same necessity, just as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity that its three angles are equal to two right angles. (E1P17S).

If philosophy wants to follow scientific trends and to respect standards posed by physics and mathematics, it must not use the explanatory scheme which is not adopted by physics and mathematics. In another words, it must not explain human behavior by final causes because a man would be, in that case, "a kingdom within a kingdom".

21 GREETIS, Edward Andrew. *Spinoza's Rejection...*, op. cit., p. 31.

22 Cf. BENNETT, Jonathan. *A Study...*, op. cit., p. 216.

Spinoza, as enlightener, fought against human prejudices, false fears and hopes. He mentions, as the basic prejudice from which arises every other, the one concerning teleology:

Now all the prejudices which I intend to mention here turn on this one point, the widespread belief among men that all things in Nature are like themselves in acting with an end in view. Indeed, they hold it as certain that God himself directs everything to a fixed end; for they say that God has made everything for man's sake and has made man so that he should worship God. (E1App).

After men having convinced themselves that anthropomorphous God had created everything for man's sake so that he should worship him, only one step was necessary to get close to conviction, or prejudice, about good and evil, merit and sin. If we add religious belief in immortality of soul and common belief in human freedom, prejudice arises about heaven and hell as the basic things which should be sought or avoided. In that way, man permanently lives in fear and hope regarding his future state. In such a condition, he is guided by imagination and not by true knowledge (by which he would know that there is not neither heaven nor hell) with consequence that he becomes easy pray of theologians who proclaimed themselves as the sole experts and interpreters of holy scriptures. In another words, they gave themselves a status that could easily turn to even more noble status: they are mediators of the eternal salvation. Uneducated mass, frightened by the greatest possible punishment, easily became pray of manipulation by the same those mediators of salvation who very often fulfilled their role not guided by honest motivations. In that sense, mathematics stepped forward as a true "savior", for it doesn't care about ends but only about essences and properties of mathematical entities. It showed another standard of truth and gave an example to men so that they don't conceive the thing teleologically but look for true essences of things and effects that follow from those essences.

## 2 IMPLIED TELEOLOGY?

After all these reasons against human teleology, it seems confusing, at least, the fact that Spinoza in many places still uses the words "aim", "end", "purpose", "goal". I'll quote just some of those places.

## A) IN EPISTEMOLOGY

Spinoza opens his *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* with consideration whether a true good exists which we should strive for, or which will enable us to enjoy the greatest happiness. Realizing that apparent goods that the mass strives for (wealth, honour, sensual pleasure) are not the true goods, Spinoza makes conclusion: “But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind with joy alone, unmixed with any sadness” (TIE, § 10). Spinoza invites us to fulfill our true nature and to achieve the knowledge of our unity with the whole Nature and to help the others to achieve the same goal. That is the end he strives for (cf. TIE, § 13-14).

In achieving that goal, man should first improve his intellect, which means “emending the intellect and rendering it apt for the understanding of things in a manner appropriate to the achievement of our purpose” (TIE, § 18). Spinoza also talks about means necessary for achieving that purpose (cf. TIE § 25). Insofar as the knowledge consists in getting know the particular essences, such knowledge should be the end of man’s efforts (cf. TIE, §§ 26-29). Spinoza surmises the aim in epistemology at the end of his *Treatise*:

Our aim, then, is to have clear and distinct ideas, that is, such as originate from pure mind and not from fortuitous motions of the body. Next, so that all ideas may be subsumed under one, we shall endeavor to connect and arrange them in such a manner that our mind, as far as possible, may reproduce in thought the reality of Nature, both as to the whole and as to its parts. As to the first point, our ultimate aim, as we have already said, requires that a thing be conceived either through its essence alone or through its proximate cause. (TIE §§ 91-92).

We should also recall that Spinoza puts the third kind of knowledge as epistemological end. Achieving such a knowledge not only enables man to conceive better the reality but it is necessary condition for human happiness, “for blessedness is nothing other than that self-contentment that arises from the intuitive knowledge of God” (E4App4).

## B) IN ETHICS

Purposefulness of action in ethics can be seen through Spinoza’s arranging his principal work: it proceeds from ontological premises and after, by geometrical order, shows what are man and his affects; how he is enslaved through them; how he can set him free from them and achieve the blessedness. The power of reason and freedom can be seen as culmination of his philosophical thinking and, in this sense, as an aim he was tending to. Ethical perfection, through adequate knowledge, enable men to achieve higher level of activity/freedom.

Whether Spinoza puts some goal in ethics we can realize by putting some rhetoric questions: was Spinoza indifferent to whether a man will live enslaved by his passions or will develop active affects under the guidance of reason? Or, speaking of “true” goods unlike the “apparent” goods, does he simply and neutrally describes what would their difference consist of or perhaps promotes true goods and not apparent ones? It seems that he, by promoting specific ends that men should achieve, not only promotes human teleology but he himself acts teleologically.

What does Spinoza say about freedom? It consists in acting from own nature. Such acting is, in truth, determined but is free insofar as the result of that acting doesn’t depend on external things but arises from own nature and is explicable (in greater part, at least) by it. Invitation to free action, or putting such a freedom as aim, is even more justified and reasonable insofar as man is necessarily subject to influence of external things he should set him free of. The more a man is free the more powerful he is and achieves the higher level of true happiness. The whole structure of Spinoza’s principal work shows the clear ethical end that should be achieved: increasing, by gaining adequate knowledge, own freedom and realizing proper blessedness.

## C) IN POLITICS

Human beings, as citizens, live in organized society, and purpose of a civil order “is nothing other than peace and security of life” (TP V, §2). Through the history of humanity, there were different model of government, but

Spinoza puts, as ideal and paradigmatic form of political set-up, democracy because in it the equality and activity are assured to a greatest number of men:

I think I have thus demonstrated quite clearly the basis of the democratic state, which I have elected to discuss before all others because it seemed the most natural form of state, approaching most closely to that freedom which nature grants to every man. For in democratic state nobody transfers his natural right to another so completely that thereafter he is not to be consulted; he transfers it to the majority of the entire community of which he is part. In this way all men remain equal, as they were before in a state of nature. (TTP 16, p. 531).

The citizens, in democracy, have right to elect and to be elected as those who implement political power. In such a way, they find themselves in better position than in monarchy or aristocracy, where they are not even consulted about state's policy and in which they have no possibility participate in political power actively. Democracy is, in that sense, the goal the society should aim at.

Having seen Spinoza's arguments against human teleology, but also some places where he invites people to act purposefully, we should see what is the real power of arguments against human teleology and whether there is, anyway, some room – in spinozism – for human teleology.

### 3 ARGUMENTS FOR HUMAN TELEOLOGY

In this section, I will first look back at argumentative power of antiteleological reasons and I will thereafter adduce some arguments why Spinoza, after all, allows (and requires!) human teleology.

#### a) Problem of naturalism

We have seen that human teleology doesn't fit within naturalistic conception, but we should ask how much naturalism is successful project within spinozism anyway, regardless of how much Spinoza insists that the man must not be "a kingdom within a kingdom". Don't we have here too ambitious strategy with weak point not only in human teleology but in some other places too? For example, what about an important aspect of human acting in sense that

man endeavors to increase his power of action? Namely, Spinoza not only makes statement that man tends to increase his power of action but he invites him to do that. Suffice it to compare the fourth and fifth part of *Ethics* to realize that it was Spinoza's intention. For, when Spinoza puts and defines human freedom as a superior form of human existing and acting in comparison to enslavement, he simultaneously invites man to increase his freedom and power of action. Every Spinoza's statement about what is really useful to men is actually invitation to increasing the power of acting, freedom, perfection. But, in which way does God, with his action, fit within such a speech? In no way! He not only doesn't fit but he cannot fit because God, whose essence is unlimited dynamism and power, cannot increase his power of acting since this power is already expressed as fully as possible. God, who is in every way infinite and most perfect being (cf. E1P11Dm2), cannot – by definition – move to a higher level of perfection. His power is unlimited because there is nothing outside him that could eventually limit it. Or, how would Spinoza explain that a stone endeavors to increase its power of acting?

A moment that also doesn't fit within naturalistic conception is man's imagining of what will be helpful to him in order to preserve in being and to increase his power (cf. E3P28). Namely, if the basic doctrine of *conatus perseverandi* in case of man is formulated with words: "If he does it, it helps him"<sup>23</sup> it could fit within general Spinoza's conception of self-preservation and in that case naturalism would be respected as a basic structure of causing in Nature in which what matters is the actual set-up of something from which proceeds some act. The best expression of nonteleologically and essentialistically understood *conatus perseverandi* we have in Spinoza's proposition: "The conatus with which each thing endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself" (E3P7) because it is actual thing's set-up that is stressed here as a basis of acting. However, Spinoza later conceives man's *conatus perseverandi* through teleological formula: "If it would help him, he does it", because what is stressed here is some

<sup>23</sup> BENNETT, Jonathan. **A Study...**, op. cit., p. 229.

future state that serves as an end understood as self-preservation and increasing of power. And so Spinoza says that we try to promote whatever we imagine to increase pleasure (cf. E3P28), or “Every man, from the laws of his own nature, necessarily seeks or avoids what he judges to be good or evil” (E4P19). Insofar as we seek what we judge to be good we practically realize our *conatus perseverandi* on a basis of believing that some action will help us to achieve some future end which is self-preservation and increasing of power. The problem is in a fact that the above mentioned believing doesn’t fit within naturalistic context because neither God, nor a stone, nor an oak, acts by help of belief.<sup>24</sup>

In conclusion, Spinoza obviously had justified and understandable reasons for insisting on naturalism. It is, however, too ambitious project that manifests its weak points especially in case of human behavior: in case of “increasing of power” and “belief” which are essential moments of human acting but are also moments that we don’t find in acting of God and infrahuman (especially inanimate) things.

#### B) PROBLEM OF PARALLELISM

According to parallelism, the acting of body cannot be explained by the acting of mind because it is not caused by it, and vice-versa. Qualitative difference between the way how body acts (following the laws of mechanics and inertia) and how mind acts (in conscious and intentional way) Spinoza tends to diminish by levelling or bringing closer these two constitutive parts of man. But, was he successful about it?

Let us take the example that Spinoza himself puts forward: building the house (cf. E4Praef). For the sake of simplicity, let us imagine that a man builds his house alone, without help of building constructors. So, he imagines the pleasure of domestic life and wants to build a

24 Della Rocca welcomes Spinoza’s introduction of believing into a speech on *conatus perseverandi*, but notes the problem that a man is – because of endeavour for self-preservation and increasing of power on basis of believing – “a kingdom within a kingdom“, that is, Spinoza didn’t offer a naturalistic account of belief (cf. DELLA ROCCA, Michael. Spinoza’s metaphysical [...] op. cit., p.218-219). Bennett will note that Spinoza, insofar as belief and desire are concerned, „has no remotely satisfactory theory“. (BENNETT, Jonathan. **A Study...**, op. cit., p. 328).

house. But, building house is complex task that requires many different activities and works so that man could eventually live in it. All these activities and works must be coordinated and programed in a manner that, after having been done, man can safely live in the house. Now, if we apply Spinoza’s parallelism on this case then we find a big problem: how to explain man’s behavior from the perspective of his body’s acting? Interactionistic model wouldn’t have, in such a case, that sort of problem because it says that body accomplishes all activities as guided by mind (although it should, of course, offer some better solution of body-mind interaction than that of Descartes): mind knows what activities should be accomplished first, that is, it knows the order of different activities; it knows what material should be used at every stage of building, etc. However, Spinoza tries to explain the activity of body, when building house, only from the laws of body’s nature. But, what “explanations” does Spinoza offer and can they be accepted as “explanations” at all?

For example, body’s acting, when a man builds the house, can hardly be explained by mechanical and inertial laws (from “physical digression” after E2P13) which are followed by simple and inanimate bodies. Then, can Spinoza’s claim that “nobody has determined what the body can and cannot do, without being determined by mind”, that is, “solely from the laws of its nature” (E III, P2, S) stand as an explanation? Can we take as an explanation his acknowledgement that we actually don’t know what the body is capable of because “nobody as yet knows the structure of the body so accurately as to explain all its function” (ibid)? It is surprising that Spinoza uses analogy with animals and sleepwalkers who “do many things in their sleep that they would not dare when awake” (ibid). I think we can rightly make conclusion that above mentioned Spinoza’s “explanations” cannot be taken as true explanations. Namely, when Spinoza compares acting of man’s body, when building the house, with animals then that analogy could amount to explanation if he had adduce an example of some gorilla or monkey which built the house like man does it. Or, has anyone ever seen some sleepwalker building the house in his sleep?

Generally speaking, the doctrine of mind-body identity and that of parallel manifestation of mind's and body's acting are very unclear, especially if we try to explain man's complex activities. The basic problem lays in causal and conceptual barrier drawn between body's activities (which follow physical and inertial laws) and mind's activities (which are conscious and intentional).

No matter how much man's acting based on desire is problematic for Spinoza (so that he says that he doesn't see the difference between appetite and desire), desire is – exactly because of consciousness – important to Spinoza anyway. If Spinoza, as the aim of his ethical project, stresses leaving the state of enslavement through passions and achieving active emotions, then knowledge is indispensable: “A passive emotion ceases to be a passive emotion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it” (E5P3). But, can we form a clear and distinct idea of some emotion if we are not aware of it? Not, of course! It is desire, and not appetite, crucial for effective transforming passive emotion into the active one.

In conclusion, we can say that parallelism, as well as naturalism, is not sufficiently solid and persuasive in itself to serve as strong argument against human teleology. If Descartes, by chance, had lived long enough to be able to read and comment Spinoza's alternative solution to the problem of relation mind-body, I think he would have good reasons to label ironically Spinoza “famous man” or “true philosopher” wandering how could such a great man offer “solutions” of that kind to man's acting. I think that Spinoza wasn't successful in his project of levelling mind's and body's acting and in giving good alternative to interactionism. He himself departs from that levelling when, in process of teleologization of *conatus perseverandi*, the initiative regarding self-preservation and increasing the power ascribes more and more to man's mind and not equally to mind and body, the issue that I'll discuss later.

#### C) CAUSAL INTERNALISM/EXTERNALISM

Let's recall: Bennett developed – taking Spinoza's parallelism as basis – an argument against human teleology which follows in this way: causal power of body relies exclusively

on its intrinsic properties such as shape, size, position etc. If, for the moving of body, are crucial its intrinsic properties then the acting of mind must follow the same rules: representational properties cannot have causal or moving power because they are extrinsic and not intrinsic. In that manner, human teleology is practically made impossible because some external thing (some un/pleasant future state, for example) cannot move a man to action, that is, it cannot be causally relevant for his acting.

However, I think that such a doctrine is suitable for explanation of behavior of some simple thing, especially in causal isolation, but man is everything but causally isolated. In another words, interaction is inevitable and is something that basically determine his constitution and action arising from that constitution. The best proof thereof are passions as the principal man's motivation. Desire is “very essence, or nature, of each individual insofar as that is conceived as determined by some given state of its constitution to do something” (E3P56Dm). It is important here to stress that

The nature or essence of emotions cannot be explicated solely through our own essence or nature [...], but must be defined by the potency, that is..., the nature, of external causes as compared with our own power. Hence there are as many kinds of each emotion as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected [...], and men are affected in different ways by one and the same object [...], and to that extent they differ in nature. Finally, one and the same man [...] is affected in different ways toward the same object, and to that extent he is variable. (E4P33Dm).

After having seen that man's constitution is basically affected by external things, it appears easier to determine the nature of content of ideas that constitute man's mind. Although Spinoza claims that the object of mind's idea is constituted by its body (cf. E2P13C and S), it is important to note that body exists “according as we sense it” (E2P13C), namely

All the modes wherein a body is affected follow from the nature of the body affected together with the nature of the affecting body... Therefore, the idea of these modes will necessarily involve the nature of both bodies... So the idea of any mode wherein

the human body is affected by an external body involves the nature of the human body and the external body. (E2P16Dm).

So, when the mind has idea of its body it has idea of particular state in which its body is at a moment, and this state or affection is result of interaction of own body with external bodies.

From what is said we can see that man is, in his action, most often determined by his own nature and the nature of external body as well. Man's acting arises from desire, and desire is constituted according to nature of own body as it is affected by external bodies. Since desire is man's basic drive for self-preservation and increasing the power and since man is always in interaction with external things that help or hinder that appetite (cf. E4P5), it follows that also ideas – on basis of which man realizes particular acts (since ideas reflect specific affectedness of own body, move and direct man's acts) – depend, at least partially, on external things which man imagines. In that sense, it is justified to claim that representational features of ideas co-determine their motivational-causal power although being extrinsic. The point is that we must not conceive actual man's constitution, in his intrinsic properties, in some sort of causal isolation but we must take in consideration external bodies that co-determine this constitution and enable so determined constitution to realize itself in a specific way and in a specific direction. In another words, representational features (based on external things which are "represented") of man's ideas are determined by causal interaction of own body with external bodies. It is important to stress that the same causes determine causal power and content of ideas as well, and this fact shows that "content of an idea is relevant to its causal powers".<sup>25</sup> What are implications of this result for the issue of human teleology?

If we have seen that idea contains representational properties that have essential role in motivating and directing the action, then we can and must take external causes (including future states) as relevant factor for determining motivational and directional component of those ideas. Ideas, in this moving property, don't depend only on intrinsic properties (causal internalism)

but neither only on extrinsic properties (causal externalism) but on mixture of those properties, since some idea reflects specific encounter of own inner constitution or own nature and nature of external bodies, that is, specific interaction of own and external natures. Excellent example of such an interaction we have in passions. Insofar as passions are affections of body and ideas of those affections (cf. E3Def3), they move man to action which, therefore, cannot be explicated solely on basis of intrinsic properties that belong to mind's ideas. In that way, the door is opened for human teleology since external things and future states co-determine man's behavior creating in him passions.<sup>26</sup>

As we saw, Greetis insists on translating of controversial Spinoza's expression *comparata* exclusively in sense of "comparing" our power with power of external causes. Here we should mention that Spinoza talks about different aspects of man's interaction with external things that manifest certain power depending on their nature. So he teaches us that the power of some external thing can positively or negatively affect our power of acting: "the human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of activity is increased or diminished" (E III, Post1). However, here we have not the aspect of interaction on which Greetis insists: own power with certain quantity which can be compared with quantity of power of some external thing with which own power is in interaction. In another words and strictly speaking, afore mentioned "comparing" takes place when own power is jeopardized by external powers and is eventually destroyed: "There is in Nature no individual thing that is not surpassed in strength and power by some other thing" (E4Ax); or "the power of a man is limited in comparison with something else, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes" (E4P3). In that sense, a man shares the destiny of all other things: thanks to external things, he exists; on interaction with them depends his increasing and diminishing of his power of action; this interaction will, finally, lead him to destruction caused by external causes.

25 LIN, Martin. **Teleology**..., op. cit, p. 338.

26 "[...] to the extent to which our behavior is motivated by thoughts about the future and external objects, it is motivated by passions", LIN, Martin. **Teleology and [...]**. op. cit., p. 342.

However, when evaluating Greetis' criticism of Lin's translation of *comparata* as "paired", we must take in consideration the context in which this word shows up. If we consider man's power in interaction with external powers solely from the point of view of quantity, we must, together with Spinoza and Greetis, conclude that our power is weaker than external powers and will eventually be surpassed by them. Quantitatively speaking, our power is weaker in comparison with external things and in this sense we should use the translation of *comparata* in manner which Greetis promotes (compared). But, it is important to notice that our power of acting must be determined qualitatively too: "there are as many kinds of each emotion as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected" (E4P33Dm).

Greetis claims:

although the causal power of passions, as we learned above, rely on intrinsic natures, i.e., the essence or desire of the thing affected and how much its *conatus* is helped or hindered, the passions themselves are widely individuated. That is, the causal powers of passions are simply desire, but to provide a complete explanation of passions, they can be termed according to their external causes.<sup>27</sup>

No doubt that man's essence is, above all, his power to persevere in being and increase his power. It cannot be something else than power since it is an expression of divine essence which is unlimited power of existing and acting. It is useful to draw here the parallel between divine and human power regarding one important aspect. Namely, divine infinite power is connected with divine perfection on one side and, on the other side, Spinoza claims that "Nothing exists from whose nature an effect does not follow" (E1P36). In other words, from necessarily existing divine essence there must necessarily follow effects. What are these effects? Infinite and finite modes which, under different attributes, express divine power. It means that divine power is realized (that is, it has effects) by being expressed in concrete ways, i.e., through concrete modes. Existing of finite modes also depends on their producing some effects:

Whatever exists expresses God's nature or essence in a definite and determinate way [...]; that is [...], whatever exists expresses God's power, which is the cause of all things, in a definite and determinate way, and so [...] some effect must follow from it. (E1P36Dm).

It is clear, from this statement, that man's causal powers, in order to exist at all, must be realized in some effects. To be realized in some effects, they must be determined quantitatively and qualitatively just as the divine power is realized through quantitative-qualitative concretizations of its modes. Man's powers can gain their quantitative-qualitative determination only through some interaction with external things. So, the basic point is as follows: man's power cannot exist without being realized in some way; to be realized, it must be determined quantitatively and qualitatively; this quantitative-qualitative determination can be gained only through interaction with external things and their powers. In another words, interaction with external powers represents *conditio sine qua non* for realization of own power. In that sense, the aspect of interaction, through which some passion gains its external denomination (cf. E3DA48E), is superficial aspect. Of course, interaction offers such external denomination but its role is much deeper and more important because it determines passions quantitatively and qualitatively, and external denomination is only consequence of such a determination. In that deeper ontological sense, it is justified to talk about our power which is *paired* with power of external thing through interaction as basis for quantitative-qualitative determination of own power. Could own power, by itself, determine itself what to do or how to act and in which direction? No! What would own power be without interaction with some external power that open possibility for own power to act in some specific way? Maybe some diffusive tension, but that tension, which strives to be realized, couldn't be realized without interaction. In another words, considering own power in causal isolation and without interaction can be only some sort of thought experiment. It is true that everything, including man, has its basic dynamism from inside (as a specific expression of divine essence

27 GREETIS, Edward Andrew. **Spinoza's Rejection**..., op. cit., pp. 31-32.

which is pure power),<sup>28</sup> but this dynamism can be realized and can produce some effect only through interaction with external things (their essences and powers). Human passions are co-caused (and in that sense paired) with external things: “The essence of a passive emotion cannot be explicated through own essence alone” (E4P5Dm). Something is explicable only taking in consideration its cause. If our passions are explicable not only through our own essence but through our essence and essence of external thing, then our passions are caused by our essence and essence of external thing.

To conclude, representational properties of ideas cannot be neglected when it is about their causal powers because causal powers of ideas arise from the constitution of body as it is determined after being affected by external things. Ideas, when express constitution of their bodies, express their particular affection after interaction with external things. On that affection depends man’s behavior. Specific affection depends on specific natures of external things. The constitution of body must be, in order to be determined for action, concretized quantitatively and qualitatively and such a concretization is achieved solely through interaction with external things (including future states or events) which have specific power depending on their specific nature. In that sense, the proper essence or power acts in synergy with external essences and because of that we can – and must – say that own power is *paired* with external powers. The outcome of that synergy is readiness for action since such an action is directed towards concrete effect because the body’s constitution itself, from which action receives its basic impetus, is concretized.

#### D) THE ISSUE OF SCIENTIFIC AND ENLIGHTENMENT REASONS

As for scientific reasons which Spinoza adduce against human teleology, we can say that the question of how much the whole Nature acts according to formal and efficient causes is essentially connected with issue of how much naturalism is solid as doctrine. Naturalism is, of course, important doctrine that Spinoza promotes, but we can rightly ask is

28 “a thing does not receive any of its causal powers externally” (GREETIS, Edward Andrew. **Spinoza’s Rejection**..., op. cit., p. 31).

such a doctrine realizable in such a radical form as our philosopher believed it was possible. Is the approach, which stresses only formal and efficient causes, applicable completely on human behavior? Man’s endeavor to preserve in being and to increase his power of acting – by imagining future states and through belief that they will contribute to his pleasure – only shows that the project of radical naturalism is hardly realizable and that a man still stands as “a kingdom within a kingdom”.

As for enlightenment reasons, we cannot adduce strict philosophical counter-arguments since they are motivated by Spinoza’s humanistic-enlightening endeavor. Spinoza tried to help people not to suffer from passions upheld through prejudices promoted by theologians. The fear of future punishment or hope in future reward are probably the strongest passions which don’t allow men to breath freely in this life and make them subjected to religious authorities. The fear of hell and hope in heaven can be eliminated if men are persuaded that they don’t act guided by some end but starting from actual constitution. Against those passions, Spinoza fought not only by means of his antiteleology but by means of other doctrines too: deanthropomorphized God who cannot be “judge”; necessitarianism which excludes freedom and moral responsibility; doctrine of mind’s “eternity”, according to which human mind doesn’t survive its body. Spinoza tried to enlighten his readers helping them to get know the whole Nature, their true place in it and what they can expect and hope for.

#### e) Teleological interpretation of *conatus perseverandi*

Although *conatus perseverandi* is the basic moving force of man’s acting, that strive for self-preservation is basic characteristic of every thing and not only men. But things differ in a way how they realize their *conatus perseverandi*. Man’s specificity consists in that that he can realize his *conatus* imagining different future states that can more or less successfully help him in satisfying his basic striving. Exactly through this imagining future states as ends he manifests his superiority in comparison to other things. Thanks to his intellect, he developed different sciences and knowledges and he can most effectively apply them if he foresees some

desirable future state and knows how to achieve desired future state using different means. So, man can imagine future states and value them by criterion which one will be more useful to him for his self-preservation.

However, when imagining future desirable states as possible – one of which he puts as most desirable end and acts according to that end – he presents himself as acting like “a kingdom within a kingdom”. The problem is not only that man in that way oversteps the boundary of strict naturalism but such an action is hardly compatible with necessitarianism. Namely, if Spinoza says that in future is possible only one state because the actual constitution of reality allows only one future state, then imagining and believing that something will happen implies contingency, which is incompatible with strict spinozistic necessitarianism. Belief has not only epistemic aspect in a sense that we don't know what will actually happen in future but also ethical aspect in a sense that we believe that this or that future state will help us in realization of our *conatus*. Belief is, in this context, very important but also very controversial element which we should discuss in detail.

Spinoza doesn't speak systematically of possibility of belief's fitting with his system but he is aware of the fact that belief or imagining is inevitable component of man's behavior:

We endeavor to bring about whatever we imagine to be conducive to pleasure; but we endeavor to remove or destroy whatever we imagine to be opposed to pleasure and conducive to pain. (E3P28).

It can be seen, from this important proposition, that our acting is based primarily on our striving to gain pleasure and remove pain. In this process, we imagine (*imaginamur*) or believe that something will be conducive to pleasure. It can also be seen that man's acting is directed toward particular end (increasing pleasure and destroying pain) and that in this sense it is not, and cannot be, neutral regarding its directedness.

The source of our belief is the lack of knowledge of ourselves and external things that affect us. We don't know the whole network of causes and effects and cannot but guess what will happen. When the mind conceives

external things through its body, it can have only inadequate knowledge because it conceives them in a manner how they affect our body and not what they are in themselves. Then, the mind doesn't have adequate knowledge about its body because it conceives it in specific constellation which depends on a way how it is affected by external things. Particular affectedness of own body is always result of fortuitous encounter of our body and external bodies. Adequate knowledge consists in finding some common and stable elements in all things and not in being dependent on fortuitous affections of our body.

If we talk about man's acting directed to some future state which is un/desirable for him, it is important to stress that he cannot have adequate knowledge about this future state. Such a state will, by itself, happen in a determined way but man doesn't have introspection in causal network responsible for realization of that future state which is the only one possible. He can, with his adequate knowledge, have only introspection in general and common constitution of things but not the introspection whether this constitution will lead to the concrete future state that would be useful to him. As the highest form of the knowledge, Spinoza defines intuitive knowledge and “this kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things” (E2P40S2). This kind of knowledge is adequate insofar as every essence is conceived in its being caused by formal essence of some divine attribute, but it doesn't help man to know some future state.

So, a man finds himself in an unenviable situation: on one side, he is pushed to do something that will help him in his self-preservation and increasing his power of action and, on the other side, he doesn't know whether some of his action will bring about desired future state which he imagines to be useful to him. It means that his action cannot be but action based on belief that something will happen that is useful to him. When he “imagines” such a future state, he can only endeavor to make it happen or not to happen. Even if he has true directives (through the reason's commandments), he has to use inadequate knowledge for fulfillment

of those directives.<sup>29</sup> If intellect tells us, for example, that we have to strive for something that is really useful to us, all we can do is to apply, through inadequate knowledge and according to specific circumstances, some means for implementation of that general directive. Or, if our reason tells us that we should be close to rational people who we can imitate, we still have to evaluate whether somebody is rational in a sense that he can be our example how to develop love towards God. In this evaluation, we have to rely on previous experience which can be useful (cf. E4App27) although it is gained through fortuitous interaction with external things. Regardless of how much belief based on inadequate knowledge can be imperfect means for realization of our *conatus perseverandi*, the fact is that it contributes to the teleological interpretation of man's *conatus* and not to the non-teleological one.

Useful distinction of formulas of striving for self-preservation offers Bennett who expresses non-teleological formula as follows: "If he does it, it will help him"; and teleological formula he expresses as follows: "If it would help him, he will do it".<sup>30</sup> The first formula stresses the actual man's constitution responsible for his doing something that will help him to preserve in being and increase the power of acting. Spinoza, in the beginning, puts his doctrine of *conatus perseverandi* in a clear non-teleological sense. After having stated that "Each thing, insofar as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being" (E3P6), he identifies very soon *conatus* with actual essence of thing (cf. E3P7) and interprets the acting of a thing in an essentialistic sense: "From the given essence of a thing certain things necessarily follow... nor do things effect anything other than that which necessarily follows from their determinate nature" (E3P7Dm). Here we still don't find mention of consciousness and its role in realizing *conatus*. Also, the speech about *conatus perseverandi* up to this moment is general and can easily fit within naturalistic conception insofar as the behavior of everything can be explained in sense of its essence and

what follows from it. If we recall Bennett's non-teleological formula, we can say that everything does what follows from its nature and will help it in its self-preservation.

However, the "twist" begins with E3P9 when Spinoza introduces the element typical of human striving for self-preservation: consciousness. Namely, man has not only this striving but consciousness thereof too: desire (cf. E3P9S). In the beginning, Spinoza treats this consciousness in a way that the mind, with its ideas, shares the same fate of its body when it passes to greater or lesser perfection (cf. E3P11 and S). However, in Spinoza's treatment of man's *conatus* there shows up a new element: the mind is not treated anymore as the one which passively shares the fate of his body but as the man's constitutive part which takes initiative in achieving greater perfection: "The mind, as far as it can, endeavors to think of those things that increase or assist the body's power of activity" (E3P12). This different statements in Spinoza's doctrine of *conatus* can be seen as stages in a process of teleologization which culminates in Spinoza's proposition:

We endeavor to bring about whatever we imagine to be conducive to pleasure; but we endeavor to remove or destroy whatever we imagine to be opposed to pleasure and conducive to pain. (E3P28).

Self-preservation is not seen any more as mere striving by which man doesn't differ from other things but as an *end* which is he conscious of (together with the means necessary for achieving that end) and which he tries to achieve through belief. In another words, man acts focused on the effect of his acting, which doesn't mean that there is no moving force that "pushes" him from behind but the accent is on some future state that, in the first place, makes it possible that that "pushing" happens because it shows desired direction in which it would be useful to act. Man is, of course, driven to do something that will preserve his being and will increase his power of acting, but first he has to evaluate what will help him and to focus on end and means necessary for achieving desired future state. If the whole story was exhausted only in acting from his actual constitution, that is, in a way of acting only efficiently, then it would be difficult (or impossible) find the best

29 Cf. KISNER, Matthew J. **Spinoza on Human Freedom.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 189-190.

30 BENNETT, Jonathan. **A Study**..., op. cit., p. 244.

direction for realization of *conatus*. Or, we can put the question: how would man, anyway, realize his *conatus* if he is not aware of consequences his action will lead to? How would he differ from other inhuman and inferior things? If he has on disposition higher level of knowledge and consciousness, then he is supposed to act using those capabilities. Even more, he is obliged to use those capabilities in order to act the best way he can, or to realize his *conatus* in the most effective way. If he, in this process, can be helped by focusing on some future state for which he believes to fulfill in best way his basic striving, then he “must” act that way.

Moreover, don't fit within such a context of superior or more efficacious self-preservation two very important (but controversial too!) elements contained in his central proposition about *conatus perseverandi*: “as far as he can” and “tries”? These two expressions from EIII, P6 we can understand in a sense that man is abandoned to himself and his powers, capabilities and means that he has on disposition to preserve his being and increase his power of acting. If one of those capabilities is that of conscious imagining of end and means necessary for obtaining it, than he has to use it, because that is the only way he can promote his self-preservation and increase his power of acting as far as he can.

Belief is not connected with *conatus* only in a manner that we saw so far but it is present in other aspects of human behavior as well although all of them spring from this basic *conatus*. Spinoza defines love as “pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause” (E3P13S). This external cause is responsible for man to feel some pleasure and that is why man loves it. However, there are also possible situations in which it suffice to imagine or believe that the beloved thing is destroyed to feel pain, and vice-versa: “He who imagines that what he loves is being destroyed will feel pain. If, however, he imagines that it is being preserved, he will feel pleasure” (E3P19). So, Spinoza teaches that mere belief in existing external thing of which we think that makes pleasure to us is enough for us to feel that pleasure. We should remember that pleasure means increasing the power. But, it seems that in that way man creates some parallel world which perhaps doesn't coincide with the real

one. Such a treatment of pleasure and pain is hardly compatible with naturalistic context on which Spinoza otherwise insists, or “he does not provide, and does not clearly have the resources to provide, a naturalistic account of belief”.<sup>31</sup> Let's imagine someone with very strange sense of humor who tells me that one person, very dear to me, died. Let's imagine that I believed him because I could not find out no sign that would foster my suspicion. There arises in me pain which is caused by what? Objective event or my subjective belief? It seems that belief corrupts Spinoza's naturalism insofar as other things don't feel pleasure or pain on basis of their imagining but on basis of some real cause.

It is interesting enough to see the connection between psychological mechanism of anticipation and belief. We can say that doctrine of anticipation is the strongest Spinoza's weapon, within psychology, against human teleology because he explains, with this doctrine, the future ends departing from actual man's constitution which projects in future some end that should be realized in order to increase pleasure and diminish pain. If imagining some future state provokes the present pleasure of anticipation then this present pleasure – and not the future pleasure – will work as factor moving man to act. Spinoza tries to gain, in that way, immediateness of cause and effect taking care of direction of causing, that is, from the present to the future. But, how the present pleasure arises anyway? By imagining some future state that I evaluate as un/pleasant after which in me arises pleasure or pain which moves me to action. In another words, “projection” works after I have imagined some future state that can be “end” projected from my actual constitution. If I take medicine today because I expect or believe that I'll avoid tomorrow's pain, than taking medicine is caused by present pain developed through anticipation of tomorrow's pain, but the present pain would not have arisen if I had not imagined tomorrow's anticipated pain. So, the present pleasure or pain of anticipation exists and can move to action only through belief or expecting. But we can find out that some belief is not justified.<sup>32</sup>

31 DELLARocca, Michael. **Spinoza's metaphysical...**, op. cit., p. 222.

32 Cf. BENNETT, Jonathan. **A Study...**, op. cit., pp. 216-218.

Belief is also indispensable in another psychological mechanism: imitation (cf. E3P23 and 27). Spinoza teaches us that for existing in us some emotion it suffices to imagine other men who are affected by that emotion. Of course, we can be completely wrong when evaluating other men and their emotions. If Spinoza invites us to imitate men who developed adequate knowledge and love for God, then he also invites us to use inadequate knowledge because only that way can we judge other men to be really in a state which we imagine they are in.

Belief is, epistemologically speaking, inferior to adequate knowledge but it is indispensable in many man's behaviors. Moreover, belief can sometimes directly help man to preserve his being and increase the power of acting. If we have to be subjected to dangerous and difficult operation of heart, we have to believe that doctor is sufficiently qualified and that he really wants to help us. Or, if we walk through some area and find the sign: "Attention, mines!", we'll probably save our lives by believing that there are indeed mines on that area.

As for human teleology, I think that belief and imagining calls for teleological explanation of *conatus perseverandi* because it stresses consciousness and intentionality in directing man's acting. I think that teleological approach best explains very important issue of directedness of human acting, at least in some important cases of human life. In order to be able to evaluate teleological approach, let's see first the other two approaches.

Inertial model of human acting relies on the model of mechanical physics according to which scientists interpret moving of bodies in physical realm. According to this model, bodies move rectilinearly without stopping unless some other body acts on them and changes their direction, speed or stops them. Or, if bodies are in rest they try, by themselves, stay in that state. In that sense, J. Carriero describes Spinoza's understanding of acting as follows:

The main idea behind Spinoza's account of agency is to take the picture he finds in simple situations in the new science and to apply it systematically. Simple bodies, when not interfered with by other bodies, just continue to do what they are already doing through a metaphysical inertia.

Their motive tendencies are not structured about ends.<sup>33</sup>

According to inertial model, when it is applied to mind's area, man's ideas possess mental inertia to remain in actual form of existence.<sup>34</sup>

Problem of directedness of man's acting is resolved here by starting from man's moving tendency. When it is accompanied with consciousness, we try to confirm it and this confirmation amounts to belief that where this tendency leads us is – good. This understanding of "good" Spinoza actually promotes when he says that we strive for something not because we judge it as good but we judge it as good because we strive for it. In other words, evaluation of good is accommodated to basic tendency, not vice-versa. In that way, the primacy of efficient cause is confirmed while final cause appears to be some kind of fiction based on projection and imagining where that tendency would lead us.

In comparison to inertial model, essentialistic model stresses more the specific essence of something, and this essence should be conceived in its basic reality: it is power. As we know, Spinoza builds his ontology starting from God as the unique substance which is unlimited power of being and acting. This power is concretized and expressed through different modes every one of which is specific exemplification of divine essence. Like the source of every God's causal acting is his essence, the source of every thing's acting is its essence.

According to essentialism, *conatus perseverandi* should be interpreted in sense that everything tends to realize fully its essence and not merely stay in a state in which it actually exists. We can find here great difference in comparison with inertial model. There is difference in one other important aspect too: this model is more suitable for explanation of thing's acting in context of its inevitable interaction with other things, while inertial model is more suitable for explanation of thing's acting in its causal isolation.<sup>35</sup>

33 I take this quotation from: VILJANEN, Valtteri. **Spinoza's Dynamics**..., op. cit., p. 172.

34 Cf. VILJANEN, Valtteri. **Spinoza's Dynamics**..., op. cit., p. 173.

35 Cf. VILJANEN, Valtteri. **Spinoza's Dynamics**..., op. cit., p. 227.

As for direction of acting, essentialism teaches that something will realize its essence in direction where it finds least resistance and avoids teleological directedness of acting. Viljanen, the proponent of this mode, admits – in his excellent book on dynamism in Spinoza’s metaphysics – that every action, to be realized, must be directed in some direction, but it doesn’t mean that it must have an end toward which it will act: “Any power needs a direction; but it does not need a *telos*, nor does Spinoza think it would”.<sup>36</sup> He applies such a interpretative scheme to man and he tries to resolve the problem of directedness of his man’s acting by using analogy with water masses and river dam: river flows in direction in which it encounters the least resistance.<sup>37</sup> Similarly, man’s acting is directed where it encounters the least resistance or maximum help in its basic striving to realize his essence. In that context, pleasure and pain show which direction gives bigger or lesser resistance.

What about man’s acting through belief? Viljanen first offers explanatory scheme applicable to the action of every thing: “If, of the options available to X, A causes most pleasure to X, X strives to do or maintain A” and then – in cases of man’s acting through belief – offers scheme: “If, of the images present to X, I causes most pleasure to X, X strives to attain A”.<sup>38</sup> Exactly in case of man’s acting, when it is realized through imagining something that brings to man the most pleasure, Viljanen is ready to allow teleological explanation of such action:

if we define teleology as a style of explanation in which events are explained by their (presumptive) effects, it is obviously possible, based on aforesaid, to construct teleological action explanation.<sup>39</sup>

However, Viljanen promptly claims that it would be mistake to consider Spinoza as declared teleologist since he believed it was possible to realize thoroughly reductionistic program or to reduce the statements containing

teleological expressions into ones that don’t contain them. Viljanen also believes that teleological explanation of man’s acting is not suitable and complete and instead of it he offers the one arising from his essentialism:

If we know (1) X’s essence and what follows from it alone, (2) that X strives against any opposition to fully realize its essence, (3) that X directs its power to where it is least resisted (or least sorrow is felt), (4) what is X’s prevailing state or constitution, and (5) in what circumstances must X operate, we are in position to provide adequate explanations and predictions of X’s actions.<sup>40</sup>

The advantage of such a model Viljanen sees in that that in this way we respect ontological order of things, since “The essence is always ontologically prior and the cause, its effects (that which we strive to bring about, often falsely called ends) are ontologically posterior”.<sup>41</sup>

In the same manner, the existence of something that we consider good depends on essence’s constitution. Here we can see a parallel with Descartes’ conception of God who by his own will determines or sets “good”. So, as something is good because God chose it (it is not chosen by God because it is good in itself) in the same way – in man’s case – “good” is such because it arises from human essence’s constitution and it is not the case that man’s essence should adjust to some “objectively” determined good.

When we talk about the problem of directedness of man’s acting, particularity of teleological model lays in putting accent on conscious and intentional acting, which is directed to some end and is mediated through belief. It is of crucial importance to show whether man realizes or not his *conatus*, at least in some cases, by acting with ends (some future state that is un/desirable for him) in view. In order to show validity of this model it is necessary put forward some comparative advantages in comparison to two aforementioned models.

As for inertial model, it seems that it has two basic defects. First, it is suitable for

36 VILJANEN, Valtteri. **Spinoza’s Dynamics...**, op. cit., p. 242.

37 Cf. VILJANEN, Valtteri. **Spinoza’s Dynamics...**, op. cit., p. 233.

38 VILJANEN, Valtteri. **Spinoza’s Dynamics...**, op. cit., p. 238.

39 Ibid.

40 VILJANEN, Valtteri. **Spinoza’s Dynamics...**, op. cit., p. 240.

41 VILJANEN, Valtteri. **Spinoza’s Dynamics...**, op. cit., p. 243.

explanation of things in causal isolation. Or, if we talk after all about interaction among things (physical digression after E2P13) here we have simple physical bodies that cannot be compared, by the complexity of their constitution, with man. Man is, as complex spiritual-corporeal unity, always in hardly understandable and predictable interaction with other things and we must take in account this fact when talking about man's action or passion. Man's being free from interaction with other things is only thought experiment:

if it were possible for man to undergo no changes except those which can be understood solely through his own nature, it would follow ... that he cannot perish but would always necessarily exist. (E4P4Dm).

The man's complexity, which is far bigger than that of simple, inanimate and unconscious physical thing, presupposes far complex interaction with external things, with consequence that man is affected by external things in much more complex way than simple physical things.

Then, insofar as we have – in inertial model – claim about retaining the state in which some body actually exists, that could create problem when interpreting man's acting. Namely, man not only tries to remain in his existence but he also tries to increase his power/perfection/freedom/activity. Even if this power's increasing essentially is in function of self-preservation, it is undeniable phenomenon that can hardly fit within inertial model. Man's mind not only tries "to think of those things that increase or assist the body's power of activity" (E3P12) but also tries to act that way (cf. E3P28).

As for essentialist model, it takes into account bigger complexity of man's constitution<sup>42</sup> and the fact that man strives for increasing his power, because it is about "idea, fundamental for the dynamics of our emotions".<sup>43</sup> In the same manner, we can say that this model respects radically the basic ontological premises of spinozism insofar as it tries to explain man's acting in the same way as divine acting. Namely,

42 Cf. VILJANEN, Valtteri. **Spinoza's Dynamics**..., op. cit., p. 226.

43 VILJANEN, Valtteri. **Spinoza's Dynamics**..., op. cit., p. 225.

if the divine essence is the only acting thing and this thing doesn't act for some purpose, then neither man can act for some purpose. If man is expression of the divine essence, then his action must have antiteleological structure like the divine one. If divine essence, which is power, acts through formal and efficient causes, than man acts that way too.

However, I find problematic the way how man's behavior – according to essentialism – should be explained. To be able to offer proper and full explanation of man's behavior, we should first have to know man's essence and what follows from it.<sup>44</sup> Does Spinoza offer useful information about man's essence in view of man's acting? Let's look first some definitions and descriptions that Spinoza gives.

First of all, man's essence is "constituted by definite modifications of the attributes of God" (E2P10C), or man consists of modes which express God's nature in determined way (cf. E1P25C). Man's mind is idea of his body and this body is complex individuum which retains his specific identity as long as his constitutive parts "preserve the same mutual relation of motion-and-rest as before" (E2P13Ax3Lemma5), where retaining of aforementioned relation means retaining its nature. Man's nature realizes itself, in concrete life, through *conatus* and this one is shaped through interaction with external and fortuitous things. Exactly this interaction and its results (the concrete man's constitution determined for action) are hardly knowable because we don't have adequate knowledge nor of ourselves, nor of external bodies, nor of the results of interaction of our body with other bodies. So, can we know what will be man's acting in some particular situation? Viljanen responds that man will act – like river's masses – in a direction where he finds least resistance. But what exactly direction is that? If we don't (and can't) know ourselves and external things and if we don't know relevant network of causes and effects, then we can't know the directedness of our action in a concrete situation. We could only state *a posteriori* that man acted in this direction because there he found least resistance. I think that teleological model has

44 Cf. VILJANEN, Valtteri. **Spinoza's Dynamics**..., op. cit., p. 240.

advantage when, stressing the conscious and intentional imagining of desirable future state, better explains why the action went in this and not in that direction.

When we try to resolve this problem, of course, we have to take into account man's ontological position in causal set-up of the whole Nature. The only causes that Spinoza allows in this Nature are formal and efficient ones. However, when we try to explain the concrete man's action then it seems that formal and efficient causal scheme is not sufficient. We can (and must) talk about man as efficient cause insofar as we consider the basic moving force that pushes him to act, but this moving force is quantitatively-qualitatively determined through the result of his interaction with other things. How this moving force is actually determined we see by its effects realized by action which is always directed in some direction. Desire, which move to action, doesn't mean only consciousness of appetite but consciousness of some external thing or future state which, through imagining and belief, co-determine this desire. Desire makes it possible conscious striving toward some end and only through this striving, actualized by being directed towards some future end, we can best see what was this desire like. Insofar it is right to appeal to final causes in order to explain concrete man's acts.

The probable difficulty (or impossibility) to explain man's realization of *conatus* only in inertial or essentialistic manner made Spinoza to "teleologize" his central doctrine of *conatus perseverandi*. This teleologization begins with E3P7 and culminate in E3P28. The fact that Spinoza transfers initiative, when it is about directing man's action, to mind and not to man as whole (mind and body) additionally confirms teleological model which stresses acting and initiative of mind and not of man as whole (or body alone). If the problem of directedness of man's acting can be best resolved by teleological model, it must be preferred. In the same manner, if acting, guided by end, assures more efficaciously persevering in being and increasing of power then man "must" act that way otherwise he wouldn't do his best: he wouldn't use all possible means he has on disposition when affirming his essence; he wouldn't act as far as he can.

Teleological model has advantage in all cases of complex and important man's behavior when it is crucial for him to pick up the right and best direction. We spoke of building house, but let's consider another example: young man Tomislav wants, after high school, to study something. His first choice is philosophy but he is also interested in management. Then he starts to think about other issues important to him: he would like to make as much money as possible because he wants to live in a big house; he wants to drive good car; he wants to have some house on a coast for summer holiday; he wants to have enough money to be able to pay expensive schools for his children etc. And here comes troubles: if specialization in philosophy doesn't assure all those benefits, he will decide to study management although his biggest love is philosophy. In this and many other important life situations man has to ponder about various possible future states that are relevant to him. He has to evaluate and compare what future state would most efficaciously assure him self-preservation and increasing of power. He has to evaluate which means he has on disposition to achieve some of desirable state. It doesn't mean that man will in every situation act that way (sometimes he will act by inertia, sometimes in direction where he finds least resistance), but he will certainly do his best to realize his *conatus* – when it is about complex and important issues of his life – in most efficacious manner. If thinking of possible and desirable future states and means for achieving them helps him to do what is most useful to him, he is obliged to act teleologically because only in this way he does what he truly can. Finally, isn't he superior to other beings exactly by this capability to hold on and ponder, in complex and important life situations, about different possible future outcomes, instead of acting instinctively or being guided by principle of choosing direction where he finds least resistance?



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